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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis explores the ways in which civil and uncivil groups in Northern Ireland use 
the Internet to generate soft power. This research assesses whether the Internet creates a 
critical multiplier effect for marginal groups, such as terrorists and interface 
communities. A coding scheme, adapted from previous studies of political part websites, 
is used to determine whether these groups have realised the potential of the Internet as a 
tool for political mobilisation. The dissertation considers whether there are any 
qualitative differences between the online framing of terrorist-linked parties and the 
constitutional parties in the region. The phenomenon of amateur terrorism is also 
analysed through the lens of Loyalist and Republican solidarity actors. The analysis 
determines whether solidarity actors were more likely to justify political violence on their 
websites than their respective political fronts. In addition, the websites of rival residents’ 
groups are examined to determine whether the Internet can help generate social capital 
across sectarian interfaces. The analysis determines whether residents’ groups use the 
Web to strengthen in-group identities, or to engage in dialogue with rival interface 
communities. In doing so, the research tests the cyberoptimist assertion that the Internet 
will facilitate forms of communication that undermine unequal power relations within 
nation-states. The online audience for Northern Irish terrorists is modelled using Internet 
usage patterns and the ranking systems used by Internet search engines. Internet usage 
patterns are examined to define the potential audience available to Northern Irish 
terrorists via their websites. The study suggests that there is little to differentiate between 
the websites of terrorist-linked groups, such as Sinn Fein, and the websites of 
constitutional parties, such as the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). In 
contrast, Loyalist and Republican amateurs often use paramilitary insignias on their 
websites to demonstrate their opposition to the peace process. However, these websites 
do not constitute a new dimension of terrorist threat to the peace process. Analysis of 
residents’ group websites suggests that they further the competition of ‘victimhoods’ 
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between Loyalist and Republican interface communities. Both sides use their web 
presence to claim that they were constantly under threat of attack from the community 
situated at the other side of the ‘peaceline.’ Moreover, the thesis suggests that there will 
be a limited online audience for both civil and uncivil actors in Northern Ireland. The 
online audience for these actors is likely to consist of Internet users who use the Web for 
political research and Loyalist and Republican supporters in the ‘offline’ world. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This thesis presents an analysis of how the Internet may be used to redefine the 
boundaries of civil society in contemporary nation-states, using Northern Ireland as its 
case study. While most recent studies have tended to focus upon how Islamic 
fundamentalists have used the Web (see Conway, 2006 Weinmann, 2004), there has been 
little research on how the Internet is used by terrorist organisations during a period of 
conflict transformation. This dissertation will investigate how terrorists engaged in a 
peace process use the Internet to generate soft power, as they seek to demonstrate their 
democratic credentials to online audiences. In addition, the cyberoptimist assertion that 
terrorism may be solvable if its perpetrators are given greater opportunity – via the 
Internet - to propagate their political ideologies will be analysed. To this effect, the 
potential of the Internet as a tool for organisational linkage and mobilisation will be 
examined. The thesis addresses these research issues by analysing the websites of 
Loyalist and Republicans in 2004 and 2005. This case study is pertinent to the discussion 
of terrorist soft power due to the paramilitary ceasefires which facilitated the Good 
Friday Agreement (1998). Arguably, the peace process legitimised terrorist-linked parties 
such as Sinn Fein, who in turn have acheived unprecedented electoral success since the 
late nineties. Thus, soft power has arguably become integral to the campaigns of 
Northern Irish terrorists who had previously perpetrated political violence to advance 
their political objectives. However, not all Northern Irish terrorist organisations have 
supported the peace process. Dissident groups on both sides continue to use both political 
violence and party politics to pursue their objectives. Conceivably, these groups may be 
using the Internet to justify their terrorist campaigns. In this thesis, an Internet coding 
framework, developed from previous studies of political party websites such as Gibson 
and Ward (2000), will be used to analyse the framing and function of these websites. The 
analysis considers how the online framing of terrorist-linked groups differs from the 
framing of civil society groups in post-conflict Northern Ireland. The function of these 
websites will be examined to assess the extent to which civil and uncivil groups have 
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realised the potential of the Internet as a tool for political communication.  
 
TERRORIST USES OF THE INTERNET 
 
Cyberterrorism 
 
In this thesis, the potential of the Internet as a propaganda tool for terrorists will be 
examined. Authors such as Denning (2000) suggest that information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) provide a new medium through which the terrorist can attack the 
nation-state. As nation-states increasingly use ICTs to store and disseminate information, 
these information systems represent potential targets for terrorist actors. This has 
arguably led to a new form of terrorism in cyberspace, namely cyberterrorism. 
Cyberterrorism can be defined as “the unlawful attacks and threat of attacks on 
computers, networks and information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a 
government or its people in furtherance of political objectives” (Denning, 2000:1). So far, 
only a few terrorist organisations, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
have engaged in cyber-terrorism.1 In 1996, LTTE e-bombs simultaneously hit several Sri 
Lankan diplomatic missions, creating a ‘virtual blockade’ (Zanini and Edwards, 2001: 
44). The paralysis of the Sri Lankan missions marked a significant propaganda coup for 
the LTTE insurgents.   
 
Overall, the methods used by ‘cyber-criminals’ [hackers] and ‘cyber-terrorists’ [terrorists 
on the Internet] appear similar. Both hackers and terrorists manipulate the content of 
popular websites to gain publicity. Personal messages and cartoon graphics are the most 
popular calling cards used by these ‘cyber-vandals.’2 So far, terrorists appear to lack the 
necessary skills to hack into the websites of government agencies. There have been no 
recorded instances of a terrorist cyberattack on nation-states such as the United States 
(Weinmann, 2005: 143). Nevertheless, nation-states invariably fail to differentiate 
between terrorists and cyber-criminals when discussing issues like the threat of cyber-
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terrorism. It is arguably politically expedient for nation-states to assert that terrorists are 
responsible for all hacking incidents online, as the public will be unlikely to oppose 
restrictions on Internet freedoms if they believe that the Web is a “haven for perverts and 
terrorists” (Moore, 1999: 42). Consequently, cyberterrorism receives more headlines in 
the conventional mass media than the covert utility of email, or bulletin boards, by 
terrorist actors. The research presented in this thesis will focus on how terrorists use the 
Internet to support their activities in the offline world, rather than the threat of 
cyberterrorism.  
 
The thesis presents an analysis of the extent to which Northern Irish terrorists, and their 
supporters, use their websites to generate soft power in post-conflict Northern Ireland.3 
Soft power is the “ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to 
adopt your goals (Nye, 2004: 5). The dissertation will consider what function Loyalist 
and Republican websites fulfill for their respective groups, and whether this differs from 
the terrorist uses of the Internet identified in previous studies. As Conway (2006) 
suggests, there appears to be a consensus amongst authors who have studied how 
terrorists use information and communication technologies (ICTs). Authors such as 
Cohen (2002), Thomas (2003), and Furnell and Warren (1999) have identified broadly 
similar terrorist uses of the Internet, such as the dissemination of propaganda, 
fundraising, and the planning of atrocities. In addition, Weinmann (2004) identified other 
core terrorist uses of the Internet, such as data mining and information sharing, in an 
article entitled WWW.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism uses the Internet. A synthesis of 
these studies suggests that there are five core terrorist uses of the Internet, namely 
publicity and propaganda, planning and coordination, data mining and information 
sharing, mobilisation and fundraising, and networking. In this thesis, the websites of 
Loyalists and Republicans will be analysed to determine whether these actors are using 
the Web for these purposes. 
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Publicity and Propaganda 
 
Authors such as Weinmann (2004) and Cohen (2002) suggest that terrorists depict 
themselves as freedom fighters on their websites, in an effort to counter their violent 
image (p.6). In this thesis, the online framing of Loyalist and Republicans will be 
examined to determine whether they use their websites to circumvent the ideological 
refractions of the mass media. Conway (2003) suggests that the Internet allows terrorists 
to wage cybercortical warfare, a form of conflict conducted against minds to change the 
will of an enemy (Szafranski, 1997: 404). There is already some evidence to suggest that 
terrorists are using the Internet to “claim that their enemy is the real terrorist” 
(Weinmann, 2004: 3). Ethno-nationalist terrorist organisations often use their websites to 
discredit their critics and define themselves as members of civil society. Thus, emotive 
words like “freedom fighter” and “state oppression” often permeate the solidarity 
websites of terrorist organisations such as the Basque separatists, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
(ETA).4 In addition, terrorist organisations often seek publicity to further their 
psychological war against a target population. This may take the form of statements, 
released on the Internet, that are designed to intimidate a target audience. For example, 
terrorists have used the Internet to release images of their hostages to the conventional 
mass media. One such video, released on a number of Islamist websites in February 
2002, showed the beheading of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.5 In the video, 
Pearl states his captors’ demands to the camera, calling for the immediate end of the US 
presence in Pakistan.6 Subsequent to the Pearl video, jihadist groups have posted videos 
of other hostages being executed, including British contractor Ken Bigley and American 
entrepreneur Nick Berg (Conway, 2006:11).  
 
Research into how terrorists use the Internet has tended to focus on the content of these 
online communications rather than its likely recipients. While terrorists do appear to be 
using the Internet to generate their own propaganda, they must attract an online audience 
  
 
 
 5 
   
 
if these messages are to intimidate a target population. In the case of Daniel Pearl, the 
extensive media coverage of his kidnapping may have led many people to search for the 
video of his execution on the Internet. This suggests that the online framing of terrorists 
may only influence public opinion if reported in the conventional mass media. As 
Conway points out, Hizbollah’s ‘cybercortical’ campaign only came to prominence in 
1999, when a news report about mangled remains of slain Israelis published on a 
Hizbollah website caused a political row between the Israeli Defence Force and the 
families of several murdered Israeli marines (p.13).7 There is limited evidence to suggest 
that Hizbollah’s efforts to attract an American audience to their website during this 
period proved successful, despite the provision of English language facility on the three 
main Hizbollah websites (p.11). This research directly addresses the issue of who visits 
‘pro-terrorist’ websites, using Northern Irish terrorists as its case study. In chapter 4, the 
online audience for terrorists will be analysed by looking at Internet usage patterns in 
Europe and North America, as well as the factors that influence the accessibility of a 
‘pro-terrorist’ website on the Internet. This will determine whether Loyalist and 
Republican websites are likely to reach an audience beyond their core supporters.  
 
Planning and Coordination 
 
Authors such as Weinmann (2004) suggest that the Internet is an ideal arena for the 
planning of terrorist activity, as it offers cheap anonymous communication. Security 
sources believe that some terrorists use a single email account for intra-group 
communication, with the password and username of an email provided to each member 
of the group. Messages between group members are saved as draft rather than sent to 
another email account, to be deleted once read by the recipient (Hinnen, 2005: 39). This 
leaves no communication transaction that can be recorded by the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP). Terrorists already appear to be using ICTs to plan and perpetrate 
atrocities. Evidence gathered from a laptop belonging to Ramzi Yousef, the terrorist 
responsible for the failed 1993 World Trade Centre attack, showed that there were 
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itemized plans to destroy a number of U.S airliners on the same day (Eid, 2006: 8). There 
is also some evidence to suggest that Northern Irish terrorists may be using the Internet to 
plan and perpetrate atrocities. Loyalist terror groups such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters 
(UFF) have used the websites of their affiliates to identify potential targets. In March 
2001, the Belfast Telegraph reported that a message on an ‘Ulster Loyalist’ website 
directed members of the Limavady UFF to attack a bar allegedly frequented by members 
of the Provisional IRA.8 Although this particular example came to the attention of the 
press, the scale of such covert utility of the Internet is difficult to assess. In chapter 3, the 
websites of dissident Loyalist and Republicans will be examined to determine whether 
these groups are also using the Web to plan and perpetrate terrorist atrocities.   
 
Data Mining and sharing information 
 
Terrorists also use the Internet to obtain information on potential targets and share 
techniques with like-minded individuals. There is already some evidence to suggest that 
terrorists are using publicly available information to plan and coordinate atrocities. An Al 
Qaeda training manual, recovered in Afghanistan in 2002, stated that its operatives could 
gather ‘at least 80 percent of information about the enemy through public sources.’9 
Terrorists may also share information with other terrorists online. For example, the 
Global Islamic Media Front offered a ‘degree in jihad’ to Internet users who visited its 
website in 2005. The webmaster offered specialization in “electronic media, spiritual and 
financial jihad” (Ariza, 2005: 1). The evidence presented at the trial of the men 
responsible for the Madrid train bombings in March 2004 suggests that other jihadist 
groups are using the Internet for research and information sharing. One of the attackers 
was shown to have downloading a document entitled ‘Jihadi Iraq: Hopes and Dangers’ 
from a jihadist website (p.2).  
 
The Ulster Loyalist Information Service (ULISNET) website illustrates the extent to 
which dissident Northern Irish terrorists may be using the Web for data mining. 
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ULISNET claimed that its basic function was to provide the media with press releases 
from the dissident Loyalist group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). Yet, the 
organisation appealed for information about rival Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries 
on its website. Internet users who had “even the slightest information on active 
Republican terrorists” were invited to email the organisation through a secure email 
server.10 In chapter 3, the websites of dissident Loyalist and Republicans, who remain 
committed to armed struggle, will be analysed to determine whether these groups are 
using the Internet to gather intelligence about potential targets. 11 
 
Mobilisation and Fundraising 
 
Terrorists also use the Internet to mobilise supporters and solicit resources from 
sympathisers. Internet users may be asked to submit an email to the webmaster if they 
wish to join the organisation. For example, Fritz, Harris, Kolb, Larich, and Stocker 
(2004) located an Iranian website that provided an application form for Internet users 
who wished to become martyrs (9). Alternatively, terrorist recruiters may use online chat 
rooms to approach Internet users who are sympathetic to their cause (Weinmann, 
2004:16). In addition, there appears to be significant evidence that terrorists are using the 
Internet to solicit resources from sympathisers. Fundraising may be facilitated through 
the website of an affiliate of a terrorist organisation, such as a political party or a charity, 
to avoid legal sanctions under anti-terrorist legislation such as the US Patriot Act (2001). 
Hinnen (2005) asserts that jihadists use sympathetic websites to post bank account details 
to which funds for various terrorist organisations can be transferred. One website, 
www.ummah.net, provided bank accounts for the Harkat ul Muhjadeen at the Allied 
Bank of Pakistan, urging Internet users to donate funds in support of the ‘global jihad’ 
(38).  
 
While most recent studies have focused on how jihadists use the Web for recruitment, 
there has been relatively little research conducted into whether ethno-nationalist terrorists 
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use ICTs to mobilise supporters. Once again, the content of the ULISNET website 
suggests that dissident Loyalist and Republican terrorists may be using the Web for 
mobilisation and resource solicitation. Analysis of the ‘Projects’ section revealed that 
ULISNET was part of the in fact part of the ‘support network’ for the LVF. For example, 
Internet users were asked to donate bullet-proof vests to the organisation, for ‘obvious 
uses.’ Unsurprisingly, this website was shut down in late 2004.12 Although this appears to 
be an isolated case, it raises issues around the extent to which ‘pro-terrorist’ webmasters 
are able to utilise the public spaces of the Web to attack the liberal democracies. In this 
thesis, the websites of dissident Republican terrorist organisations will be analysed to 
determine whether they are using the Web for recruitment and resource solicitation.  
 
Networking  
 
Some terrorist groups have followed the lead of transnational corporations, using ICTs to 
organise themselves into decentralized networks. In theory, network based terrorist 
organisations are immune to infiltration by the authorities, as they are “based around the 
idea of ‘leaderless resistance” (Tucker, 2001: 1). In the Middle East, network based 
groups have gradually replaced old hierarchical groups such as the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The Internet allows terrorist groups such as Hizbollah to 
communicate with like-minded groups based in diverse locations such as Chechnya, 
Palestine, and Afghanistan (Weinmann, 2004: 9). Still, it should be noted that network 
based terrorist organisations are not a product of the “information age.” The Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO), a network of smaller Palestinian groups, formed as early 
as 1964, long before the creation of the Internet. Nevertheless, technological innovations 
like email have facilitated the restructuring of terrorist hierarchies into networks.  
 
Hoffman (1998) suggests that the Internet has made terrorism “accessible to anyone with 
a grievance, an agenda, a purpose or any idiosyncratic combination of the above” (p.185). 
Thus, groups such as Hamas have developed a network structure of loosely connected 
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autonomous actors, which includes private individuals living outside the Middle East. 
The label ‘amateur terrorist’ can be applied to these individuals, who often “have little or 
no formal connection to an existing terrorist group” (Hoffman, 1998: 185). While these 
individuals are not full members of the organisation, they nevertheless act to further the 
objectives of a terrorist group. For example, lone terrorists like Ramzi Yousef, the 
perptrator of the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing, have often retrospectively been 
linked to decentralised terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda (p.1). In chapter 5, this 
phenomenon of amateur terrorism on the Internet will be explored through the lens of 
Loyalist and Republican solidarity websites. Solidarity websites are defined here as 
websites that project messages of support for Loyalist or Republican terrorist groups, but 
reveal no formal link between the webmaster and these organisations. The framing and 
function of these websites will be analysed to enable a comparison with the websites of 
political fronts, such as Sinn Fein. This analysis will also reveal whether solidarity actors 
and political fronts provide links to one another on their respective websites.   
 
Terrorist framing and soft power 
 
Recent empirical studies have tended to focus on how terrorists use militaristic language 
to generate soft power and mobilise supporters. Conway (2006) asserts that Hizbollah 
uses its collection of websites to publish details of its military operations against Israeli 
forces. For example, one website features a ‘military operations’ section, which provides 
a detailed account of all Hizbollah operations since 1997 (p.110). While this information 
may be targeted at the Israeli media, as well as a potential global audience, it also serves 
another critical group objective. Commentators suggest that the Hizbollah web presence 
is very important for the morale of its ‘resistance fighters,’ as it informs them of the 
support they receive from across the globe (Whine, 1999:233). In a similar vein to 
Hizbollah, a recent study suggests that Hamas uses one of its websites, www.palestine-
info.net, to encourage acts of terrorism. Research commissioned by the Center for Special 
Studies found that this website encouraged terrorism against Israeli targets, affirming the 
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movement’s “commitment not to disarm and to continue its terrorist attacks on Israel 
until its destruction” (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2005). By way of 
contrast, this research analyses whether ‘pro-terrorist’ webmasters are likely to generate 
soft power if they frame their subjects as civil society actors, as opposed to freedom 
fighters engaged in armed conflict.  
 
The Northern Irish conflict is pertinent to the discussion of terrorist soft power due to the 
paramilitary ceasefires which facilitated the Good Friday Agreement (1998). Some 
commentators suggest that the Northern Irish media helped build cross-community 
support for the Belfast Agreement (1998) through their adoption of a ‘peace frame.’ This 
peace frame created a bond between pro-peace groups from both camps, making a clear 
distinction between the political fronts that were engaged in the process and the violence 
associated with their terrorist sponsors (Wolfsfeld, 2001:36). Arguably, the peace process 
has legitimised terrorist-linked parties such as Sinn Fein, who in turn have acheived 
unprecedented electoral success. In contrast to the censorship associated with the UK 
Broadcasting Ban (1998), many terrorist-linked parties, or political fronts, now enjoy 
routine access to the news media, the public, and the government. While these terrorist 
organisations remain committed to their ceasefires, soft power has arguably become vital 
to the achievement of their objectives, with political parties the primary vehicle for these 
aspirations. As Sinn Fein has adopted an agenda that is broadly similar to that of the 
nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), this raises questions as to the 
frames employed on its website. Conceivably, these groups may be using their websites 
to demonstrate their commitment to democracy, differentiating themselves from the 
activities of their terrorist sponsors. Yet, not all Northern Irish terrorist organisations have 
called a permanent cessation to their military activities. Dissidents on both sides have 
continued to use both political parties and acts of terrorism to communicate with target 
audiences. These groups may be using militaristic language on their websites to suggest 
they are freedom fighters motivated by a just cause. In chapter 3, the online framing of 
political fronts will be analysed to determine whether these groups reveal their terrorist 
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linkages on their websites. This will also inform the wider debate about how terrorists 
frame conflict on their websites in order to intimidate target audiences and attract 
supporters. 
 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-TERRORIST LEGISLATION: CAN 
TERRORISTS ACT WITH IMPUNITY ONLINE?  
 
This dissertation will determine whether Loyalist and Republican websites are similar in 
content and form to the ULISNET website that was shut down in late 2004. In this 
respect, the research will test the hypothesis that terrorists can act with impunity online if 
they manipulate existing patterns of Internet governance to their advantage. Internet 
governance can be defined as the “collective action by governments and/or the private 
sector operators of Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) networks, 
to establish rules and procedures to enforce public policies and resolve disputes that 
involve multiple jurisdictions” (Mueller, Mathiason & McKnight, 2004: 4). Governments 
may remove offensive content from the Internet if the person responsible for its 
transmission contravenes national legislation. European Union member states and the 
United States have passed a number of laws that have defined the limits of ‘acceptable’ 
behaviour online. Many of these laws were passed after the terrorist attacks on 
Washington and New York in 2001, as evidence emerged showing that the terrorists had 
used email to plan the hijackings.13 Caral (2004) asserts that European Union and US law 
form a de facto global ‘regime’ governing online behaviour, through their political 
leadership, economic dominance and large numbers of Internet users (p.7). In this thesis, 
Loyalist and Republican websites will be analysed to determine the degree to which this 
anti-terrorist regime influences what ‘pro-terrorist’ webmasters post online.  
 
US Anti-Terrorist Legislation post 9/11  
 
In order to analyse the web activism of Loyalists and Republicans, one must first develop 
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an understanding of the legal sanctions that ‘pro-terrorist’ webmasters may face if they 
contravene anti-terrorist legislation. Post 9/11, anti-terrorist legislation in the United 
States sought to broaden the definition of a terrorist offence, to enable the prosecution of 
people who incited terrorist atrocities and provided resources for proscribed terrorist 
organisations. The US Patriot Act (2001) was one of the first pieces of legislation to 
target the ‘support networks’ of proscribed terrorist organisations.14 There are several 
sections of the US Patriot Act that apply to webmasters responsible for maintaining ‘pro-
terrorist’ websites, despite the word ‘Internet’ featuring only once in the 342-page 
document. For example, the Act prohibited the provision of material support to terrorist 
organisations “when it is known and intended that it be used to prepare for, or carry out, 
certain terrorist related crimes.”15 The definition of a terrorist organisation was also 
expanded to incorporate people who incited violence and gathered information regarding 
the potential targets of terrorist activity.16 The FBI’s ‘Carnivore’ system was to be an 
integral part of a surveillance system that would monitor the activities of terrorist 
organisations, and in particular Al Qaeda affiliates, on the Internet.  
 
United Kingdom Anti-Terrorist Legislation post 9/11 
. 
The United Kingdom government utilised a similar definition of terrorist offences in its 
anti-terrorist legislation post 9/11. The UK Terrorism Act (2000) remains the largest 
piece of anti-terrorist legislation passed by a Member State of the European Union to 
date.17 This Act also defined the “invitation of support” for a proscribed terrorist 
organisation as a terrorist offence.18 In addition, this legislation prohibited the provision 
of resources to those responsible for terrorist atrocities, although the individual would 
only face prosecution if they were knowingly complicit in these terrorist activities. The 
list of terrorist offences also included, for the first time, a specific offence relating to the 
disruption of a computer system (Walker, 2002: 20). However, the UK anti-terrorist 
legislation passed after the 9/11 atrocities did not propose the creation of a surveillance 
system similar to ‘Carnivore,’ or an investigatory body with the powers of the FBI. The 
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UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act (2001) proposed a diluted version of the 
surveillance protocols contained in the US Patriot Act. For example, Part XI of the ATCS 
stipulated that communication service providers should retain communications data for 
an ‘investigatory rainy day’ (Walker and Akdeniz, 1993: 162). Yet, the legislation did not 
specify a period for communication service providers to retain communications data, nor 
impose financial or legal penalties upon those who failed to comply (p.167). This has led 
to inconsistencies in the pattern of data retention in the United Kingdom. While 
companies such as British Telecom retain their traffic data for seven years, Internet 
Service Providers such as America Online (AOL) keep their email data for just three 
months (p.168).  
 
Overall, the UK and US anti-terrorist legislation proposed similar definitions of terrorist 
offences. In effect, this enabled nation-states to prosecute webmasters who provided 
material support for terrorists, or incited others to perpetrate political violence. However, 
the application of anti-terrorist legislation in both polities is arguably inconsistent, despite 
the convergence on the definition of terrorist offences. For example, the FBI has the 
authority to subpoena communications data that is unavailable to their British 
counterparts. Furthermore, the inconsistencies in data retention between companies based 
in the United Kingdom and the United States illustrate the problematic nature of 
launching anti-terrorist operations online. Anti-terrorist legislation such as the UK 
Terrorism Act can be characterised as a national response against a terrorist cyber threat 
that may emanate from other nation-states. Therefore, terrorists and their sympathisers 
may be able to manipulate patterns of Internet governance in order to their keep their 
websites online.  
 
Supranational Regulation: The United Nations and the European Union. 
 
International organisations could help coordinate efforts to identify and remove ‘pro-
terrorist’ websites from the Internet. The European Union and the United Nations have 
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passed a large number of anti-terrorist conventions since 9/11. These conventions broadly 
conform to the principles embodied in the anti-terrorist legislation of the United Kingdom 
and the United States. For example, the European Council Framework Decision on 
Combating Terrorism (2002) defined a terrorist group as a “structured group of two or 
more persons’ acting in concert to commit terrorist offences.”19 These offences included 
‘directing’ terrorism and supplying information or material resources to a proscribed 
terrorist organisation. The European Union has also attempted to direct the legislation of 
its member states in the area of ‘cyber-crime.’ The Council of Europe’s Cyber Crime 
Convention (2001) included a number of new criminal offences, including the intentional 
illegal access of computer systems and the interception of ‘non-public transmission of 
computer data’ (Akdeniz, 2003:10). These offences could apply to terrorists who use 
illegally obtained communications data to plan and perpetrate atrocities. 
 
The United Nations Security Council has also issued a number of Counter-Terrorism 
Resolutions, such as Resolution 1373, that impose binding obligations on all member 
states. This Resolution called on all nation-states to deny terrorist organisations 
“sustenance and support and to cooperate on issues such as intelligence gathering” 
(Graham, 2005: 48). Analysis of both the European Union and United Nations 
conventions suggests that websites that solicit resources, or incite political violence, on 
behalf of proscribed terrorist organisations should have a limited lifespan. In theory, 
websites hosted by companies within the European Union or United States should be 
subject to the terms of these conventions. If a national government is satisfied that a 
webmaster is aware that they are providing material support for terrorists, they can take 
legal action against the Internet Service Provider to remove this website from the 
Internet. 
 
The failure of many nation-states to ratify the conventions of the United Nations 
undermines efforts to create an international consensus on the definition of terrorist 
offences. A convention will only govern expectations in a global policy area if all 191-
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member states incorporate its terms into their own national legislation. Analysis of the 12 
UN anti-terrorism conventions suggests that there is not unanimity amongst nation-states 
on issues such as the definition of terrorist offences. Only 57 of the 191 member states 
have ratified all 12 United Nations Conventions on Terrorism (de Vries, 2004: 3). In 
contrast to these conventions, United Nations Security Council Resolutions do impose 
legally binding obligations upon its member states. However, Resolutions, such as 1373, 
fail to provide universally accepted definitions of either terrorism or terrorist offences. 
UN Security Council Resolutions invariably commit member states to a series of anti-
terrorist principles and norms, such as the need for international cooperation on the 
investigation of terrorist incidents. The ambiguity of the UN Security Council 
Resolutions suggests that the United Nations is incapable of creating an effective regime 
governing the behaviour of nation-states vis-à-vis international terrorism. Nation-states 
appear unwilling to conform to an international regime that governs their behaviour in 
this policy area, and supersedes their own national definitions of terrorism and terrorist 
offences.  
 
Defining Terrorism Internationally 
 
Individuals, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and nation-states typically use the 
term ‘terrorism’ to describe violence ‘of which they do not approve’ (Schmid and 
Jongman, 1988: 3). Governments proscribe terrorist organisations who pose a threat to 
their national security. For example, the US State Department is responsible for the 
designation of terrorist organisations in the United States. It operates a ‘two-tier’ system 
of proscription vis-à-vis international terrorist organisations.20 Foreign Terrorist 
Organisations (FTO) must satisfy several key criteria. These groups or individuals must 
threaten the security of US nationals or the ‘national security, foreign policy or economy’ 
of the United States.21 The term ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisation’ can be also be applied 
to “those who assist, sponsor or provide financial material or technological support” to a 
group proscribed by the US State Department.’22 The organisations that feature on the US 
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State Department FTO list are subject to a number of sanctions, including the freezing of 
financial assets, the arrest and extradition of suspected members, and the closure of 
websites that solicit resources on their behalf. 23 In contrast to the FTO list, the Terrorist 
Exclusion List (TEL) refers to terrorist organisations and individuals that do not directly 
threaten the security of the United States. Inclusion on this list does not incur the 
sanctions brought against Foreign Terrorist Organisations, although the US Patriot Act 
(2000) allows for the deportation of individuals linked to groups that appear on the 
Terrorism Exclusion List.24 The US State Department as part of its annual report, ‘Global 
Patterns of Terrorism,’ constantly updates these lists.  
 
The UK anti-terrorist legislation also illustrates the importance of ‘national interest’ in 
the proscription of terrorist organisations. The UK Terrorism Act (2000) provided a list 
of organisations prohibited in the United Kingdom. In addition, a Home Office press 
release (February 2001) outlined the factors that determined whether a group was 
proscribed in the United Kingdom. A terrorist organisation was defined as a group that 
posed a ‘specific threat’ to the United Kingdom and British nationals overseas (Walker, 
2002: 48). The Home Secretary had the legal power to add, remove, or amend the 
schedule of proscribed terrorist organisations. The legislation did enable members of 
these groups to apply for ‘de-proscription’ if they could present new information to the 
Proscribed Organisation Appeal Commission (p.51). Thus, nation-states are unlikely to 
proscribe terrorist organisations that do not directly threaten their national interests, or the 
national interests of their close allies.  
 
Proscription: International organisations 
 
International organisations appear incapable of fostering international consensus on the 
proscription of terrorist organisations. The European Union has established a list of 45 
individuals and 36 groups ‘who are involved in terrorist acts’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 
3). The European Union directs its member states to freeze the assets of these ‘terrorists’ 
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and prohibit their financial transactions. Yet, as this directive only applies to the 25 
European Union member states, these individuals can avoid sanctions by transferring 
their financial assets to a jurisdiction outside the European Union. As discussed earlier, 
the United Nations remains the only international organisation that can set universal 
standards on issues such as the proscription of terrorist organisations. The United Nations 
has issued 12 conventions and several Security Council Resolutions on terrorism. 
However, none of these treatises included a list of proscribed global terrorist 
organisations (Graham, 2005: 47).  
 
Yet, the achievement of an international consensus on the proscription of terrorist 
organisations may be unrealistic. Nation-states will only proscribe terrorist organisations 
in line with their own national interest. It is highly improbable that the 191 member states 
of the United Nations will conclude that the same terrorist organisation threatens all of 
their respective national interests. The issue of terrorist proscription provides yet more 
evidence that international organisations are incapable of enforcing universal standards of 
behaviour upon nation-states vis-à-vis terrorism. International organisations are only able 
to issue conventions in areas such as terrorism, as opposed to legally binding treaties. As 
discussed earlier, these conventions are not legally binding unless a national parliament 
incorporates them into their national legislation. Therefore, nation-states may choose not 
to ratify the terrorism conventions that fail to satisfy their national interest. United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions could potentially impose a universal definition of 
‘terrorism’ and a list of proscribed terrorist organisations upon its 191 member states. 
However, these resolutions tend to commit member states to a series of anti-terrorist 
principles and norms, many of which already feature in their respective anti-terrorist 
legislation.  
 
Governments will only sign up to conventions that allow them to retain sovereignty in 
areas such as the proscription of terrorist organisations. This creates potential problems in 
combating the spread of ‘pro-terrorist’ propaganda online. If a national government 
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believes the terrorist has a legitimate grievance, it is unlikely to try to shut down websites 
that support this actor. Meanwhile, a webmaster may register their website in a nation-
state that does not define its subject as a terrorist actor, allowing them to post material 
that contravenes anti-terrorist legislation in their homeland. There is already some 
evidence to suggest that terrorists are manipulating the patchwork nature of Internet 
governance in order to keep their websites online. For example, the official Hamas 
website, www.palestine.info, has been hosted in a number of countries for this very 
reason, including Russia and the Ukraine.25 Azzam Publications, an Islamist terrorist 
website, has also been shut down several times between 1999 and 2001. During this 
period, registration of this website moved from one nation-state to another, from the 
United States to Brazil. 26  
 
This research will assess whether the failure to generate international consensus on 
terrorist proscription allows Northern Irish terrorists to act with impunity online. It will 
determine whether Loyalist and Republican websites are similar in content and form to 
the ULISNET website that was shut down in late 2004. Analysis of anti-terrorist 
legislation in two nation-states, the United Kingdom and the United States, suggests that 
Loyalist and Republican webmasters may be able to act with greater freedom if they 
register their websites outside the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, there are 
currently 14 proscribed Northern Irish terrorist organisations, many of which were first 
banned under the terms of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1984).27 Under the terms of 
the UK Terrorism Act (2000), webmasters who support these organisations may face 
legal sanctions if they solicit resources on behalf of these organisations, or justify their 
contemporary acts of political violence. In theory, similar sanctions may be applied to 
these webmasters in the United States under the terms of the US Patriot Act (2001). 
However, analysis of the US anti-terrorist legislation shows that the US government does 
not define many of these organisations as terrorists. Indeed, only three terrorist groups 
that were banned in the United Kingdom, the Loyalist Volunteer Force, Orange 
Volunteers and the Red Hand Defenders, featured on the US FTO list. 28 Therefore, it is 
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reasonable to assume that some webmasters may register their websites in the United 
States to avoid legal sanctions that might arise from their web activism, particularly if 
they incite others to perpetrate terrorist atrocities. The research presented in this thesis 
will determine whether Loyalist and Republican webmasters act in a similar fashion to 
their Hamas and Hizbollah counterparts, registering their websites in nation-states that do 
define their subjects as terrorist actors.  
 
THE PANOPTICON: DO TERRORISTS SELF-REGULATE ONLINE? 
 
This thesis will also test the hypothesis that ‘pro-terrorist’ webmasters may adhere to the 
norms of acceptable behaviour online. Irrespective of where they register their websites, 
‘pro-terrorist’ webmasters may moderate content on their websites in order to avoid legal 
sanctions under anti-terrorist legislation. This research will assess whether the Internet 
can be characterised as a form of panopticion, in which webmasters voluntarily adhere to 
the norms of acceptable behaviour. The panopticon was a device used in correctional 
institutions to control the occupants. The architectural apparatus meant that the 
incarcerated are unable to see each other while being visible to an overseer in an 
inspection lodge, based at the centre of the structure (Lyon, 1994: 62). The knowledge of 
the super-ordinate was enough to ensure conformity and obedience amongst the 
incarcerated (Spears and Lea, 2000: 438). Uncertainty was used as a means of 
subordination, as the occupants would never know when the super-ordinate was watching 
them (Lyons, 1994: 60). In a similar vein to these occupants, webmasters may be well 
aware of what they can transmit on their websites and the likely consequence if they do 
not conform to the norms of acceptable behaviour online. In effect, the anti-terrorist 
legislation of the European Union and United States provides a de facto ‘regime’ in this 
global policy area, defining a set of principles and norms to which webmasters should 
adhere. As a result, webmasters may choose not to incite others to perpetrate political 
violence on their websites, nor solicit resources on behalf of proscribed terrorist 
organisations. In addition, terrorists are aware that intelligence agencies are monitoring 
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their activities online, using surveillance systems such as the FBI’s ‘Carnivore’ program. 
This may prompt ‘pro-terrorist’ webmasters to regulate content posted on their websites. 
 
Yet, terrorists may be able to generate soft power by adhering to the rules of acceptable 
behaviour online. Like other civil society actors, terrorist soft power may depend upon 
the attractiveness of their ideology, as well as the values of the organisation (Nye, 2004: 
8). If a webmaster uses their website purely to express support for the ideology of a 
terrorist actor, they will usually be immune from prosecution under the terms of ‘human 
rights’ legislation and supranational International conventions. Fourth – generation rights, 
including the right to information and the right to communicate, are enshrined in this 
legislation (Council of Europe, 1997:39). For example, Article 10 of the Council of 
Europe’s ‘Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ 
(1950) asserts that people should have the “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers.”29  
 
Moreover, the US First Amendment is probably the most frequently cited piece of 
legislation in the debate over the freedom of speech on the Internet. This Amendment 
asserts that the US Congress should make no law “abridging the freedom of speech or of 
the press” (US Constitution Online, 2005). Webmasters and Internet Hosting companies 
often cite ‘First Amendment Rights’ when justifying the continued presence of websites 
that project controversial views, such as ‘pro-terrorist’ websites. This has created a 
divergence between the regulation of harmful content in Europe and the United States. 
Critics assert that European Union member states have a ‘lower threshold of proof’ for 
regulating content than the United States (May, Chen and Wen, 2004: 269). As a result, 
many terrorist organisations have registered their websites with Internet hosts based in 
the United States. For example, the Hamas websites, www.islamicblock.org and 
www.fm-fm.com, were registered with Internet hosts based in Texas in 2004.30 This 
raises issues around the extent to which nation-states are able to limit the soft power of 
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terrorists online, particularly if ‘pro-terrorist’ webmasters post material that complies 
with the norms of acceptable behaviour online. In this thesis, the panopticon model will 
be analysed through the lens of civil and uncivil actors in Northern Ireland. Conceivably, 
Loyalist and Republican webmasters may remove references to terrorist activity in order 
to comply with the norms of acceptable behaviour online.  
 
THE INTERNET AND POLITICAL MOBILISATION 
 
The Internet as a solution to terrorism 
 
This dissertation will also test the cyberoptimist assertion that terrorism itself may be 
resolvable if its perpetrators use the Internet for political communication. Spears and Lea 
(1994) suggest that the Internet facilitates forms of communication, interaction, and 
organisation that undermine unequal status and power relations (p.428). Cyberoptimists 
believe that the Internet will lower the barriers to participation for individuals from 
marginal groups, such as terrorists.31 In effect, the cyberoptimist model implies that 
terrorists will be able to generate soft power via their websites, reducing their need to 
perpetrate violence in order to generate publicity for their cause. However, this analysis is 
based on the assumption that terrorism is a rational communication strategy, employed by 
sub-state actors who lack both political power and routine access to the mass media. In 
Chapter 2, this thesis will explore whether terrorism can be characterised as a form of 
‘coercive communication,’ used by sub-state actors who ordinarily receive minimal 
coverage in the mass media. The terrorism as political communication model will be 
analysed in order to determine whether all forms of terrorism are publicity oriented. 
Throughout the thesis, the online framing of Loyalist and Republicans will be examined 
to determine whether these actors are using the Internet to attract an audience beyond 
their core supporters.  
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The cyber paradigms 
 
In chapter 6, the potential of the Internet as a tool for mobilisation will be analysed 
through the lens of Loyalist and Republican interface communities. The online framing 
of rival residents’ groups will be analysed to determine whether they are using their 
websites to generate social capital. The analysis will determine whether these groups are 
using the Web to strengthen in-group identities, or to engage in dialogue with rival 
interface communities. In this respect, this dissertation will provides further evidence as 
to whether the Internet will create a multiplier effect for marginal groups within 
contemporary nation-states. Authors such as Bimber (1998) and Rheingold (1993) 
suggest that the Internet reduces the costs of political mobilisation for political groups, 
including terrorists. As Mueller, Mathiason, and McKnight (2004) suggest, the principles 
that govern behaviour on the Internet stipulate that the enabling power of the Internet 
should be available for both ‘good and bad information and communications behaviour’ 
(p.20). So far, there has been no consensus amongst academics as to how ICTs will 
transform politics. Norris (2001) suggests that there are three cyber paradigms that 
describe the impact of ICTs on contemporary nation-states.  
 
These are: 
 
1. The cyberoptimist model suggests that the Internet will undermine unequal power 
relations, creating a multiplier effect for marginal groups, 
 
2. The cyberpessimist model proposes that the Internet will ‘unleash new 
inequalities of power and wealth,’ reinforcing the gap between activists and the 
disengaged, 
 
3. The cybersceptic model suggests that it is too early to tell whether ICTs will have 
a lasting effect upon patterns of political organization and behaviour. 
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The research presented in this thesis will determine whether civil and uncivil groups in 
Northern Ireland are realising the potential of the Internet as a tool for political 
mobilisation and organisational linkage. In doing so, the dissertation discusses which of 
these cyber paradigms, if any, are suitable conceptual tools for characterising the web 
activism of these groups.  
 
The Internet as a tool for mobilisation: the cyberoptimist view 
 
Mobilisation can be defined as “the process by which candidates, parties, activists, and 
groups induce other people to participate” (Krueger, 2006: 760). Thus far, studies of 
online mobilisation have tended to be used as evidence to support one of the three cyber 
paradigms. Cyberoptimists, such as Corrado and Firestone (1996), speculate that new 
media technologies could provide a solution to the problem of voter apathy in advanced 
industrialised nation-states. This malaise is illustrated by the decline in election turnouts 
in the United Kingdom over the past two decades.32 For example, Owen (2006) suggests 
that the Internet has facilitated a new form of political activism amongst young people in 
the United States. Recent studies suggest that young people [aged between 18 and 29 
years old] use Internet information in their political decision-making, and are increasingly 
likely to produce political content online (Owens, 2006: 35). In addition, low electoral 
turnouts may be partially remedied by the utility of electronic voting systems similar to 
the QUBE “teledemocracy” piloted in California in the 1980s (Barber, 1984: 275). Budge 
(1996) suggests that ICTs could facilitate a mediated form of direct democracy, in which 
‘push button’ voting would allow for the regular use of referendums in government 
decision-making. Political parties would organise the political agenda and assume 
responsibility for putting government bills to the public vote.33 Under this proposed 
‘plebiscitary democracy,’ people who were unable to attend a polling station would be 
able to cast their vote without leaving their own home.  
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Cyber enthusiasts suggest that a well-placed computer could be as important a 
development tool as an irrigation pump in isolated communities (Norris, 2001: 36). 
Cyberoptimists also believe that ICTs could help foster a global civil society, in which 
transnational advocacy networks operate across the globe to strengthen the voice of the 
developing world (Norris, 2001: 8). According to some commentators, civil society in the 
Information Age represents “both a withdrawal from the state and a move towards global 
rules and institutions” (Kaldor, 2003: 588). The structural concept of global civil society 
refers to all civil society actors, with the exception of governments, private sector 
companies, and families, which act internationally (p: 590). For example, the Make 
Poverty History (MPH) campaign could be considered a transnational advocacy network 
by virtue of its appeal for support from people across the globe.34 The organisers of the 
MPH campaign used ICTs to coordinate a series of public demonstrations - also known 
as White Band Days - in cities across the globe, including Rio, Dublin, and Calgary. 
While the MPH campaign may not have achieved all of its objectives, it nevertheless 
illustrates how civil society actors can use ICTs to mobilise support for political 
campaigns across national borders.35 
The Internet, civil society, and semi-authoritarian states: cyberoptimism? 
 
It is in semi-authoritarian nation-states that ICTs have arguably generated the most 
tangible political change to date. Cyberoptimists point to the Chiapas uprising in Mexico 
(1994) as an example of how ICTs can help mobilise opposition against semi-
authoritarian states. Support for the Zapatista insurgents mobilised on websites hosted 
across the globe, as non-governmental organisations lobbied nation-states to intervene in 
the region.36 While not representing a coup d’état via cyberspace, the lessons of Chiapas 
for the political elites of semi-authoritarian states were clear. Sub-state political activists 
in semi-authoritarian states are able to attract a multitude of sympathisers worldwide 
utilising the public spaces of the Internet. Thus, when Yugoslav leader Slobodan 
Milosevic attempted to limit the activities of Radio B92 in August 1999, ICTs enabled 
the station to continue broadcasting to international audiences. As Milosevic had shut 
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down the station premises, radio transmissions were sent via satellite to other Association 
of Independent Media (ANEM) groups, who in turn transmitted the material on the 
Internet.37 The radio station was to play a critical role in organising the demonstrations 
that ended Milosevic’s government in October 1999. Both of these case studies suggest 
that the Internet may enable marginal groups to mobilise support for their cause on the 
Internet. This dissertation will examine whether the Internet is creating a similar 
multiplier effect in terms of mobilisation for civil and uncivil groups in Northern Ireland. 
 
The Internet and political mobilisation: the cyberpessimist view 
 
Cyberpessimists assert that the Internet will reinforce the gap between rich and power, as 
well as between activists and the disengaged (Norris, 2001: 12).Authors such as Putnam 
(2000) argue that the Internet does not have a significant impact upon civic engagement 
within nation-states. The digital divide, the gap between those who are able to benefit 
from ICTs and those who are not, is cited as evidence that the Internet may not live up to 
the hype of the cyberoptimist model. Recent studies suggest that although the digital 
divide may be narrowing, Internet consumers are still most likely to be drawn from 
Europe and North America. Despite having only 5.1 percent of the world’s population, 
North America provides 21.5 percent of the total number of Internet users worldwide. 
Meanwhile, Internet penetration in Africa remains low, with an estimated 3.5 percent of 
its population having access to the Internet (Internet World Statistics, 2007). This ‘First 
World’ hegemony is also reflected in the prevalence of English as the vernacular of 
cyberspace. While some citizens in the developing world may speak fluent English, the 
vast majority may lack the necessary linguistic skills to understand English language 
websites. As a result, so-called ‘Fourth Generation Rights,’ which include the right to 
information and the right to communicate, may be denied to these people on the 
Internet.38 Hence, cyberpessimists suggest that the Internet facilitates new forms of 
asymmetric communication between the developed and developing worlds, rather than 
the level playing field prescribed in the equalization model. 
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Cyberpessimists also suggest that the Internet will reinforce existing patterns of political 
participation within liberal democracies. There is already some empirical evidence to 
support the reinforcement model. Political bulletin boards appear to promote ‘homophily’ 
rather than stimulate genuine political debate between societal groups. People choose to 
post to groups that contain people with similar political ideologies to their own. For 
example, a survey of political Usenet groups found that only 9.3 percent of leaders posted 
messages to ideologically dissonant groups (Hill and Hughes, 1997: 13). Moreover, data 
collated from the Minnesota E-Democracy project suggests that a high level of ‘cultural 
capital’ is a fundamental prerequisite for political participation online.39 The volunteers 
who subscribed to the project in 1994 tended to have university level education, incomes 
well above the national average, and an interest in politics in the offline world (Jensen, 
2006: 44). The project did not tend to attract volunteers who had little or no prior interest 
in politics. Thus, cyberpessimists contend that ICTs are not a potential solution to voter 
apathy in liberal democracies, as people cannot be compelled to engage in political 
activism online. This model suggests that marginal groups, such as dissident terrorists in 
Northern Ireland, may not experience a critical multiplier effect in terms of mobilisation 
using their websites. 
 
The Internet and political mobilisation: the cybersceptic view 
 
The cybersceptic viewpoint is perhaps the most apposite conception of how ICTs have 
altered power relations within nation-states to date. Norris asserts that while the ICTs 
have the potential to amplify the voice of ‘less resourced insurgent and challengers,’ it is 
too early to tell whether they will alter power relations within contemporary nation-states 
(Norris, 2001: 39). In a similar vein to the other cyber paradigms, there is empirical 
evidence to suggest that ICTs have yet to have a dramatic impact on political 
mobilisation within nation-states. Recent studies suggest that political parties across the 
globe use their websites to provide standard information about the party, most of which 
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can be accessed in the offline world (Nixon, Ward and Gibson, 2003:.235). Political 
parties tend to use their websites for top-down communication, rather than encourage 
dialogue with their grass roots and Internet users. Furthermore, peripheral political parties 
do not appear to have experienced the critical multiplier effect postulated in the cyber 
optimist model. While these fringe parties have an official website, they may have 
limited success in reaching large online audiences due to their low visibility on Internet 
search engines.40 As Nixon et al assert, ICTs may “allow these parties to survive, but they 
hardly allow them to strive” (P.35).  
 
The early indications are that people are using Web 2.0, the section of the Internet that 
provides a platform for user-generated content, for similar purposes. People tend to use 
social networking websites, such as Facebook and Myspace, to reinforce their own 
identities. However, one cannot assume that this form of web activism will not evolve in 
the future. The recent mobilisation of protestors against proposals for road pricing in the 
United Kingdom, which saw 1,274,362 people sign a petition on the Downing Street 
website, may be the standard-bearer for a new form of web activism.41 In addition, the 
advent of Webcameron may provide an insight into how political party websites will 
evolve in the future.42 Political leaders may turn to blogging as a means of 
communicating with target audiences in the near future. Therefore, cybersceptics believe 
that it is too early to claim that ICTs will reinforce patterns of political behaviour within 
nation-states. 
 
While the Internet may be creating a multiplier effect for some NGOs in terms of 
organisational linkage, there is limited evidence to suggest that this constitutes a critical 
mass as was suggested in the cyberoptimist model. Many civil society organisations have 
yet to realise the potential of the Internet as a means of facilitating new forms of political 
deliberation and protest. NGOs have used ICTs in a conservative fashion to date, with the 
notable exception of high-profile campaigns such as Make Poverty History (2005). For 
the majority of NGOs, the Internet has enabled new forms of intra-group communication, 
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rather than provide forms of communication that undermine unequal power relations 
within nation-states. Transnational advocacy networks, such as GreenNet, use ICTs for 
recruitment, fund-raising, issuing press releases, and advertising their core values to 
Internet users who visit their websites. The GreenNet website provides a portal for 
environmental NGOs based across the globe.43 This website provides information as to 
how Internet users can join an environmental NGO in their respective polities. Yet, there 
is limited evidence to suggest that these campaigns have influenced the environmental 
policies of nation-states. In contrast to the Make Poverty History campaign, NGOs such 
as GreenNet do not receive extensive media coverage nor attract the attention of 
influential politicians or celebrities. This suggests that factors in the offline world may 
determine the ability of transnational advocacy networks to influence government policy. 
As Shah et al (2001) suggest, the relationship between new media and social capital may 
be “dynamic and highly contextual” (p.154). The research presented in this thesis will 
determine whether the Internet is likely to have a critical multiplier effect for marginal 
groups in post-conflict Northern Ireland.  
 
This thesis systematically explores the ways in which civil and uncivil groups use the 
Internet to generate soft power. This research assesses whether the Internet creates a 
critical multiplier effect for marginal groups, such as terrorists. A coding scheme, adapted 
from previous studies of political party websites, is used to determine whether these 
groups have realised the potential of the Internet as a tool for political mobilisation. The 
online frames of all Northern Irish political parties are examined to assess the extent to 
which they have been influenced by the peace frame employed by the Northern Irish 
media in the late nineties. The dissertation examines whether there are any qualitative 
differences between the online framing of terrorist-linked parties and the constitutional 
parties in the region. The phenomenon of amateur terrorism is also analysed through the 
lens of Loyalist and Republican solidarity actors. The analysis determines whether 
solidarity actors were more likely to justify political violence on their websites than their 
respective political fronts. In addition, the websites of rival residents’ groups are 
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examined to determine whether the Internet can help generate social capital across 
sectarian interfaces. The analysis determines whether residents’ groups use the Web to 
strengthen in-group identities, or to engage in dialogue with rival interface communities. 
In doing so, the research tests the cyberoptimist assertion that the Internet will facilitate 
forms of communication that undermine unequal power relations within nation-states. 
The online audience for Northern Irish terrorists is analysed using Internet usage patterns 
and the ranking systems used by Internet search engines. Internet usage patterns are 
examined to define the potential audience available to Northern Irish terrorists via their 
websites. Factors that influence the ranking of websites, including the sale of priority 
retrieval to the highest bidder and website linkage, are analysed to determine their 
potential impact upon the audience available to Northern Irish terrorists online. 
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Chapter 2: Media and Terrorism: can political violence be characterised as a 
communication strategy? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The cyberoptimist model implies that terrorism itself may be solvable if its perpetrators 
are given greater opportunity – via the Internet - to propagate their political ideologies. In 
order to test this hypothesis, one must first develop an understanding of the relationship 
between terrorism and the mass media. Crelinsten (2002) characterises terrorism as a 
form of ‘coercive communication,’ used by sub-state actors who ordinarily receive 
minimal coverage in the mass media (p.83). In this chapter, Margaret Thatcher’s 
assertion that the media provides terrorists with the ‘oxygen of publicity’ will be analysed 
using case studies such as the TWA 847 hostage crisis (1985). The norms that influence 
the editorial decisions of journalists will be analysed to determine whether they 
encourage marginal groups to perpetrate political violence. In addition, the ideological 
justifications for political violence will be examined to determine whether all forms of 
terrorism are media-oriented. The ‘terrorism as communication model’ will then be 
discussed with reference to Loyalists and Republican terrorist organisations in Northern 
Ireland. The analysis suggests that although terrorism can be characterised as a form of 
political communication, it is too simplistic to suggest terrorism is resolvable if its 
perpetrators are granted greater access to the media. Political ideologies motivate 
terrorists to perpetrate political violence, rather than the pursuit of media attention. The 
chapter concludes by analysing the nuances of the Northern Irish conflict, in order to 
contextualise the research in this thesis. 
 
DO THE NORMS THAT INFLUENCE THE MEDIA ENCOURAGE TERRORISM ? 
 
In this section, the proposition that the media encourages terrorism is analysed with 
reference to the four media models, as originally conceived by Siebert, Peterson, and 
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Schramm (1963). This hypothesis suggests that terrorism is a rational communication 
strategy, utilised by actors who receive little or no coverage in the mass media. Media 
models are relevant to the analysis of the ‘terrorism as political communication’ model as 
they define how mass media organisations should behave vis-à-vis terrorist organisations. 
These models could potentially create a context in which sub-state minorities perceive 
that political violence is the only communication strategy available to them. This reflects 
the role of the mass media in political communication within nation-states. The mass 
media can be characterised as an “agent of political socialisation” within nation-states, 
presenting a set of cultural values that their audience tacitly accept as typical of a 
particular society (Graber, 1997: 3). Terrorists typically perceive that the media do not 
reflect their ideological values, nor provide a space in which they can communicate with 
both sympathetic and hostile audiences. Thus, terrorists arguably perpetrate atrocities to 
forcibly gain access to the “triangle of political communication,” encompassing the news 
media, the public, and the government (Nacos, 2003: 3). Terrorists claim that their 
grievances are only likely to receive media coverage if illuminated by a high profile 
atrocity. 
 
Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1963) identified four models that characterise the 
behaviour of the mass media in advanced industrialised nation-states (See Table 2.1). 
There is a high degree of convergence between these models on the issue of censorship. 
All four models assert that the media should not enjoy absolute freedom of expression 
within nation-states, irrespective of whether they are fully independent from the ruling 
government. The Soviet and authoritarian models converge on the principle that the 
media should 'support and advance' the policies of the government in power (Siebert, 
Peterson and Schramm, 1963: 18). Both models also prescribe that the government 
should exercise monopoly powers over indigenous mass media organisations, prohibiting 
privately owned media companies. Therefore, these models suggest that the ruling 
government should receive more press coverage than small sub-state minorities.  
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[Table 2.1 here] 
 
Both the libertarian and social responsibility models suggest that the media should enjoy 
a greater degree of autonomy from their respective governments. The libertarian model 
suggests that the media should inform, entertain, and encourage critical thinking amongst 
their audience on political issues (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1963: 51). The media 
are characterised as a 'check' on the power of the government, rather than a vehicle for its 
propaganda (Negrine, 1994: 25). In theory, the editorial independence of the media stems 
from its financial self-sufficiency, as each media organisation relies upon private 
investment for sustenance rather than government funding. Therefore, libertarian norms 
in the mass media may benefit terrorists in terms of the level of coverage they receive in 
the aftermath of an atrocity. People inevitably turn to media sources for information on 
terrorist atrocities. Therefore, media organisations will provide extensive coverage of a 
terrorist atrocity if it affects a large population, as this will reflect the interests and values 
of their target audience. This leads to terrorists receiving extensive coverage in the mass 
media long after they have perpetrated an atrocity. However, the model identifies several 
circumstances in which a national government should limit the freedom of its indigenous 
mass media. Governments can restrict the flow of information from the media to its 
audience in order to protect the reputation of individuals from defamatory comments, or 
to prevent the dissemination of obscene and indecent materials (p.55).  
 
The social responsibility model suggests that journalists should forsake the lure of large 
audiences and “behave responsibly in the interests of society” (Graber, 1997: 19). In 
theory, the media should provide an arena for both the government and its citizens - 
including minorities - to express their political opinions within democratic nation-states. 
However, the ambiguity of this model enables governments to use the norms of social 
responsibility to attack the right of the media to criticise their policies, a policy arguably 
consistent with the norms of the authoritarian model. This reflects the 'philosophical' 
similarities between the authoritarian and social responsibility paradigms (p: 22). The 
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'interests of society' in these media models typically equates to the interests of the nation-
state, and by default those of the ruling government. Furthermore, both models advocate 
the use of the media to support the 'basic ideas' of society and to “shape people into more 
perfect social beings” (p.22). Political minorities, whose interests conflict with the ‘basic 
idea of society,’ are thus unlikely to receive routine coverage if these models influence 
the behaviour of the mass media. 
 
The Hallin and Mancini media models 
 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) add more nuances to the libertarian model, suggesting there 
are in fact three models that influence media behaviour within democratic nation-states. 
In contrast to the media models devised by Siebert et al, these models are all based upon 
cases studies. 
These are: 
 
1. The liberal (North Atlantic) model, used to describe the media systems in the 
United Kingdom and the United States.  
2. The Democratic Corporatist model derived from studies of media systems in 
northern Europe.   
3. The Polarised Pluralist model, used to describe media systems within 
Mediterranean countries in southern Europe 
 
All of these models are based on the idea of political parallelism, that is to say the extent 
to which each media system reflects the political climate of a nation-state.44 The liberal 
model is probably the most similar to the libertarian model devised by Siebert, Peterson, 
and Schramm. This media system is characterised by the relative dominance of 
commercial media, with governments exerting an appreciable influence upon the 
activities of public sector broadcasters, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 11). However, minorities are still likely to receive limited 
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media coverage under this media system. In the United Kingdom, one of the examples 
used by Hallin and Mancini to illustrate this model, the press is overtly political and 
linked to political parties (p.246). As such, the media are still likely to reflect the views of 
the political elite, as opposed to provide an outlet for minorities who have limited 
political power.  
 
The other models suggest that there should be a closer relationship between the political 
establishment and the media. For example, the Democratic Corporatist model suggests 
that the commercial media should have a strong association with organised political 
forces (p.170). Although the state has a legally limited role in the media, political parties 
may still influence the news agenda. This is in sharp contrast to the level of state 
interference prescribed by the Polarised Pluralist model. This system has lower levels of 
journalistic autonomy in comparison to the other two models. This model envisages a 
close relationship between the media and the state, as the media is heavily reliant upon 
state subsidies (p.119). In the absence of a strong commercial media, journalists are often 
pressurised to comply with the wishes of the political elite. Overall, minorities are 
unlikely to receive the press coverage they often crave in liberal democracies, as 
organised political forces have the ability to influence the news agenda. All of the media 
models suggest that the freedom of the mass media should be restricted in accordance 
with the interests of their respective government. Sub-state minorities will remain outside 
the ‘triangle of political communication’ if these models influence the behaviour of the 
media in their respective polities.  
 
Do these norms encourage sub-state minorities to perpetrate political violence? 
 
Media models describe how the media “should or could operate,” rather than provide 
accurate descriptions of how they actually operate.45 Few, if any, nation-states have 
established systems of control over the media that comply with any of these media 
models in their totality. Nevertheless, when these norms influence the behaviour of the 
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mass media they indirectly contribute towards the circumstances that drive some sub-
state actors towards political violence. For example, the authoritarian model suggests that 
the media should represent the views and interests of the government in power. 
Therefore, sub-state minorities, whether radicalised or not, are not supposed to have 
access to the mass media due to the close relationship between the media and the political 
elite. As a result, groups defined as terrorists will face widespread censorship in semi-
authoritarian nation-states. Many of these states will control their indigenous mass media 
with reference to the norms of the authoritarian model.  
 
The mass media also contributes towards the exclusion of minorities within liberal 
democracies. The libertarian model, which views the media as a check on the 
government, prescribes a system of media ownership that minimises government 
interference with the freedom of the press. In theory, the mass media should highlight the 
ideologies of anti-state groups for the benefit of the wider population. However, the 
reliance on advertising revenue forces media organisations within liberal democracies to 
seek large audiences to satisfy the requirements of their sponsors. This pursuit of higher 
viewing and circulation figures inevitably reduces the space allocated to less popular 
pursuits, such as the interests of political minorities. Nation-states may also use the norms 
of social responsibility to justify censorship of the media within democratic nation-states. 
Governments, that define the 'interests of society' as synonymous with their own, may 
prevent the media from providing a platform to radical minorities that threaten the 
political status quo. In addition, the Hallin and Mancini models suggest that there may be 
strong ties between organised political forces and the media in liberal democracies. These 
political forces are unlikely to encourage the media to focus on the interest of radical 
minorities, particularly if this is at the expense of their own political agendas.  
 
Clearly, the norms that influence the media do contribute to the context that drives some 
sub-state actors towards political violence. Within liberal democracies, disillusioned 
minorities do not receive media coverage due to the free market principles that determine 
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the system of media ownership and financing. In semi - authoritarian nation-states, there 
is an ideological rationale for the exclusion of political minorities from the ‘triangle of 
political communication,’ particularly if they do not express support for the ruling 
government. However, it is perhaps too simplistic to suggest that terrorism would be 
solvable if disillusioned groups were given greater access to the conventional mass 
media. Terrorists may perpetrate violence for reasons other than attracting the attention of 
the mass media. There will always be people who perceive that the status quo is 
intolerable, violence being the only remedy available to them (Laqueur, 1978: 255). Even 
so, they may cite their exclusion from the mass media as one of the grievances that has 
led them to use violence for political advantage. Conceivably, governments may justify 
the removal of a ‘pro-terrorist’ website with reference to one of the media models. In this 
thesis, the research will determine whether the potential of the Internet as a means of 
generating soft power depends upon the limits placed on the use of these technologies by 
nation-states.  
  
TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA 
 
The analysis will now focus on whether all forms of terrorism rely upon the 'oxygen of 
publicity.' The ‘oxygen of publicity’ axiom first came to prominence in 1985, when 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously declared that the media “provides the 
oxygen of publicity upon which terrorists depend” (Hoffman, 1998: 143). Thatcher 
insinuated that all forms of terrorism depend upon the coverage of the mass media, 
irrespective of their objectives, ideologies, and the context in which they operate. Yet, 
this axiom fails to acknowledge that terrorism is a subjective, rather than an objective, 
political issue. Terrorism is a generic term used to describe ‘non-permissible’ violence, 
whether it be perpetrated by states, groups, or individuals. There is no consensus amongst 
academics or national governments upon a universal definition of terrorism. For example, 
if all national governments accepted the 'oxygen' axiom, the majority of academic and 
government definitions of terrorism would presumably identify publicity as one of the 
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desired effects of political violence. The evidence provided by the Schmid and Jongman 
study of 'official' definitions of terrorism (1988) would appear to offer only moderate 
support for this proposition. Publicity appeared in only 21.5 percent of the definitions 
analysed, far behind the most commonly identified variables of violence (83.5 percent), 
political motivation (65 percent), and fear (51 percent) (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 3). 
The Wieviorka models will be analysed to determine whether terrorists perpetrate 
political violence solely to capture the attention of the mass media, or to achieve other 
individual and collective objectives (See Table 2.2). 
  
[Table 2.2 here] 
 
Passive Attitude 
 
Wieviorka suggests that terrorists may be indifferent to how the media reacts to their 
political violence (Wieviorka, 1993: 44). Two forms of political violence may persist 
irrespective of whether they receive media coverage, namely state sponsored terrorism 
and terrorism motivated by a religious imperative. These terrorist actors do not perpetrate 
political violence solely to capture the attention of the mass media. The perpetrators of 
state-sponsored terrorism use acts of political violence to “covertly bring pressure to bear 
upon the sponsor’s opponents” (Hoffman, 1998: 189). State sponsors often provide 
logistical support - such as intelligence data - to ‘hired gun’ terrorist organisations, and in 
return, these groups perpetrate atrocities that advance the foreign policy objectives of 
their sponsor (p.186).  
 
Publicity is arguably neither the intention nor the desired outcome of state-sponsored 
terrorism. Nation-states use ‘hired gun’ terrorist groups as a “potentially risk-free means 
of anonymously attacking stronger enemies,” assuming that international organisations 
remain unaware of their complicity with the terrorists (p.186). Consequently, state 
sponsors, like Libya, usually deny their links with ‘hired gun’ terrorists, despite often-
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incontrovertible evidence to the contrary. The Libyan authorities repeatedly denied any 
involvement in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over the Scottish town of 
Lockerbie in December 1988, which resulted in 270 fatalities (p.190). The scale of 
Libyan involvement in the bombing became apparent at the subsequent trial of two 
Libyan nationals for the attack in 2000, which resulted in the conviction of Abdel Basset 
Al-Megrahi in January 2001.46 The Libyan authorities eventually accepted responsibility 
for the attack in April 2003, setting up a benevolent fund for the victims’ families.47 
 
Terrorism motivated by a religious imperative is also conceived primarily as an end in 
and of itself. ‘Holy’ terrorists perpetrate atrocities for themselves rather than a target 
audience, their violence perceived as a ‘divine duty’ (Hoffman, 1993: 3). Practitioners of 
‘Holy Terror’ perceive that they are participating in a global struggle between the Islamic 
and non-Islamic peoples, their duty being to export Islamic values throughout the world 
(Hoffman, 1993: 4). ‘Holy Terror’ is not constrained by the need to secure publicity, nor 
the “political, moral, or practical constraints” that affect other terrorists (p.2). Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorists justify the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians on the 
basis that the perpetrator will gain “an afterlife in paradise” (Moghadam, 2003: 87). 
Groups such as Hamas have used suicide attacks to bring pressure upon the Israeli 
government during the last decade. For example, Islamic Jihad, widely believed to be an 
affiliate of Hamas, claimed responsibility for the Bet Lid massacre in 1995, which left 21 
people dead including the perpetrator (Laqueur, 1999: 139). 
 
Militant white supremacists in the United States also use religion to justify the murder of 
innocent civilians. The white supremacists believe that a conspiracy of Jewish interests is 
plotting to overthrow the US government (Hoffman, 1993: 6). These groups often cite 
The Turner Diaries, the ‘bible’ of the white supremacist movement, as the theological 
justification for their anti-Semitic political violence. This book, written by William Pierce 
in 1978, tells the story of an underground white supremacist movement that engages in a 
‘race war’ against a ‘Jewish-Negro’ alliance. The Turner Diaries allegedly inspired a 
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number of attacks by white supremacists in the 1990s. For example, the book describes 
how white supremacists use an ammonium nitrate oil truck to disrupt a Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) computer installation.48 Timothy McVeigh’s attack on the Alfred P 
Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City (1995), which resulted in 168 fatalities, bore a 
remarkable similarity to the attack envisaged in Pierce’s book.49 In sum, both ‘Holy’ and 
state sponsored terrorists do not perpetrate violence solely to gain the oxygen of 
publicity. These actors are likely to continue to perpetrate atrocities, irrespective of 
whether they receive coverage in the mass media.  
 
Relative Indifference 
 
Alternatively, the terrorist could have a ‘relatively indifferent’ relationship with the mass 
media (Wieviorka, 1993: 43). In this scenario, the terrorist continues to manipulate the 
mass media coverage of their atrocities while simultaneously using alternative channels 
of political communication, such as legally constituted political front organisations or 
insurgent guerrilla armies (p.43). Ethno-nationalist terrorist organisations, such as 
Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), have established political fronts to compete in regional 
elections. Herri Batasuna (later renamed Batasuna) was set up in 1978 to create a new 
front in the struggle for Basque self-determination.50 In theory, participation in local and 
national elections provides a platform hitherto unavailable to terrorist organisations, 
enabling them to generate publicity for their cause without the need to perpetrate high 
profile atrocities. In reality, these political ‘fronts’ often receive minimal electoral 
support and terrorist organisations invariably persevere with their military campaigns in 
order to gain publicity. For example, in the 2001 Basque regional elections, the Batasuna 
party received just 10.12% of the votes cast, giving them just seven seats in the 75 strong 
regional Assembly.51 Predictably, the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) military campaign 
continued unabated after this election result.  
 
On the other hand, terrorists may have sufficient human resources to exert physical 
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control over a disputed territory. The establishment of a ‘military’ presence in a territory 
will inevitably expose its inhabitants to the rationale of the terrorist organisation. The 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers) more closely resemble a ‘guerrilla’ 
army than a sub-state terrorist organisation. The Tamil Tigers have an estimated 10,000 
‘soldiers’ at their disposal, compared to the average terrorist organisation that possesses 
between 10 and 100 members.52 The group has utilised these ‘soldiers’ to wage what in 
effect has become a civil war against the central government, asserting their hegemony 
over a quarter of Sri Lanka’s territory.53 These examples illustrate how high profile 
atrocities - designed to maximise publicity for the terrorist organisation via manipulation 
of the mass media - can be just one of several methods used in a terrorist’s psychological 
war against a target audience.  
 
Media-Oriented Strategy 
 
Terrorists pursue a media oriented strategy if they manipulate their knowledge of media 
operations in order to maximise publicity (Wieviorka, 1993: 44). In this scenario, the 
terrorist commits an atrocity at a time and location conducive to securing the maximum 
possible media coverage. These terrorist actors perpetrate high profile atrocities in order 
to further their campaign of ‘psychological warfare against a target audience. This 
psychological campaign typically has two central aims, to increase public recognition of 
the terrorist’s rationale and reduce public confidence in the national government (Gerritts. 
1992: 30). If an individual identifies with the victim, perpetrator, or the motivation 
behind the atrocity, then the terrorist can claim a psychological victory (Schmid, 1989: 
545). Terrorists often perpetrate atrocities that force television broadcasters to interrupt 
their regular schedules with ‘news flashes.’ News flashes allow these actors to ‘terrorise’ 
large audiences who have no prior knowledge of the terrorist actor or their ideology. The 
harrowing pictures of two commercial airliners flying into the World Trade Centre in 
New York on 11 September 2001, and its subsequent collapse, perhaps best illustrate the 
power of the ‘news flash.’ The World Trade Center attacks were a “perfectly 
  
 
 
 41 
   
 
choreographed production” aimed at American and international audiences (Nacos, 2003: 
3). The first aircraft, American Airlines flight 11, crashed into the North Tower of the 
World Trade Center at 8.45am (EST).54As news networks such as CNN began to transmit 
live footage of the burning North Tower, United Airlines flight 175 crashed into the 
South Tower, watched by a global television audience.55  
 
Ultimately, a media - oriented strategy may only provide ephemeral gains for a terrorist 
actor engaged in a ‘psychological’ war. The media bombard audiences with images of 
both ‘man-made’ and natural disasters on an almost daily basis (Negrine, 1994:30). 
Consequently, the mass media can only bestow transcendental qualities upon a terrorist 
atrocity, like 9/11, if it periodically follows up on the event in question. The terrorist who 
adopts this strategy arguably has to execute a series of cataclysmic atrocities to retain the 
attention of the mass media in the medium to long - term. The message behind the 
terrorist campaign changes accordingly, as the initial plea of ‘look at me’ evolves into a 
different message, namely, ‘I’m still here’ (Gearty, 1991: 13). In sum, terrorists who lack 
the resources of groups like the Tamil Tigers may choose to adopt a media - oriented 
strategy. Yet, this strategy provides only short-term gains, unless the terrorist perpetrates 
a series of high profile atrocities that repeatedly capture the attention of the mass media.  
 
Total Break from Society 
 
Wieviorka’s final model suggests that an antagonistic relationship may develop between 
the terrorist and the mass media. Terrorists may target media personnel, as they perceive 
that they are collaborators with an ‘unjust’ political regime (Wieviorka, 1993: 44). For 
example, a group calling itself the Jaish al-Islam (Army of Islam) held the BBC 
correspondent Alan Johnston in captivity for nearly four months in the Gaza Strip in 
2007. During this period, a number of video tapes featuring images of Mr. Johnston were 
sent to media organisations, such as Al Jazeera TV. In these videos, Mr. Johnston’s 
captors stated that they would release the BBC journalist if a number of Islamist prisoners 
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were released from British prisons.56 This provided a propaganda coup for the Army of 
Islam, who received extensive media coverage until Mr. Johnston was eventually 
released in July 2007. Alternatively, terrorists may murder journalists because they are 
outspoken on issues that resonate with their supporters.57 In 2004, terrorists murdered 53 
journalists from countries as geographically diverse as Russia and Iraq.58 Overall, 
terrorists may target media personnel if they consider they are complicit with their 
enemies. However, most terrorists adopt an ambivalent attitude towards media personnel, 
rather than perceive them as collaborators with an ‘unjust’ regime. 
 
Can terrorists really be indifferent to the mass media? 
 
Wilkinson (1997) asserts, “If there is no aim to instill terror through the mass media, then 
the violence is not of a terroristic nature” (p: 52). Schmid & Jongman (1988) provide 
support for this proposition, ‘fear’ featuring in 51 percent of the definitions of terrorism 
in their study (p.3). As such, terrorism can be characterised as a ‘psychological’ weapon, 
used by actors to generate publicity for their ideologies, enabling them to communicate 
with their supporters and opponents (Chermak, 2003:7). Journalist Ted Koppel suggests 
that terrorism without television coverage is similar to the philosopher’s ‘tree in the 
forest,’ “if nobody hears it fall, it does not exist” (Clawson, 1990: 242). All terrorists 
benefit from media coverage of their atrocities as it exposes audiences to their political 
ideologies, albeit for a brief period.  
 
The development of the mass media has altered the means by which polities identify with 
the causation and effects of political violence. In 1881, Narodnya Volya, arguably the 
world’s first terrorist organisation, assassinated Tsar Alexander II in the world’s first high 
- profile terrorist atrocity (Clutterbuck, 2004: 154). People identified with the victim or 
perpetrator of this assassination through the publication of their names in newspapers 
across the globe. After the first television satellite launched in 1968, ‘real time’ colour 
television pictures aided the process of identification. Terrorism, like the mass media, has 
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evolved over the past century as new phenomena such as state-sponsored and ‘holy’ 
terror have emerged. Publicity is less important for state-sponsored terrorism, with most 
state sponsors refusing to claim responsibility for atrocities perpetrated in their name. 
State-sponsored terrorists do not need to publicise their cause or to solicit financial 
support from a particular constituency (Clawson, 1990: 242). For terrorists motivated by 
a religious imperative, the act of political violence also constitutes an end in and of itself. 
Superficially, at least, these terrorist actors do not require the oxygen of publicity 
provided by the mass media. 
 
Although publicity may not be the primary goal of ‘holy’ or state-sponsored terrorists, 
both are still likely to benefit from media attention. For state-sponsors of terrorism, the 
media speculation on their alleged responsibility for an atrocity may represent a 
propaganda coup in itself. For example, the extensive media coverage that followed 
Lockerbie arguably enhanced Libya’s reputation as a leading sponsor of international 
terrorism.59 For terrorism motivated by a religious imperative, suicide-bomb attacks 
arguably fulfil two sets of objectives, namely the objectives of the individual and those of 
the terrorist organisation. A suicide attack draws the attention of the media towards the 
terrorist organisation and its grievances, as well as turning the individual terrorist into a 
martyr. For example, Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been responsible for a number of 
lethal suicide attacks in the past decade, such as the 9/11 atrocities. Al Qaeda publications 
stress the importance of ‘oxygen of publicity’ to the organisation. The Al Qaeda ‘Jihad’ 
urges its adherents to target ‘sentimental landmarks,’ such as the Eiffel Tower in Paris, in 
order to maximise publicity for the organisation (Nacos, 2004: 3). In sum, all forms of 
terrorism rely upon the mass media to further their campaigns of psychological warfare. 
Some terrorist actors are less dependent upon the mass media for sustenance than others 
are, as they conceive their violence as an end in and of itself. Elsewhere, some terrorist 
actors may not claim responsibility for atrocities, for fear of implicating a state sponsor. 
Nevertheless, by definition, all terrorist actors use political violence as an instrument to 
achieve strategic political and ‘military’ objectives. The manipulation of the mass media 
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via high profile atrocities remains the most effective method of ‘terrorising’ a target 
audience. 
 
THE EFFECTS OF MEDIA REPORTING (1) PRO - TERRORIST 
 
Sympathetic Constituencies 
 
In this section, the positive and negative effects of media reporting on terrorist atrocities 
will be discussed. Media coverage has the potential to bestow a ‘transcendental’ quality 
upon a terrorist atrocity, as graphically illustrated by the 9/11 atrocities. Terrorists 
achieve psychological victories over a target audience hours, days, and even years later if 
television news networks capture their atrocities live and replay these images constantly. 
Media coverage of terrorist atrocities also enables terrorist actors to communicate with 
sympathetic constituencies. Most terrorist actors, with the notable exception of state -
sponsored terrorists, solicit financial and human resources from sympathetic 
communities. Terrorists perceive that sympathetic constituencies are more likely to offer 
this support when ‘terrorist deeds’ are perpetrated, and, more importantly, seen to be 
perpetrated in their name (Gerrits, 1992: 40).  
 
Terrorists may justify individual atrocities on the basis that they represent the ‘will’ of the 
people that they purport to represent. For example, in the wake of the Republican hunger 
strikes in 1981, Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams suggested there was a ‘considerable 
popular demand’ for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) to take ‘punitive 
action’ against Britain (Adams, 1986: 86). Sympathetic Irish American ‘solidarity’ 
groups such the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) funded the Provisional IRA 
activity that followed the hunger strikes (Horgan and Taylor, 1999: 8). The Irish Northern 
Aid Committee (NORAID) has allegedly funded the ‘military’ campaign of the 
Republican movement since the beginning of the Northern Irish ‘Troubles.’ In 1977, the 
US government provided further evidence of the organisation’s links to the Republican 
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movement, forcing it to register as an ‘agent’ of the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA).60 Nonetheless, Irish American groups, irrespective of their complicity with acts 
of terrorism, have remained steadfast supporters of the Republican movement since the 
late 1960s. The Provisional IRA arguably perpetrated high profile atrocities in this period 
to demonstrate to sympathetic audiences that they were committed to the ‘armed struggle. 
Media coverage not only allows terrorists to intimidate target audiences, but also 
provides a means of mobilising support from sympathetic constituencies. Terrorists 
perpetrate high-profile atrocities in order to convince their patrons that they are still 
actively pursuing their common objectives.  
 
The Contagion Effect 
 
Media coverage of atrocities may provide a model for future terrorist operations. Schmid 
(1989) asserts that successful hijackings of aircraft in the 1970s influenced 53 percent of 
attempted transportation hijackings in 1989 (p.558). The TWA 847 hostage crisis (1985) 
arguably illustrates this ‘contagion effect.’ The hijacking of TWA 847, en route from 
Rome to Cairo on 14th June 1985, bore a strong resemblance to previous acts of aviation 
terrorism, such as the Dawson’s Field hostage crisis. On 6 September 1970, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) seized control of four aircraft travelling from 
Europe to New York, two of the hijacked planes being forced to land at the Dawson’s 
Field airfield in Jordan. After a fifth aircraft had been hijacked and taken to Dawson’s 
Field a day later, the terrorists demanded the release of Palestinian terrorist Leila Kaled in 
return for the return of the passengers. The hostage crisis culminated in the destruction of 
the three aircraft in front of the assembled international media, the release of Khaled and 
the imprisonment of three of the Palestinian guerrillas.61 The Lebanese Shi’a terrorists 
who hijacked flight TWA 847 also demanded the release of incarcerated Palestinian 
terrorists in exchange for the safe return of their hostages. Similar to the events at 
Dawson’s Field, the international media assembled in Beirut to record the hostage crisis 
as it unfolded. The blanket television coverage provided by the American Broadcasting 
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Corporation (ABC), National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) and Columbia 
Broadcasting System (CBS) networks deeply traumatised millions of Americans. 
Coverage across the three networks amounted to 491 reports, totalling 729 minutes, in the 
17-day period of the hostage crisis (Choi, 1994: 122). The TWA 847 hostage crisis itself 
arguably provides a model for future aircraft hijackings, as “behaviour rewarded is 
typically behaviour repeated” (Schmid, 1989: 558). The hostage crisis ended after the 
Reagan administration met the demands of the terrorists, forcing Israel to release 756 
Shi’a prisoners (Hoffman, 1998: 133).  
 
The Reagan administration complied with the demands of the terrorists, as public opinion 
in the United States demanded the safe return of the 39 American hostages at almost any 
cost. The ‘human-interest’ stories reported by the three main news networks affected 
public opinion vis-à-vis the hostage crisis (P.133). News networks concentrated upon the 
plight of the hostages and their families to justify the expense of their continued presence 
in Beirut, allowing relatives a platform to call for the release of the 756 Shi’a prisoners in 
exchange for the 39 American hostages (p.133). The TWA 847 model suggests that the 
media could prove to be a valuable weapon for a terrorist engaged in a protracted hostage 
crisis. Concessions are more likely to be achieved by the terrorist if public opinion - 
influenced by ‘human interest’ stories reported by the media - favours the safe return of 
the hostages over other political considerations, such as a government’s refusal to 
negotiate with terrorists. Overall, media reporting of atrocities creates a contagion effect 
for terrorism, allowing terrorists to copy the successful methods and strategies used by 
others elsewhere.  
 
THE EFFECTS OF MEDIA REPORTING (2) ANTI-TERRORIST? 
 
‘Culturally Relevant’ Terrorism 
 
The coverage of terrorism in the mass media may not benefit all groups who perpetrate 
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political violence. Some terrorist atrocities may receive blanket coverage in the mass 
media while others fail to make the front pages of newspapers or appear as a ‘headline’ 
on television news bulletins. For example, between 1968 and 1974, The London Times 
reported only 57 percent of all international terrorist incidents, as defined by the RAND 
Corporation.62 The norms of the four media models arguably affect the level of media 
coverage afforded to a terrorist atrocity. As discussed in this chapter, the four media 
models suggest that national governments can restrict the freedom of the media in a 
number of circumstances. Governments may justify such restrictions on the basis that a 
story is offensive, defamatory of certain individuals, or constitutes a threat to national 
security. Media organisations cannot broadcast material that draws attention towards a 
terrorist without some consideration of the political ramifications of their actions. In 
addition, media editors are must decide whether a terrorist atrocity is more ‘newsworthy’ 
than the other breaking stories of the day. Newspaper editors devote limited space to 
politics and rely upon advertising revenue or government subsidy to maintain their 
operations. 24-hour ‘rolling’ television news networks such as CNN also have to satisfy 
their corporate sponsors, although they can ‘break’ live news stories as they unfold, as 
demonstrated by the blanket coverage of the 9/11 atrocities. Thus, all news media 
organisations must decide whether a terrorist atrocity is ‘relevant’ to its core audience.  
 
The Western mass media tend to focus upon terrorism directed against ‘elite nations,’ 
such as the United States, rather than atrocities perpetrated elsewhere. Galtung & Ruge 
analysed the factors that influenced the coverage of three foreign crises in the Norwegian 
mass media. Their study concluded that an event, like a terrorist atrocity, had to be 
“culturally relevant, unexpected, and of a certain amplitude” to gain media coverage in 
Norway (Negrine, 1994: 120). The 9/11 atrocities arguably illustrate how these factors 
influence the behaviour of the mass media worldwide. These attacks on Washington D.C. 
and New York were both unexpected and unprecedented in terms of the number of 
fatalities. If a terrorist atrocity fails to satisfy at least one of the conditions outlined by 
Galtung and Rye, it is unlikely to receive coverage in the Norwegian mass media. 
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Terrorism does not sell as well as ‘sex and money’ and editors have to consider the 
interests of both their audience and sponsors in deciding whether a story is ‘newsworthy’ 
(Wieviorka, 1993: 47). 
 
UK Media Perspective on Northern Ireland: Hierarchy of Death? 
 
The murders of three juveniles in March 1993 illustrate how seemingly identical terrorist 
atrocities can receive vastly different levels of media coverage. In March 1993, the 
murders of three-year-old Jonathan Ball and twelve-year-old Tim Parry in a Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) bomb attack in Warrington received extensive media 
coverage in the United Kingdom. Tabloid newspapers such as The Sun, The Daily Mail, 
and The Daily Star were littered with condemnations of the Provisional IRA atrocity for 
several days after the atrocity.63 Just five days later, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) 
murdered 17-year-old Damien Walsh in West Belfast. The three tabloid newspapers, so 
vitriolic in the editorials published in the aftermath of the Warrington murders, failed to 
mention the West Belfast murder in their subsequent publications.64 The young age of the 
two victims may partly explain the ferocity of the media coverage that followed the 
Warrington attacks. Jonathan Ball was one of the youngest victims of the Northern Irish 
conflict.  
An alternative explanation might be that the editors of tabloid newspapers in the United 
Kingdom did not consider the murder of Damien Walsh newsworthy. Greenslade (1998) 
suggests that the disparity in media coverage of the two attacks is indicative of a 
‘hierarchy of death’ that permeates British media coverage of Irish terrorism. British 
people killed in mainland Britain [England, Wales or Scotland] are rated the most 
‘newsworthy,’ receiving the most headlines in tabloid newspapers such as The Sun. The 
second rank of ‘victimhood’ consists of army personnel killed on active service in 
Northern Ireland, with civilian victims of Loyalist and Republican paramilitary attacks in 
Northern Ireland rated the least ‘newsworthy.’ There is a high degree of convergence 
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between the Greenslade analysis and the Galtung and Ruge study. The Warrington bomb 
captured the attention of the mass media because one of the victims was just three years 
old. In contrast, the British tabloid press considered the murder of Damien Walsh 
“another statistic in an old story with too many tragedies.”65 The ‘hierarchy of death’ 
paradigm suggests that the British mass media focus upon atrocities that resonate with its 
core audience. Northern Irish terrorist organisations will receive greater coverage in the 
mass media if they perpetrate atrocities on the UK Mainland, rather than within Northern 
Ireland. 
 
NEWS FRAMING AND TERRORISM 
 
The chapter will now consider how news framing affects a terrorist’s psychological war 
against a target population, and whether terrorists always benefit from the negative 
publicity generated by their atrocities. News framing is the process whereby media 
organisations “define and construct political issues and public controversies” (Nelson, 
Clawson and Oxley, 1997: 657). The media models analysed earlier in this chapter 
inform how media organisations frame a terrorist atrocity. The TWA 847 hostage crisis 
demonstrates how news framing, with reference to the libertarian model, can benefit the 
terrorist. The US government acceded to the demands of the terrorists after US public 
opinion - influenced by the soft human-interest stories in the mass media - demanded the 
safe return of the 39 hostages at virtually any cost (Hoffman, 1998: 133). Yet, news 
framing may not always work to the advantage of a terrorist actor. For example, the 
grievances that inspired Al Qaeda were largely overlooked by the US media in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 atrocities. Analysis of Time and Newsweek magazines in the five-
week period that followed 9/11 showed that “journalists strongly affirmed a sense of US 
national identity,” rather than analyse the factors that led to the atrocities in the first place 
(Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudeaux, and Garland, 2004: 46). Consequently, terrorists 
cannot assume that the media will publicise their grievances if they report on one of their 
atrocities.  
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The mass media can provide a terrorist actor with the ‘oxygen of publicity’ with 
reference to the norms of the social responsibility model. In this scenario, the terrorist 
actor does not exert control over the mass media per se, although they may continue to 
benefit from the publicity surrounding their activity. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
the social responsibility model suggests that the media should act ‘responsibly’ and in 
support of the basic ideas of society. In theory, this might include participation in a 
counter-terrorist operation. For example, the US news media played a critical role in the 
capture of Theodore Kaczynski, also known as ‘The Unabomber,’ in April 1996. 
66Federal agents apprehended Kaczynski in September 1995 after several people 
recognised his writing style in a number of manifestos published in the New York Times 
and the Washington Post. Kaczynski had initially promised to restrict his terror campaign 
if these newspapers agreed to publish one of his manifestos (Hoffman, 1998: 155). The 
newspapers published the manifestos at the request of the US Justice Department, who 
hoped that someone might recognise the writing style of the author. Kaczynski was 
captured shortly afterwards, when his brother informed the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) that he recognised the writing style in the manifestos (p.155).  
 
Therefore, high profile atrocities can have unanticipated - and occasionally negative - 
consequences for terrorist actors if the mass media do not reproduce the ‘irresponsible’ 
journalism that infected the TWA 847 hostage crisis. In some cases, media coverage may 
constrain the activities of terrorist organisations. For example, American journalist Jerry 
Levin, taken hostage in Lebanon in 1984, believed that extensive media coverage forced 
his captors to spare his life. After his release, Levin claimed that he had not been 
executed because his captors were concerned about the possible impact of his death on 
international opinion (Kegley, 1990: 242). Both these incidents demonstrate that the 
‘oxygen of publicity’ may come at a high price for terrorist actors. If the media frame an 
atrocity with reference to the norms of social responsibility, the terrorist may face capture 
or other unanticipated outcomes.  
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The Effect of News Framing on Support for Terrorism 
 
News framing can change public attitudes at an aggregate level towards terrorism if a 
number of conditions are fulfilled. Philo suggests that three factors are important in 
audience reception, namely direct experience of the issue being reported, the use of logic 
to identify contradictions within the media account, and the cultural, political and value 
systems of the audience members (Philo, 1999: 284). Therefore, the mass media can 
strongly influence perceptions about events if an audience has no direct experience of the 
event and does not share similar cultural values to the protagonists involved (Philo, 1994: 
30). The Philo analysis suggests that news framing could have a significant impact upon 
perceptions of terrorism perpetrated abroad, rather than at home. The Arab-Israeli 
conflict can be used to illustrate the impact of news framing upon perceptions of 
international terrorism. The widely held perception amongst the American public is that 
terrorism in the region is almost universally of Palestinian origin. This reflects the fact 
that the words ‘Muslim’ and ‘fanatic’ are almost interchangeable in the US media (Alali 
and Byrd, 1994:11) These frames carry such influence on the opinions of the audience as 
several of Philo’s conditions are present. The American public - with the notable 
exception of the Jewish and Muslim communities - have neither direct experience of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict nor any cultural or political ties to the principal political actors in the 
region. This audience is therefore more likely to be attentive to the cues of the American 
media on the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
 
Yet, news framing may have little or no effect upon the terrorist’s ability to mobilise 
support from sympathetic constituencies. Many terrorists perpetrate high profile atrocities 
in order to mobilise support from constituencies, many of whom broadly support their 
aims and methods. These groups are unlikely to cut their ties with terrorist organisations, 
even if they receive negative publicity in the mass media. Moreover, terrorists perpetrate 
political violence to subject a target audience to a psychological war, rather than to win 
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popular support. As discussed in this chapter, a terrorist can claim a psychological victory 
if their activities receive any media coverage, good or bad. Therefore, terrorists perpetrate 
atrocities which are likely to secure media coverage, as demonstrated by the 9/11 
atrocities. This raises questions as to whether media manipulation remains the most 
effective vehicle for a terrorist’s psychological warfare. Cyberoptimists suggest that the 
Internet can create a critical multiplier effect for these marginal groups, allowing them to 
choose their own frames and attract a potential global audience. In this thesis, the online 
framing of Loyalist and Republicans will be analysed to determine how these actors use 
their websites to mobilise supporters and intimidate target audiences.  
 
THE TROUBLES: AN OVERVIEW 
 
Ethnic Nationalism and ‘Double Minority’ 
 
In order to analyse online communications in post-conflict Northern Ireland, it is 
necessary to develop an understanding and appreciation of the nuances of the Northern 
Irish conflict and the actors, both state and non-state, that have been party to this conflict. 
The Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ can be characterised as the clash of two strands of ethnic 
nationalism. Ethnic nationalist movements seek to ‘politicise’ an ethnic group through the 
exploitation of its history and culture that distinguishes it from other ethnic groups. 
Invariably, these groups will reject political assimilation and cultural accommodation in 
multi-ethnic states (O’Sullivan See, 1986: 148). Since the creation of Northern Ireland in 
1921, Protestant and Catholic communities have failed to agree upon a common identity 
to which they both can subscribe (Graham, 2004: 484). Catholic and Protestant social 
identities remain predominantly tied to their external ‘ethno-guarantors,’ the Republic of 
Ireland and Great Britain respectively (Byrnes, 2001: 341). Catholics typically identify 
themselves as Irish, while Protestants identify themselves as British. These social 
identities directly influence the political aspirations of these ethnic communities. The 
majority of Catholics vote for nationalist or republican political parties, who wish to see 
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Northern Ireland reunite with the Republic of Ireland. Republicans are differentiated from 
nationalists by virtue of their support for political violence. Meanwhile, the majority of 
Protestants vote for Unionist and Loyalist political parties, who support the existing 
union with Great Britain. In a similar vein to Republicanism, Loyalism is based upon a 
‘narrative of violence,’ with ‘pro-state’ terrorists claiming that they exist purely to protect 
the province from Republican attacks (p.488). Moreover, Bryan (2000) asserts that the 
terms Protestant, Unionist, and Loyalist are used in some discourses ‘almost 
interchangeably,’ as are the terms Catholic and nationalist (p.15).  
 
The ‘Double Minority’ model illustrates the mutual distrust between Northern Ireland’s 
two main communities. Protestants and Catholics tend to believe that one side can only 
gain at the expense of the other (O’Connor, 1993: 142). Both communities perceive that 
they are a politically disadvantaged minority in the region, albeit for very different 
reasons. Catholics in Northern Ireland believe that they are an oppressed minority in a 
state dominated by their Protestant neighbours. The economic and political 
discrimination against the Catholic community in Northern Ireland before 1968 [and 
recent surveys suggest persists today in some sectors] has contributed towards this 
negative stereotyping of the Protestant community.67 Protestants also perceive that they 
are a minority, although this is in comparison to the entire population of the island of 
Ireland (Roe, Pegg, Hodges & Trimm, 1999: 125). Unionists perceive that members of 
the Catholic community are not loyal to the British monarchy, as demonstrated by their 
support for the reunification of Ireland (Hennessey, 1994: 128). As the notion of being 
British in an Irish context is an integral part of Protestant identity, the perceived 
disloyalty of the Catholic community has reinforced the siege mentality amongst the 
unionist community. In sum, both Protestants and Catholics in the province perceive that 
politics in Northern Ireland is a zero-sum game. Despite potential cross cutting cleavages 
like language and class, conflicting national aspirations have undermined efforts to 
reduce inter-communal tensions in Northern Ireland since 1921. 
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Unionist Control: 1921-1972 
 
The roots of the Northern Irish conflict can be traced back to the system of governance 
established in the Province in 1921. Cochrane (1994) asserts that these governing 
arrangements embedded sectarianism “deep into the fabric of the Northern Irish state” 
(p.164). The Stormont ‘control system’ bestowed power upon the Ulster Unionist Party, 
who predominantly acted in the interests of the Protestant community (McGarry, 2002: 
455). The redrawing of electoral boundaries, also known as ‘gerrymandering,’ ensured 
that Unionist politicians dominated the Stormont Assembly at the expense of their 
Nationalist counterparts. In addition, Catholics faced discrimination in local government 
employment and the allocation of public sector housing (Bew and Gillespie, 1993: 1). 
This control system collapsed because of changes in the social composition of the 
Catholic community. A confident, energized, Catholic middle class emerged in the late 
1960s that were no longer willing to accept second - class citizenship in Northern Ireland 
(McGarry, 2002: p.455). The Stormont Assembly was unable to satisfy the political, 
social, and economic aspirations of the newly politicised Catholic middle class. 
Accordingly, the Catholic middle classes featured prominently in the civil rights 
demonstrations that defined the era. Reflecting the zero-sum nature of Northern Irish 
politics, both communities reacted differently to the imposition of Direct Rule from 
Westminster in March 1972. While the Catholic community saw the removal of the 
Unionist control system as a victory, Protestants saw it as an embarrassing defeat. Brian 
Faulkner immediately tendered his resignation as Northern Irish Prime Minister, 
declaring that the transfer of power to London “cannot be supported or accepted by us” 
(Bew & Gillespie, 1993: 48). In sum, the Stormont Assembly allowed one community to 
impose its will upon the other. This system fell apart when the emergent Catholic middle 
classes challenged the institutionalised discrimination associated with the Unionist 
control system. 
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From Sunningdale to the Anglo-Irish Agreement: Unionist Divisions 
 
The Sunningdale Agreement (1973) marked the first attempt by the British government to 
create a ‘consociationalist’ power-sharing coalition in Northern Ireland. In contrast to the 
Unionist control system, the reconstituted Northern Ireland Executive contained members 
of the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), with its’ leader Gerry Fitt 
named as Deputy Chief Executive. However, the power-sharing executive lasted less than 
six months, collapsing in May 1974 due to a strike organised by the Ulster Workers’ 
Council (UWC). The UWC strike received support from a large cross section of the 
Protestant community including the Ulster Vanguard Party (UV) and Dr Ian Paisley’s 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The collapse of the power-sharing institutions 
illustrated the ‘intra-segment’ divisions within the Protestant community. The Protestant 
community was - and remains - a heterogeneous unit. In contrast to the relatively 
homogeneous Catholic community, the Protestant community encompasses over 50 
religious denominations, the various Loyal Orders, and a number of political parties 
(Monaghan, 2004: 484). The failure to gain the support of these groups undermined 
efforts to establish power-sharing institutions in Northern Ireland.   
 
Sunningdale also highlighted the siege mentality that existed within the Protestant 
community. The Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC) opposed the power-sharing executive 
due to the creation of a cross-border body, the Council of Ireland. This reflected the 
widely held perception amongst the unionist community that increased cross-border 
cooperation would lead to unification with the Republic of Ireland. After the collapse of 
the Executive in May 1974, there were several failed attempts to reintroduce devolved 
government to Northern Ireland, such as the ‘Rolling Devolution’ scheme in 1982. All of 
these initiatives failed due to their inability to command the support of the main political 
parties in Northern Ireland. For example, the Alliance Party of the Northern Ireland was 
the only political party to express its support for the restoration of devolution to the 
province, as was proposed in a government White Paper in April 1982. 68 The British and 
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Irish governments finally agreed to manage the conflict together via the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement signed in November 1985 (Byrnes, 2001: 338). Although the Agreement 
increased cross-border cooperation on a number of security and legal issues, it did not 
directly address the problem of reconciling the Protestant and Catholic communities. 
Indeed, the inter-governmental negotiations that led to the treaty widened the schism 
between Unionists and Nationalists in the province. The Democratic Unionist Party and 
the Ulster Unionist Party were united in their vehement opposition to the treaty. Both 
parties organised a Unionist ‘Day of Action’ in March 1985, which saw businesses across 
the region shut down in protest against the proposed treaty (Bew and Gillespie, 1993: 
196). Meanwhile, nationalists viewed the treaty as a positive development, which secured 
a role for Dublin in the constitutional affairs of Northern Ireland. For nationalist 
politicians, such as Brid Rogers of the SDLP, the treaty meant that ‘there was no going 
back’ to the Unionist control system (O’Connor, 1993: 373).  
 
The ‘Civil Society’ Paradigm: The 1990s 
 
While efforts to reintroduce a ‘consociationalist’ power-sharing executive in Northern 
Ireland continued into the nineties, they went hand-in-hand with a new ‘civil society 
approach’ (Byrnes, 2001: 328). The rationale for the civil society approach was that 
social identities could be ‘reconstructed’ by altering the patterns of social interaction 
between Protestants and Catholics in the region. In Northern Ireland, the necessity to 
oppose the ‘other’ community - or ‘out-group’ – has played a key role in social identity 
formation in both communities (p: 330). Children learn at an early age the images used to 
categorise members of the other community (Carter & Byrne, 2000: 56). The creation of 
the Community Relations Council (CRC) in 1990 marked the beginning of a process to 
encourage dialogue at grass roots level between Northern Ireland’s two main 
communities. The CRC provided funding and advice to civil society groups who sought 
to “build trust, transparency, and openness” between Protestant and Catholic 
communities (p: 328). Throughout the 1990s, the CRC provided support to community 
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groups such as Corrymeela, who attempted to build sustainable links between the two 
communities (McCartney, 2003: 3). Evidence from the Northern Ireland Life and Times 
Survey (NILTS) suggests that attitudes towards the ‘other’ community improved slightly 
during the early 1990s. Between 1989 and 1996, the proportion of survey respondents 
wishing to work in a mixed religion workplace increased from 84 percent to 95 percent 
(Hughes & Donnelly, 2004: 579). In addition, the proportion of respondents who 
believed that inter-communal relations would improve in the future increased from 32 
percent in 1989 to 62 percent in 1998 (p.577). Although projects like Corrymeela may 
have made some inroads into the ‘siege mentality’ of both communities in the nineties, 
there was limited evidence to suggest that the civil society approach was directly 
responsible for these attitudinal changes. 
 
The Good Friday Agreement: Post Conflict? 
 
The Good Friday Agreement (1998) marked a return to the consociationalist power-
sharing model created by the Sunningdale Agreement. The Belfast Agreement sought to 
deconstruct the siege mentality within both communities that had caused the collapse of 
the Sunningdale institutions two decades earlier. This was to be achieved through the re-
conceptualisation of the role of the external ‘ethno-guarantors’ in Northern Ireland 
((Byrnes, 2001: 341). Britain and the Republic of Ireland were to become the ‘trustees’ of 
the Northern Irish peace process, rather than antagonists involved in a power struggle 
over the disputed province. In addition, a series of political concessions were made to the 
unionists and nationalist political parties that had been involved in the negotiations that 
led to the Good Friday Agreement. Cross border-bodies, a long- term aspiration for 
nationalists since the ill-fated Council of Ireland, were a key component of the Belfast 
Agreement. Increased cooperation with the Republic of Ireland implied that Northern 
Ireland was no longer an ‘internal’ British concern (Williams & Jesse, 2001: 572). The 
constitution of the Republic of Ireland (1936) was amended to ease the security concerns 
of the unionist community. Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution had originally 
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asserted the jurisdiction of the government of the Republic of Ireland over the six 
counties of Northern Ireland. This territorial ‘claim’ was removed under the terms of the 
Good Friday Agreement.  
 
Moreover, the ‘principle of consent’ was designed to alleviate Protestant and Catholic 
concerns regarding the sustenance of their ethnic identity. Protestants could console 
themselves with the fact that the status quo would remain due to their greater numbers. 
Catholics could look forward to the prospect of a united Ireland once they became the 
largest community in Northern Ireland. Demographic studies suggested that this would 
happen soon, perhaps within a few generations. The number of people defining 
themselves as Protestant had declined since the start of the ‘Troubles,’ from 63.2 percent 
in 1961 to 50.6 percent in 1991. By 1991, 38.4 percent of the population of Northern 
Ireland defined themselves as Catholic (McGarry, 2002: 460). In sum, the Belfast 
Agreement provided incentives to persuade politic al representatives from both 
communities to participate in a power-sharing executive. The siege mentality of both 
communities was to be alleviated through constitutional reform in both the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. In this thesis, the online communications of civil 
and uncivil groups in the region will be analysed to assess the extent to which Northern 
Ireland’s two main communities still perceive politics as a zero-sum game.  
 
NORTHERN IRISH TERRORISTS AND THE MASS MEDIA 
 
Information Management: ‘Psyops’ 
 
In this section, the Northern Irish conflict will be used to illustrate the nexus between 
news framing and terrorism. The Northern Irish conflict can be characterised as a 
‘propaganda war supported by a shooting war’ (Clutterbuck, 1983: 87). Both terrorist 
organisations and the security forces in Northern Ireland have engaged in ‘information 
management’ operations, or ‘psyops,’ since the outbreak of the Northern Irish conflict. 
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‘Psyops’ refers to the use of propaganda to “influence the opinions, emotion, attitudes 
and behaviour of enemy, neutral and friendly groups during a military action” (Curtis, 
1988: 229). In the early 1970s, the British authorities made conscious efforts to 
discourage publicity for both Loyalist violence and the killing of terrorist suspects by the 
security forces, while using terrorist atrocities to discredit their principal enemy, the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army. In 1971, the British Army recognised the importance 
of ‘psyops’ by creating an Information Policy Department in Northern Ireland. This 
department enjoyed a few early successes, most notably when the British media blamed 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army for the McGurk’s bar atrocity in December 1971. 
The British army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) provided misleading 
information to journalists that linked the Provisional Irish Republican Army to the 
atrocity. In his article a day later, London Times journalist John Chartres reproduced the 
army’s version of events ‘word for word’ (Curtis, 1988: 91). In reality, a group who 
identified themselves as the ‘Empire Loyalists’ had claimed responsibility for the attack 
on the North Belfast public bar.69  
 
Loyalist and Republican terrorist organisations responded to British ‘disinformation’ by 
creating their own brand of ‘psyops,’ delivered through their own organisations rather 
than the conventional mass media. Political ‘front’ organisations such as Sinn Fein and 
the Progressive Unionist Party played a critical role in countering the propaganda of both 
the British media and state.70 As these were legal political parties, they were able to 
project the ideologies of their terrorist sponsors in local and national elections. In 
addition, Republicans sought to publicise their own narrative via the newspaper An 
Phoblacht/Republican News, which first appeared in June 1970 (Curtis, 1988: 264). This 
enabled Republicans – in particular those who supported the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (PIRA) - to publish their own political views free from the constraints of the 
conventional mass media. Publications such as The Loyalist and Combat were launched 
to provide a similar narrative stream for Loyalist terrorist groups, such as the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF). However, these publications have arguably failed to generate the 
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high levels of publicity that would enable Loyalist and Republican terrorist organisations 
to counter the ‘psyops’ of the British state. Loyalist publications in particular have 
remained a minority interest, consumed mainly by hardcore members of each movement 
and sympathisers (Cooke, 2003: 81). Nevertheless, these publications have enabled both 
Loyalist and Republican terrorist groups to communicate more effectively with the 
conventional news media. For example, An Phoblacht/Republican News has provided a 
useful news source for journalists who seek statements from the Provisional IRA in 
relation to a policy issue (p 81). 
 
Before the Good Friday Agreement, the British media routinely deprived Loyalist and 
Republican terrorists of the ‘oxygen of publicity.’ This censorship also affected political 
parties who had close links to paramilitary organisations, such as Sinn Fein. Despite Sinn 
Fein’s strong showing in the 1983 UK General Election, securing 13.4 percent of the vote 
and having its leader Gerry Adams elected in the West Belfast constituency, the party 
continued to receive minimal press coverage throughout the 1980s (Bew and Gillespie, 
1993:170). For example, in the calendar year of 1988, Independent Television devoted 
just four minutes of its schedule to interviews with members of Sinn Fein, a political 
front for the Provisional Irish Republican Army.71 Meanwhile, Loyalists had little or no 
representation in local or national politics, as demonstrated by the Progressive Unionist 
Party’s failure to win a single council seat across Northern Ireland in the 1981 local 
election (Bruce, 2001:36). In a similar vein to Republicans, these groups received little or 
no routine media coverage during the Northern Irish conflict (Bruce, 1994: 62). This 
paucity of media coverage was due to several pieces of government legislation that 
sought to curb the ability of Loyalist and Republicans to expound their ideologies. In the 
Republic of Ireland, Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act (1960) allowed the Minister for 
Communications to prohibit television and radio appearances from groups “likely to 
promote crime or undermine the authority of the state” (Purcell, 1991: 53). By the mid 
1970s, groups such as the Ulster Defence Association and Sinn Fein faced censorship in 
the Republic of Ireland. The ban applied to statements from these proscribed 
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organisations in the ‘persuasive’ media channels, namely television and radio. Although 
newspaper coverage of these groups was in theory still permitted, editors usually adhered 
to the regulations covering the ‘persuasive media’ (Purcell, 1991: 63).  
 
The UK government imposed even greater restrictions on media coverage of Northern 
Irish terrorist organisations. In a similar vein to newspaper editors in the Republic of 
Ireland, British television and radio broadcasters voluntarily prohibited interviews with 
paramilitary groups throughout the 1970s. In addition, British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC) television coverage of Northern Ireland was subject to a number of additional 
checks. All news reports covering the Northern Irish conflict had to be ‘referred up’ to 
the Controller of the Corporation, and subject to scrutiny by UK government ministers 
(Miller, 1995: 48). For example, Home Secretary Leon Brittan objected to the broadcast 
of a documentary entitled Edge of the Union in July 1985 because it featured an interview 
with Martin McGuinness of Sinn Fein. Brittan, in a letter written to the chairperson of the 
BBC, claimed that the documentary would “enable McGuinness to advocate or justify the 
use of violence for political ends, and thus the murder or maiming of innocent people, 
before a huge public audience” (Bolton, 1990:161). The documentary was withdrawn, 
only to be shown later in a truncated format after several journalists threatened to resign 
(Bew & Gillespie, 1993: 186). In sum, the British and Irish mass media attempted to deny 
Northern Irish terrorists the ‘oxygen of publicity’ in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 
spite of these restrictions, Northern Irish terrorists were still able to obtain publicity by 
perpetrating high profile atrocities during this period. 
 
The UK Broadcasting Ban: Direct Censorship 
  
The UK Broadcasting Ban, announced by Home Secretary Douglas Hurd on 19th October 
1988, enabled the British government to censor groups that were not only legal but had 
elected representatives in the Westminster parliament (Maloney, 1991: 10). The 
Broadcasting Ban arguably had a twofold effect upon Republican terrorist organisations 
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and their political fronts. On the one hand, the ban made the democratic activities of 
political fronts such as Sinn Fein increasingly difficult, as they were no longer considered 
“worthy of inclusion in news reports” (p: 68). Sinn Fein members were not only 
forbidden from making direct statements on television, but were also banned from 
entering mainland Britain. On the other hand, the ban was counter-productive as it 
mobilised support for the Provisional IRA across the globe, as Irish diasporas reacted 
angrily to the censorship of Sinn Fein in the mass media (Maloney, 1991: 46). Miller 
(1994) suggests that the Broadcasting Ban helped push Sinn Fein to the ‘outer margins of 
political life,’ exempting both the terrorists and the British government from ‘effective 
scrutiny’ in Northern Ireland (p.68). Sinn Fein was no longer held accountable for the 
‘military’ activities of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, as its members were 
unable to give direct interviews to large sections of the British media. Meanwhile, the 
British government was able to censor groups and individuals who were critical of British 
policy in the region under the terms of this legislation. However, Loyalist and Republican 
political fronts were able to circumvent the Broadcasting Ban. The broadcast media were 
able to circumvent the ban by employing unseen actors to voice the words of Sinn Fein 
politicians. As the ban did not apply to Party Political Broadcasts (PPBs), the media were 
also able to broadcast statements from political fronts, such as Sinn Fein, during local and 
national elections. In addition, parliamentary speeches were exempt from censorship 
under the terms of the ban, enabling Members of Parliament such as Ken Livingstone to 
lobby against the censorship of Republicans in Westminster (Maloney, 29: 1991).  
 
‘Qualified Humanisation’ of Terrorists and Megaphone Diplomacy         
 
 In the late 1980s, the UK government commissioned a series of television commercials 
for the ‘Confidential Telephone Number’ from local agency McCann Erickson. These 
adverts reflected a shift in the attitude of the British government towards both Loyalist 
and Republican terrorists. The misinformation spread by the Information Policy 
Department in the aftermath of the McGurk’s bar atrocity sought to demonise the 
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‘ruthless killers’ of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. In contrast, the ‘Confidential 
Telephone Number’ commercials appeared to offer a ‘qualified humanisation’ of 
terrorists, portraying them as ‘victims of circumstances’ (Finlayson & Hughes, 2000: 
397). For example, one of these commercials features the story of a father and son, set to 
the music of ‘Cats in the Cradle’ by Harry Chapin. In the commercial, the father is too 
busy being a terrorist to pay attention to his son, and ends up in prison. Upon his release, 
he has grown apart from his son, who has become involved in terrorism just like his 
father. It concludes with the father standing at the graveside of his son, killed due to his 
involvement in a terrorist murder. The voice-over informs viewers, ‘don’t suffer it, 
change it,’ inviting people to contact the Confidential Telephone number (p.404).   
 
The McCann Eriksson ‘Confidential Telephone’ advertisements arguably formed part of 
a ‘megaphone diplomacy’ that originated in the early 1990s. Megaphone diplomacy is the 
“practice of engaging in dialogue and sending messages via the media to other parties in 
a conflict, in a situation where it is not possible or desirable to conduct formal 
negotiations for whatever reason” (Sparre, 2001: 89). As discussed earlier, a combination 
of the Broadcasting Ban and editorial self-censorship had militated against the regular 
appearance of Sinn Fein members on television since the outbreak of the ‘Troubles.’ By 
the early 1990s, there were no open channels of communication between the British 
government and Sinn Fein. For example, the ‘back’ channel had broken down in response 
to Unionist anger at the exposure of this covert communication between Republicans and 
the British government in an article by The Observer in November 1993 (p.92). This 
channel had previously allowed the UK government to supply the Republican movement 
with advance copies of speeches by the Northern Irish Secretary of State and updates on 
the ongoing talks between the main Northern Irish political parties (p.92). The mass 
media became a critical communication channel between the UK government and the 
Republican movement in the mid 1990s as it attempted to deliver a peace settlement in 
Northern Ireland. 72 
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From war to peace frame? 
 
Prior to the negotiations that led to the Belfast Agreement, Loyalist and Republican 
groups employed a ‘war’ frame in their media statements. This frame depicted these 
organisations as civil society actors engaged in a legitimate war against their opponents. 
Invariably, the terrorist organisations themselves issued statements to the press to 
reiterate the legitimacy of their military activities. Both Loyalist and Republican terror 
groups used language in their press releases that indicated that they saw themselves as 
legitimate armies with military structures and ranks (Cooke, 2003:79). For example, the 
Provisional IRA frequently referred to its Army Council and Prisoners of War on 
statements released to the media during the 1980s (p.79). Paramilitary statements were 
also published in newspapers linked to Loyalist and Republican terrorist organisations, 
such as An Phoblacht and Combat. The ‘war’ frame was also expressed through 
paramilitary ‘shows of strength,’ which saw journalists invited to Loyalist or Republican 
areas to witness hooded gunmen discharge firearms into the air in front of assembled 
supporters (p.80). Loyalist and Republicans also used posters and wall murals to convey 
the impression that they were legitimate armies of national liberation, as opposed to 
illegal terrorist organisations. For example, Danny Devenney, the designer of many Sinn 
Fein posters in the 1980s, used images inspired by the propaganda of the African 
National Congress (ANC) to highlight the similarities between the two national liberation 
movements.73  
 
The Republican and Loyalist ceasefires marked the beginning of the normalisation of 
relations between terrorist-linked parties and the two [British and Irish] governments 
(Cooke, 2003: 84). During the negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement, 
Loyalist and Republicans were given unrestricted access to the mass media. At the same 
time, the media adopted a peace frame, which created a bond between pro-peace groups 
from both camps. This frame made a clear distinction between the political fronts that 
were engaged in the process and the violence associated with their terrorist sponsors 
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(Wolfsfeld, 2001:36). While dissident Republicans, such as the Continuity IRA, remain 
actively engaged in terrorism, the majority of Northern Irish terrorists have maintained 
their ceasefires throughout this period.74 This research will determine whether the peace 
frame has influenced the online communications of all Loyalists and Republicans, or 
whether some groups use their websites to legitimise their historic or contemporary 
military campaigns. As discussed in this chapter, legislation such as the UK Broadcasting 
Ban (1988) restricted media coverage of these terrorist groups during the Northern Irish 
conflict. Loyalists and Republicans developed newspapers, such as An Phoblacht and 
Combat, in order that they could circumvent the ideological refractions of the media. At a 
time when many of these groups were engaged in armed struggle, these publications 
facilitated intra-group communication and provided a propaganda tool for their terrorist 
sponsors. While political fronts such as Sinn Fein now enjoy routine access to the media 
courtesy of their support for the peace process, dissidents on both sides are arguably as 
peripheral now as they were during the era of the Broadcasting Ban. The research 
presented in this thesis will determine whether dissident Loyalist and Republicans are 
using their websites to counter the peace frame, in a similar fashion to their use of 
alternative media channels during the ‘Troubles.’ 
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Table 2.1 Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm’s media models (1963). 
Model Function Media Ownership Freedom of 
expression as 
absolute right 
Authoritarian advance government 
policies 
State Monopoly No 
Libertarian Encourage critical 
thinking, check 
government,  
Entertain. 
Private Enterprise 
and Public Service 
Yes 
Social 
Responsibility 
Represent  
societal interests e.g. 
citizens, government 
Private Enterprise 
and Public Service 
No 
Soviet Advance government 
policies 
State Monopoly No 
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Table 2.2: Relationships between Terrorism and the Mass Media 
 
Passive Attitude Relative Indifference 
Media-Oriented Total Break from Society 
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Chapter 3 The Peace Frame? Comparing the websites of Northern Irish political fronts 
and political parties  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Goffman (1974) asserts that frames are the ‘schemata of interpretation that enable 
individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences or information’ (p.21). 
Some commentators suggest that the Northern Irish media helped build cross-community 
support for the Good Friday Agreement (1998) through their adoption of a ‘peace frame.’ 
This peace frame created a bond between pro-peace groups from both camps, making a 
clear distinction between the political fronts that were engaged in the process and the 
violence associated with their terrorist sponsors (Wolfsfeld, 2001:36). In this chapter, the 
peace frame will be analysed through the lens of Loyalist and Republican political fronts, 
defined here as organisations “for and under the control of a terrorist group” (Richards, 
2001:73). The master frames of Northern Irish political parties will be examined to assess 
the extent to which they have been influenced by the peace frame employed by the 
Northern Irish media in the late nineties. In addition, the websites of political fronts and 
constitutional political parties are analysed to determine whether these groups have 
realised the potential of the Web as a tool for mobilisation and organisational linkage. 
The study suggests that the websites of organisations closely linked to Northern Irish 
terrorist groups not only do not differ markedly from those of ‘civil’ groups, but also do 
not seem to offer any new dimension of terrorist threat. All political fronts use language 
on their websites that suggests they are cultural democrats, as opposed to the public 
relations department of a terrorist organisation. 
 
THE PEACE FRAME 
 
In this section, the evolution of the peace frame will be traced from three perspectives, 
namely the mass media, the two [British and Irish] 
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terrorist organisations. Levin (2005) defines a frame as a “publicly presented definition of 
a situation containing three elements, a problem, protagonist and a solution” (p.84). For 
Northern Ireland’s two communities, the problem and protagonists have remained 
unchanged since the beginning of the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ in 1968. Nationalists 
remain committed to securing both a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and the 
creation of a socialist 32 county Irish Republic. Meanwhile, Unionists remain fervent 
supporters of the Union with Great Britain and oppose integration into a 32 county Irish 
Republic. However, the solutions identified by some terrorist organisations have altered 
by virtue of their support for the Good Friday Agreement. Paramilitaries on both sides, 
who had previously been committed to armed struggle, agreed to use exclusively 
democratic means in pursuit of their group objectives and oppose “any use or threat of 
force by others for any political purpose.”75 In turn, political parties linked to pro-
Agreement terrorist groups have altered their frames. These groups have sought to 
differentiate themselves from the violence associated with their terrorist sponsors.  
 
Political actors used the peace frame to build cross-community support for the Good 
Friday Agreement. Supporters of the Belfast Agreement differentiated political fronts 
from the violence associated with their respective terrorist organisations, portraying 
parties such as Sinn Fein as cultural democrats, committed to democracy come what 
may” (Richards, 2001: 83). This was necessary to convince sceptics within both 
communities that these terrorist organisations were sincere in their commitment to using 
exclusively peaceful means. Critics of the Belfast Agreement had claimed it allowed 
terrorist organisations to participate in elected bodies while retaining the option to return 
to political violence should they grow frustrated with the peace process. In the opinion of 
anti-Agreement unionists, political fronts were only functional democrats, their support 
for the Good Friday Agreement perceived as instrumental and even opportunistic 
(Pridham, 1990:14). Clearly, if the electorate shared this view it would be harder to 
mobilise support for the inclusion of these political fronts in the newly constituted 
Stormont Assembly. Pro-peace groups from both communities had to be convinced that 
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the Good Friday Agreement was the only means of securing permanent peace in the 
province.  
 
The media and the peace frame 
 
The media environment within Northern Ireland helped expose both communities to this 
peace frame. The worldview, or master frame, of each media organisation reflected their 
support for the Belfast Agreement and, by implication, the inclusion of terrorist-linked 
groups in the newly created power-sharing institutions. Between July 1997 and April 
1999, newspapers on both sides of the sectarian divide published editorials urging their 
readership to support the peace process. For example, the Belfast Telegraph published 62 
editorials in favour of the peace process during this period.76 The Irish News, traditionally 
considered a nationalist newspaper in favour of a united Ireland, published 64 editorials 
in support of the peace process during this period (p.34). Elsewhere, national and 
international news media organisations conformed to the framing of the Northern Irish 
media, even in the aftermath of the Omagh bombing in August 1998. Wolfsfeld (2001) 
suggests that the media ‘amplified’ the peace frame after an atrocity that could have been 
a major setback for the peace process (p.36).  
 
It is too simplistic to suggest that the framing of the Northern Irish mass media alone 
united pro-peace groups in both communities, or convinced them that terrorist-linked 
groups should be included in the Stormont Assembly. Chong and Druckman (2007) argue 
that the critical determinants of framing effect include not just the strength and 
prevalence of the frame, but also the knowledge and motivation of its recipients (p.110). 
Evidently, the media were responsible for the strength and prevalence of the peace frame 
between 1997 and 1999, as illustrated by the number of ‘pro-peace’ editorials in 
newspapers such as the Irish News. The media did not deploy an alternative frame in their 
editorials during this period, leading to accusations from anti-Agreement Unionists that 
they had stifled any serious debate about the risks associated with the peace process 
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(Wolfsfeld, 2001: 31). Yet, the Northern Irish media’s peace frame also reflected public 
opinion within the province. If these media organisations were to retain their audience 
share, their editorials had to adopt a political perspective that was acceptable to both 
communities (p.36). There was sufficient evidence to suggest that the majority of people 
within Northern Ireland favoured the peace process, particularly after May 1998 when 
71.1 percent voted ‘yes’ in the referendum on the Good Friday Agreement.77 Moreover, 
the media routinely projected the peace frame through their coverage of political actors 
that actively supported the inclusion of political fronts in the peace process, such as the 
UK and Irish governments. Many pro-peace groups, such as the Northern Ireland 
Women’s Coalition, had already adopted this master frame during the peace negotiations, 
and in the referendum campaign that followed the Good Friday Agreement. 
 
Megaphone diplomacy: antecedent for the peace frame? 
 
Richards (2001) suggests that the two [UK and Irish] governments ‘legitimised’ the IRA, 
its political front, and armed struggle through their support for the Good Friday 
Agreement (p.77). The use of demilitarisation as a quid pro quo for decommissioning had 
reinforced “Republican impressions that they had been right all along” (p.77). 
Irrespective of the choreography that lay behind efforts to secure IRA decommissioning, 
it would appear that the two governments viewed the ‘Troubles’ through the lens of the 
peace frame, and wished others to do the same. Essentially, both governments favoured 
an all-inclusive peace process, one in which terrorists were encouraged to abandon 
political violence and work towards their objectives through their political affiliates. This 
process arguably began with the ‘megaphone diplomacy’ that surrounded the clarification 
of the Downing Street Declaration (1993).78 Both governments issued a series of strategic 
statements designed to persuade paramilitaries on both sides to call ceasefires and create 
a context in which negotiations could take place with the mainstream political parties. For 
example, the declaration called for an end to all forms of paramilitary violence, stating 
that only democratically mandated parties, who were committed to “exclusively peaceful 
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methods,” could participate in negotiations regarding the future of Northern Ireland.79 
This marked the first time that the two governments had talked publicly about the 
inclusion of terrorist-linked groups in the peace process. The frame adopted by the UK 
and Irish government reflected a change in their approach to the management of the 
Northern Irish conflict. After all, the political fronts invited to join the peace negotiations 
were the same organisations that had been denied the ‘oxygen of publicity’ in the 
previous decade.  
 
Newspaper columns become the arena for the clarification of the declaration, as there was 
no channel of communication open between the British government and Sinn Fein during 
this period. UK government ministers presented information to journalists in 
‘newsworthy formats,’ such as public speeches and press conferences, in the expectation 
that they would be picked up by Sinn Fein representatives in the press (Sparre, 2001: 90). 
The UK government issued a number of statements to the media suggesting that the 
Republican movement would gain entry into the political process if they declared a 
permanent ceasefire, even if they did not accept the terms of the declaration (p.102). 
Simultaneously, Sinn Fein used its press releases to call for face-to-face meetings with 
UK government Ministers to clarify the declaration (p: 97). The subsequent Loyalist and 
Republican ceasefires (1994) paved the way for a ‘normalisation of relations’ between 
parties such as Sinn Fein and the UK and Irish governments (Cooke, 2003:84). From 
1994 onwards, terrorist-linked groups were given regular access to the news media, in 
sharp contrast to the censorship associated with the Broadcasting Ban a few years earlier 
(see chapter 2). These political fronts had become “woven into the tapestry of daily 
news” through their contact with the White House, regular meetings with the British 
Prime Minister, and their participation in negotiations over the future of Northern Ireland 
(p.83). 
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 Terrorist frames after the Good Friday Agreement 
 
The frames adopted by Loyalist and Republican terrorists altered by virtue of their 
support for the peace process. The nexus between pro-Agreement terrorist organisations 
and their political fronts had arguably shifted in favour of the latter in 2001. Richards 
(2001) asserts that the 9/11 attacks on Washington and New York led to a transfer of 
power within the Republican movement, Sinn Fein becoming the “driving force of the 
movement,” in place of the PIRA Army Council (p: 84). Concurrently, Sinn Fein 
received unprecedented level of popular support, the party receiving 17.3 percent of the 
vote in the Northern Ireland Assembly Elections (June 1998) and achieving two 
ministerial portfolios in the new Stormont Executive.80 One explanation for this electoral 
success was that Sinn Fein had adopted a political agenda closely modelled on that of the 
largest Nationalist party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Sinn Fein was 
no longer a subservient organisation projecting a ‘war frame’ that justified acts of 
political violence (see chapter 2). Equality, human rights and democracy had become 
central planks of Sinn Fein political manifestos since the Belfast Agreement (McGovern, 
2004: 623). Bruce (2001) asserts that Sinn Fein was able to compete with the SDLP by 
“not just be wanting some different things but also by wanting the same things more 
aggressively” (p.40). In order to appeal to nationalist voters, the party differentiated itself 
from the Provisional IRA. Sinn Fein claimed that it had a legitimate right to be involved 
in the political process “purely on the strength of the party’s electoral mandate,” rather 
than as negotiators acting on behalf of the Provisional IRA (O'Docherty, 1998: 158).  
 
The pro-Agreement Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), a political affiliate of the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF), also altered its political discourse after the Good Friday 
Agreement. The PUP presented a liberal political agenda that was critical of unionists 
who opposed the Belfast Agreement. The party claimed that these groups had a lack of 
confidence in the power of unionism, and that they should follow the lead of the PUP in 
dealing with its opponents within the Stormont Assembly (Bruce, 2001:45). However, the 
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PUP and the other Loyalist political parties have failed to match the electoral 
performance of Sinn Fein since 1998. For example, the PUP has received no more than 
1.4 percent of the votes cast in elections since 1998 (McAuley, 2004: 537).  Meanwhile, 
the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), political affiliates of the Ulster Defence Association 
(UDA) and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), failed to win a single seat in the 1998 
Assembly Elections (Cooke, 2003: 89). These parties were arguably unable to emulate 
Sinn Fein’s relationship with the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), as the 
Democratic Unionist Party was already established within the unionist community as the 
primary opposition to the Ulster Unionist Party (p.40). Overall, Loyalist terrorist 
organisations have struggled to find a satisfactory role in the new political landscape 
ushered in by the Good Friday Agreement. Bruce (2004) asserts, in the wake of the 
Belfast Agreement, the intended supporting population for Loyalist terrorist organisations 
have felt less of a need to create a range of institutions outside or against those of the 
state (p: 505). In effect, the Provisional IRA ceasefire may have removed the need for 
Loyalist terrorist organisations to protect their communities. 
 
Anti-Agreement Groups and the Peace Frame 
 
The peace frame was not accepted by all political organisations in Northern Ireland. 
Dissidents on both sides of the sectarian divide rejected the Good Friday Agreement. 
These groups disagreed with the solution put forward in the peace frame, namely that 
terrorist organisations should pursue their objectives through exclusively democratic 
means in the new power-sharing institutions. On the Republican side, groups such as the 
Real IRA formed due to discontent at concessions made by Sinn Fein during the peace 
process. The Real IRA claimed that the Sinn Fein leadership had jettisoned a number of 
core Republican principles by abandoning the ‘armed struggle’ (Institute for Counter-
Terrorism, 2004). However, these groups have failed to mobilise support amongst the 
Northern Irish electorate for their master frame. For example, a poll conducted for the 
BBC Northern Ireland television programme Hearts and Minds (October 2002) found 
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that only 7.1 percent of respondents in the West Belfast constituency supported dissident 
Republican organisations, such as Republican Sinn Fein. In the same poll, a clear 
majority of respondents (49.8 percent) stated that Sinn Fein “best represented” the view 
of the West Belfast electorate (Tonge, 2004: 688). 
 
The peace frame has done little to convince anti-Agreement Unionists that terrorist-
linked groups should be involved in power-sharing institutions. The release of 
paramilitary prisoners, police reform, and the involvement of Sinn Fein in the Northern 
Ireland Executive has proven particularly contentious for anti-Agreement Unionists. The 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has been the most vociferous opponents of the Good 
Friday Agreement, with its leader Ian Paisley claiming it was a “complete and total sell-
out of the province.”81 Loyalist terrorist organisations have also grown increasingly 
disenchanted with the peace process. Nearly all of the Loyalist terrorist organisations that 
initially supported the Belfast Agreement have been ‘specified’ as ‘active’ terrorist 
organisations at one time or another since 1998. For example, the Ulster Volunteer Force 
(UVF) was specified in October 2001, as the UK Home Office believed that the terror 
group had once again been engaged in violence.82 Nevertheless, the Progressive Unionist 
Party has remained a fervent supporter of the peace process, despite its military 
organisation returning to violence. In sum, the peace frame has not become the master 
frame for all political actors involved in the Northern Irish ‘Troubles.’ Dissident terrorist 
organisations on both sides do not support the power-sharing institutions, nor have 
committed to using exclusively peaceful means to achieve their objectives. In addition, 
the Democratic Unionist Party rejects the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, as it 
opposes the participation of terrorist-linked groups in the power-sharing institutions. 
These groups frame the Northern Irish conflict with reference to their own values, as 
opposed to the peace frame projected by the two governments and the Northern Irish 
media in the late nineties. The chapter now turns to a consideration of how these different 
frames are projected online. 
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THE CIVIL WEB: POLITICAL FRONTS AND POLITICAL PARTIES ONLINE        
 
Sample 
 
The material posted on the websites of political parties was analysed to determine the 
strength of the peace frame. Constitutional political parties were defined as those parties 
that have always been against the use of political violence (Cooke, 2003:83). This 
category included not just Unionist and Nationalist political parties, but also left wing 
political organisations such as the Socialist Environmental Alliance. Of the 13 
constitutional political parties that participated in the Assembly Elections, the 
Independent Labour Party and the Northern Ireland Unionist Party were the only 
organisations that did not maintain an official web presence during the period of data 
collection (See Table 3.1). 
 
[Table 3.1 here] 
 
Six political fronts - two Loyalist and four Republican - were identified with reference to 
both the First Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission (April 2004) and the 
Conflict Archive on the Internet (See Table 3.2). Many of the organisations defined in the 
study as political ‘fronts’ have publicly denied their complicity in the military activities 
of proscribed terrorist organisations, despite compelling evidence to the contrary. Sinn 
Fein’s inclusion as the Provisional IRA’s political front was based upon evidence 
presented by the Independent Monitoring Commission, a body formed to assess 
paramilitary activity in the province. The IMC report states that with regard to the link 
between Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA, “senior members of Sinn Fein are in a 
position to exercise considerable influence on PIRA’s major policy decisions” 
(Independent Monitoring Commission, 2004).  
 
[Table 3.2 here] 
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The Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) was included as it was the political front of 
the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). The IMC report states that the Irish National 
Liberation Army is the “paramilitary wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party” 
(Independent Monitoring Commission, 2004). The other Republican political fronts had 
links to dissident Republican terrorist organisations such as the Continuity IRA. 
Republican Sinn Fein (RSF) was included due to its links with the Continuity Army 
Council, widely believed to be a synonym for the proscribed Continuity IRA. According 
to security sources, the Continuity IRA is in effect the “military wing” of Republican 
Sinn Fein (Conflict Archive on the Internet, 2005). Despite their repeated denials to the 
contrary, the 32 County Sovereignty Movement was included in the study as it was the 
“political wing” of the Real IRA (Conflict Archive on the Internet, 2005). The Real IRA, 
although not listed as a terrorist organisation in the UK Terrorism Act (2000), had 
claimed responsibility for a number of high profile atrocities such as the Omagh bombing 
in August 1998.  
 
The two Loyalist political fronts identified in the study had links to four of the seven pro-
union terrorist organisations currently proscribed in the United Kingdom. Since the 
dissolution of the Ulster Democratic Party in November 2001, the Ulster Defence 
Association has received political counsel from an alternative Loyalist advisory body, the 
Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG). The IMC report asserts that the Ulster Defence 
Association is ‘associated’ with the Ulster Political Research Group and “operates 
through other paramilitary organisations such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters” 
(Independent Monitoring Commission, 2004). The Tullycarnet UPRG was included as it 
was the only branch of the Ulster Political Research Group to maintain a website during 
the period of data collection. The Progressive Unionist Party was the other Loyalist 
political front included in the study. The IMC report states that the Progressive Unionist 
Party exerts “appreciable influence” upon the activities of both the Ulster Volunteer 
Force and Red Hand Commandos (Independent Monitoring Commission, 2004).  
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Website Registration Data 
 
The majority of the websites under analysis were registered with Internet Hosts based in 
the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland (see Table 3.3). For example, a subsidiary 
of a local television station, UTV Internet, hosted the websites of the Northern Ireland 
Women’s Coalition and the Workers Party. However, it should be noted that companies 
based in Canada hosted the websites of two political fronts, the 32 County Sovereignty 
Movement and the Progressive Unionist Party.83 Irrespective of where these websites 
were hosted, the webmasters tended not to provide personal information on domain 
registration websites, such as Nominet (www.nominet.co.uk) and Whois 
(www.whois.net). The Green Party proved exceptional, providing extensive information 
on whois.net as to how internet users could contact its webmaster, such as a registered 
postal address in Germany.84 Yet, the omission of this information was not in and of itself 
evidence of the webmaster’s complicity in illegal activity. Both civil and uncivil actors 
may request that domain registration companies, such as Whois, refrain from publishing 
their contact details online. Furthermore, as these websites were registered in Europe and 
North America, they were not expected to incite political violence or solicit resources on 
behalf of proscribed terrorist groups. These webmasters were expected to self-regulate 
online, due to the anti-terrorist regime governing the behaviour of pro-terrorist 
webmasters.  
 
 [Table 3.3 here] 
 
Research Design: Website Function 
 
The framing and function of websites maintained by Northern Irish political parties was 
analysed during the study. Data was collected during May 2004 to enable a comparison 
of material posted online by these groups.85 Website function was analysed to determine 
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how these groups used their websites to mobilise supporters. Cyberoptimists suggest that 
the Internet can have a critical multiplier effect for civil society organisations via 
improvement in organisational linkage, bureaucratic efficiency and the advertisement of 
group values to a potential global audience. The study assessed whether Northern Irish 
political parties and political fronts were realising this potential, particularly in terms of 
organisational linkage and mobilisation. Irish Republicans have received support from 
diaspora communities since the beginning of the Northern Irish conflict, particularly from 
Irish – Catholic communities in the United States (O’Dochartaigh, 2003: 1). Conversely, 
Northern Ireland’s loyalist and unionist communities have been unable to mobilise a 
similar emigrant population, despite a large number of people with Ulster Protestant 
ancestry residing in North America (p.1). The study assessed whether the Internet 
enabled Loyalist political fronts to create international support networks similar to those 
established by their Republican counterparts in the late 1960s. It also analysed whether 
Republican political fronts used the Web to mobilise their established support networks. 
This was determined through an analysis of the links available on each website. Finally, 
the study determined how terrorist-linked groups and constitutional political parties 
present their frames online. It was anticipated that only political parties with large 
financial resources would be able to afford innovations such as video streaming on their 
websites.  
 
These websites were located using the Google search engine and archived for future 
research.86 In order to assess their function, each website was scored with reference to a 
coding scheme. This allowed a direct comparison between the websites of political fronts 
and constitutional political parties. It also enabled the websites to be ranked in terms of 
their interactivity, presentation, organisational linkage and online recruitment. The coding 
scheme was similar to the coding framework devised by Rachel Gibson and Stephen 
Ward to analyse the function and effectiveness of party websites (Gibson & Ward, 2000: 
p.307). A point was given to a website if it included one of the features identified in the 
coding scheme. These points were then complied to give an overall score in each of the 
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four categories measuring website function, namely interactivity, target audience, 
presentation and organisational linkage (See Table 3.4). The presentation, interactivity, 
and target audience categories provided evidence of how these groups used their website 
to communicate with target audiences. The organisational linkage category provided an 
insight into how these organisations used the Web to link with like-minded groups online. 
A website received a point if it provided links pointing towards the websites of external 
institutions, such as the news media and government agencies. For the purposes of the 
study, solidarity websites were defined as those that expressed support for the ideology of 
the actor under analysis. This did not include websites dedicated to the Irish language or 
the Orange Order, as these were considered cultural rather than political projections of 
the two traditions in Northern Ireland. International terrorist websites were those that 
offered support for an international ethno-nationalist movement, such as Euskadi ta 
Askatasuna (ETA). This feature was included to determine whether Loyalists and 
Republican exposed their links to international terrorist organisations on their websites. A 
point was also awarded to organisations that provided a large number of links on their 
websites, defined here as a minimum of 15 links.  
 
[Table 3.4 here] 
 
Online Framing 
 
The study also used qualitative frames to analyse the websites of political parties and 
political fronts. Online framing was analysed by examining the language and images used 
by these groups on their websites. It was anticipated that some terrorist-linked parties - 
such as Sinn Fein - would purposely remove references to their terrorist sponsors to 
suggest they were cultural democrats. This reflected their support for the power-sharing 
institutions created under the terms of the Belfast Agreement. However, the study was 
also designed to test the hypothesis that the Internet provides a space for dissidents to 
oppose this peace frame. As such, political fronts and constitutional political parties that 
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opposed the Belfast Agreement were expected to use their websites to criticise its 
supporters, albeit for different reasons. The Tullycarnet UPRG and the Democratic 
Unionist Party would reject the peace frame because they believed that Sinn Fein was 
only functionally democratic, with the Republican movement likely to return to armed 
struggle if it failed to achieve its objectives through politics. Dissident Republicans were 
also expected to reject the peace frame on their websites. Groups such as Republican 
Sinn Fein would claim Sinn Fein had abandoned core Republican principles, and use 
their website to justify the use of political violence to achieve a united Ireland.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Online Framing 
 
The majority of political actors under analysis used frames that were similar to the peace 
frame projected by the mass media in the late nineties. Themes such as ‘equality’ and 
‘shared responsibility’ were prevalent on the websites of many political fronts and 
constitutional political parties. These themes evoked comparison with the editorials of the 
Belfast Telegraph in 1999, which had attempted to create a bond between pro-peace 
groups in the Protestant and Catholic communities. The Social and Democratic Labour 
Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein employed virtually identical frames on their respective 
websites, stressing their support for both the equality agenda and a 32 county Irish 
Republic. The Social Democratic and Labour Party asserted on its website that it was 
committed to building new agreed Ireland based on “equality for all, partnership and 
respect for difference.”87 Simultaneously, the headline on the Sinn Fein website stated, 
“The task of building an Ireland of equals is a huge and exciting challenge for all of us.”88 
This theme of ‘equality’ resonated with the material posted online by the Progressive 
Unionist Party, the Loyalist political front with links to the Ulster Volunteer Force. Its 
website detailed how the Progressive Unionist Party supported both the ‘principle of 
consent’ and a ‘sharing of responsibility’ between Unionists and Nationalists.89 Similar 
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themes were evident on the websites of all pro-Agreement political parties. For example, 
the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland asserted on its website that “cultural participation 
and self-expression should be developed in the context of respect and understanding of 
our own and others’ heritage.”90  
 
Anti-Agreement Frames 
 
The peace frame did not influence the framing of all Northern Irish political groups 
online. Two constitutional political parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the 
United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP), used their websites to criticise the Belfast 
Agreement. Both parties supported the exclusion of Sinn Fein from the Northern Ireland 
Executive until the Provisional IRA had decommissioned all its arms and declared a 
permanent end to its terrorist campaign. For example, the Democratic Unionist Party’s 
Seven Principles stated, “terrorist structures and weaponry must be removed before the 
bar to the Stormont Exeuctive can be opened.”91  The UKUP also stated on its homepage 
that it was opposed to the “immoral provisions of the Belfast Agreement that have 
violated the basic principles of democracy by installing the frontmen for terror into 
Government.”92 Anti-Agreement Unionists used their websites to suggest that Sinn Fein 
should be removed from the peace process as they were functionally democratic, their 
commitment to democracy both opportunistic and ephemeral. This was in total contrast to 
the peace frame that suggested Sinn Fein had to be included in a peace process that 
represented all shades of political opinion. 
    
Dissident Republican political fronts also attacked the peace frame on their websites. 
These groups rarely referred to the political entity of Northern Ireland on their websites. 
For example, the Irish Republican Socialist Party website repeatedly referred to Northern 
Ireland as a ‘colonial statelet’ or the ‘occupied six counties,’ thus denying the legitimacy 
of its position within the United Kingdom.93 Dissident Republicans used frames that 
justified the use of armed struggle to achieve the reunification of Ireland. Republican 
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Sinn Fein President, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, asserted on its website, “All necessary means 
must be used to restore Ireland and her resources to the Irish people, not precluding as a 
last resort the use of physical force against the British Army of Occupation.”94 The 32 
County Sovereignty Movement also used its website to attack the Good Friday 
Agreement. The 32CSM website stated, “The Good Friday Agreement, built as it is 
around continuing partition and a Unionist veto, makes the possibility of Britain 
declaring their intention to withdraw even less likely.”95 These political fronts attacked 
Sinn Fein for participating in the peace process, claiming that they had abandoned core 
Republican principles for a peace agreement that fell far short of achieving their 
objectives. 
 
Political Fronts and Grass Roots Politics 
 
There was little to differentiate between constitutional political parties and the terrorist-
linked parties in terms of their discussion of local politics. Political parties such as the 
Ulster Unionist Party posted policy documents on their websites for public consumption, 
covering issues as diverse as Provisional IRA decommissioning and the proposed 
location of a John Lewis store near Lisburn.96 Terrorist-linked parties also used their 
websites to discuss local political issues. The Progressive Unionist Party used its website 
to detail a list of policies that addressed the interests of their voters, including proposals 
to reintroduce student grants and tackle homelessness.97 Sinn Fein also kept an archive of 
policy documents, conference speeches and party election manifestos on its website.   
 
For the smaller political fronts, grass roots politics formed the centrepiece of their 
websites. The Tullycarnet UPRG website defined neither the strategic objectives of the 
UPRG, nor its position on whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the United 
Kingdom. Instead, the website focused entirely upon issues affecting the Tullycarnet 
district in Belfast, demonstrating the UPRG’s role as a community group. For example, 
plans for the redevelopment of a local playground were published on the UPRG website, 
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with local residents invited to post their views on this development.98 Republican Sinn 
Fein also highlighted the work of its local councillors on its website. One of the headline 
stories on the website highlighted a Republican Sinn Fein councillor’s efforts to create 
more effective rubbish disposal systems in County Wicklow.99 The focus on local politics 
suggested these groups were cultural democrats, as opposed to the political wing of an 
armed terrorist organisation.  
 
Self-identification 
 
Pro-Agreement political fronts did not disclose their links to terrorist organisations on 
their websites. The Provisional IRA appeared little more than a historical footnote on the 
Sinn Fein website, featuring only in the ‘History’ section. In this section, Republican 
‘armed struggle’ in 1969 was justified in the context of Unionist political discrimination 
and British military aggression against Catholics in the region.100 The two Loyalist 
political fronts, the Tullycarnet UPRG and the Progressive Unionist Party, also omitted 
references to their respective terrorist organisations from their websites. For example, the 
Progressive Unionist Party used its website to respond to an IMC report that alleged it 
had close ties with the Ulster Volunteer Force. This was the only reference to the UVF 
throughout the entire website.  
 
These political fronts demonstrated their credentials as cultural democrats through the 
images they used on their homepage. None of these websites featured emblems 
associated with their respective paramilitary organisations. The Sinn Fein homepage 
featured pictures of its elected representatives, framed against a distinctive blue 
background.101 This was somewhat surprising as blue is a colour traditionally associated 
with the mainstream Unionist parties in the region, while Nationalist and Republican 
parties have traditionally favoured green and red on their political manifestos. The two 
Loyalist political fronts also used colours and emblems on their websites that were not 
traditionally associated with their respective ‘military’ organisations. For example, the 
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Progressive Unionist Party homepage framed its leader, David Ervine, against a white 
background, as opposed to the blue associated with Unionist and Loyalist political parties 
The Union Jack, a key emblem of the party in its election manifestos, was conspicuous 
by its absence from this website. Overall, these political fronts used their web presence to 
project a key principle of the peace frame, namely that they were cultural rather than 
functional democrats. 
 
Dissident Republicans did refer to their terrorist organisations on their websites. They 
also used language that revealed their support for political violence. For example, the 
Irish Republican Socialist Party website carried a number of statements from its military 
wing, the proscribed Irish National Liberation Army. One statement referred to an assault 
on an alleged police informer, warning that “if his family think he is above any 
responsibility to the local community for his actions, let this be a salutary lesson.”102 This 
website also depicted members of the movement as ‘comrades,’ reflecting not just the 
military ambitions of the movement but also its Marxist principles.103 The 32 County 
Sovereignty Movement also revealed its links to its terrorist sponsors, the Real IRA, on 
its website. The constitution and membership rules of the party indicated that, at the very 
least, there were cross- cutting cleavages between the 32 County Sovereignty Movement 
and the Real IRA. The constitution asserted that the 32 CSM was not interested in 
participating in elections and intended to “build a movement that can one day convince 
Britain” to withdraw from Ireland.104  
 
Conversely, dissident Republicans used images on their homepages that suggested they 
were cultural democrats. For example, the Republican Sinn Fein homepage featured a 
series of photographs of its elected representatives, alongside the party emblem. The 32 
County Sovereignty Movement did not feature any images on its website. However, the 
colour scheme did reflect the ideological position of the group, the use of green text 
against a white background evoking comparison with the green white and gold flag of the 
Republic of Ireland. The Irish Republican Socialist Party proved exceptional amongst the 
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political fronts under analysis. Its website used ‘militaristic’ images on its website that 
suggested it was aligned with a proscribed terrorist organisation. The ‘Roll of Honour’ 
section provided an image of two hooded gunmen flanked by the names of every [INLA] 
‘volunteer’ that had lost their life during the Troubles.105 In sum, the content analysis 
suggested that anti-Agreement political fronts were functional democrats. These groups 
were more likely to reveal their terrorist sponsors than pro-Agreement groups such as 
Sinn Fein. 
 
Website Function 
   
Organisational Linkage 
 
Overall, constitutional political parties demonstrated a greater range of organisational 
linkages on their websites than Loyalist and Republican political fronts (See Table 3.5). 
The Green Party and the Social Democratic Labour Party were the only political parties 
to achieve the maximum score in this category. The Green Party of Northern Ireland 
website provided links not only to the websites of environmental pressure groups such as 
Greenpeace (www.greenpeace.org), but also to a number of non-political websites, such 
as Amazon (www.amazon.co.uk).106 The Social Democratic Labour Party provided links 
on its website not only to the sites of ideologically similar political parties such as Fianna 
Fail (www.fiannafail.ie) but also to civil society organisations such as the Ulster Scots 
Agency (www.ulsterscotsagency.com).107 However, a number of political parties, 
including the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and the Workers Party, did not provide 
any links on their websites.  
 
[Table 3.5 here] 
 
Republican political fronts did not use their websites to network with terrorist groups 
who shared their left-wing political ideologies. This was an unexpected observation given 
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the historic links between the Republican movement and ethno-nationalist terrorist 
groups such as Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2004). Instead, 
Sinn Fein provided links to the websites of community groups such as the Bloody Sunday 
Trust (www.bloodysundaytrust.org) and British–Irish Rights Watch (www.birw.org). The 
32 CSM provided no links on its website. The Irish Republican Socialist Party proved 
exceptional in the study, providing links to such diverse international groups as the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (www.pflp-pal.org), Jaleo 
(www.geocities.com.independentistas) and the Kurdish Workers Party 
(http://pkk.org/pkk).108  
 
There was little to differentiate between Loyalist and Republican parties in terms of the 
organisational linkages visible on their websites. However, there was no evidence to 
suggest that Loyalist parties were using the Internet to mobilise support from diaspora 
communities. The Progressive Unionist Party was the political front that achieved the 
highest score in this category, providing links to the websites of external news media 
organisations, such as the Belfast Telegraph (www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk), and 
government websites such as the Northern Ireland Assembly (www.ni-
assembly.gov.uk).109 Although the website provided a large number of links, none of 
these pointed towards the websites of diaspora communities that expressed support for 
Loyalist paramilitaries. The other Loyalist political front included in the study, the 
Tullycarnet UPRG, did not provide any links on its website. In sum, the study suggested 
that constitutional political parties in Northern Ireland have been more effective than 
political fronts at harnessing the ‘interconnectedness’ offered by the internet, using their 
websites to connect with external political, cultural, and media organisations online.   
 
Interactivity 
 
Constitutional political parties offered a high degree of interactivity on their websites 
(See Table 3.6). In some cases, smaller political parties provided more interactive 
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features on their websites than those with greater human and financial resources. This 
was demonstrated by the access given to political leaders on these websites. While the 
Ulster Unionist Party website provided the telephone number of the constituency office 
of leader David Trimble, the Green Party of Northern Ireland provided personal email 
addresses and mobile telephone numbers for their co-leaders Dr John Barry and Lindsay 
Whitcroft on their website.110 However, the Social Democratic Labour Party, one of the 
largest political parties in the region, achieved the same score in this category as the 
Green Party of Northern Ireland. The SDLP website provided the telephone numbers and 
correspondence addresses for each of its constituency offices in the region.111 Elsewhere, 
the study found that only one political party, the Socialist Workers Party, provided a 
bulletin board on its website.  
 
[Table 3.6 here] 
 
Republican political fronts also provided a large number of interactive features on their 
websites, the Irish Republican Socialist Party and the 32 County Sovereignty Movement 
amongst the parties that achieved the highest score in this category. Each of the 
Republican groups examined provided correspondence details for their organisations on 
their websites, although only the 32 County Sovereignty Movement published the email 
addresses of individual members on its websites.112 Republican organisations were more 
likely to encourage Internet users to subscribe to email newsletters on their websites than 
the constitutional political parties were. For example, Sinn Fein advertised its email 
newsletter, The Irish Republican Media, on its website. This service granted the 
subscriber access to video and audio clips, exclusive interviews with the leadership of the 
party and downloadable copies of the Sinn Fein newspaper, An Phoblacht/Republican 
News.113 The study also found that Republican political fronts used their websites to 
solicit resources from sympathetic constituencies. For example, the 32 County 
Sovereignty Movement used its website to sell merchandise such as t-shirts to Internet 
users.114 
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In sharp contrast, neither of the Loyalist political fronts used their websites to solicit 
resources from sympathisers. This was indicative of the lower levels of interactivity 
available on the websites of the Tullycarnet UPRG and Progressive Unionist Party. 
Neither of these websites provided interactive features such as an email newsletter or a 
Bulletin Board for its membership, although the Progressive Unionist Party did publish 
personal email addresses for both its leader David Ervine and its Chief Electoral Officer 
on its website.115 The Tullycarnet UPRG website was the least interactive of the websites 
analysed during the study. Interaction between Internet users and the organisation was 
only possible via an email to an anonymous webmaster.116 While constitutional political 
parties and Republican groups used their websites to encourage interaction with Internet 
users, Loyalists provided no such opportunity for visitors to their websites. 
 
Recruitment Resources 
 
The study suggested that the majority of Northern Irish political parties favour face–to-
face recruitment strategies, rather than allow prospective members to apply online. 
Almost all of the groups included in the study - with the exception of the Alliance Party 
of Northern Ireland - used their websites to advertise for new members (See, Table 3.7). 
Yet, few of these organisations provided an online application form for prospective new 
members. For example, the United Kingdom Unionist Party asked those interested in 
joining the party to email the webmaster for further information.117 In a similar vein to 
the UKUP, the Workers Party asked Internet users to apply for membership at local 
branches.118 The Democratic Unionist Party proved exceptional amongst the 
constitutional political parties, asking potential new members to submit personal details 
and a £12 subscription charge on its website.119 Few Northern Irish political groups used 
the Internet to disseminate downloadable public relations material, defined here as 
election posters that could be downloaded and displayed by supporters. Once again, the 
Democratic Unionist Party was a notable exception, providing downloadable desktop 
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backgrounds, bearing election slogans such as “Time for a Fair Deal,” on its website.120  
 
 
[Table 3.7 here] 
 
A similar pattern emerged from the analysis of Loyalist and Republican websites. The 
Irish Republican Socialist Party and Sinn Fein were the only political fronts to provide 
downloadable public relations material on their websites. Although each political front 
provided information on how Internet users could become members of their respective 
organisation, potential recruits invariably had to contact the webmaster for further 
information. For example, the Progressive Unionist Party website invited potential 
members to phone or email the webmaster in order to get an application form.121 In a 
similar fashion to the PUP website, the Irish Republican Socialist Party invited Internet 
users to submit an electronic form with their email address and telephone number, 
presumably in order that the organisation could vet potential new members.122 
Nonetheless, a clear majority of political fronts used their websites to attract support from 
across the globe. For example, Sinn Fein devoted space on its website specifically to 
detail how supporters in the United States could donate resources to the Republican 
movement.123 Republican Sinn Fein proved exceptional in the study, asserting, “Members 
must live in Ireland, Wales, Scotland or England.”124 Overall, the study suggested that 
both civil and ‘uncivil’ Northern Irish political actors have chosen to rely upon traditional 
methods of recruiting new members and disseminating propaganda.  
 
 
Presentation 
 
Both constitutional political parties and political fronts maintained static web pages, 
devoid of multimedia facilities (See Table 3.8). The Democratic Unionist Party website 
was the exception to this rule, providing video footage of Ian Paisley on its website and 
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copies of manifestos as downloadable PDF files.125 The other constitutional political 
parties did not provide sound or video facilities on their websites. For example, the 
Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition provided only text and a few images of its 
politicians, such as leader Monica McWilliams, on its website.126 In a similar vein, the 
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland provided a text-based webpage, illuminated only by a 
few pictures of party members such as Eileen Bell and Naomi Long. 127  
 
[Table 3.8 here] 
 
Republican political fronts achieved scores that were well above the mean score for this 
category. In particular, Sinn Fein appeared to have invested heavily in its official website. 
This was illustrated by the layout of the Sinn Fein homepage, a series of clear 
navigation menus enabling Internet users to view the history of the organisation, contact 
local constituency offices, donate resources to the Republican movement, and subscribe 
to electronic publications such as ‘sinnfeinnews.com.’ Upon visiting the website, Internet 
users were drawn towards a banner suggesting that the website was available in multiple 
languages such as French and German. Although the message ‘Welcome’ appeared in a 
number of different languages on the homepage, the website was only available in 
English. Sinn Fein was also one of the few political fronts to use video streaming on its 
website. Both members and non-members could download video footage of speeches 
made by its leader, Gerry Adams.128 The Irish Republican Socialist Party was the only 
other political front to use video streaming on its website. The IRSP website enabled 
Internet users to download video footage of an Irish Republican Easter commemoration 
service.129  
 
Loyalist political fronts employed less sophisticated presentation methods on their 
websites in comparison to the other political parties included in the study. For example, 
the Progressive Unionist Party did not employ frames, sound or video streaming on its 
website.130 There were no clear menus for navigation, although the postal address and 
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contact telephone number of the organisation was clearly displayed on the PUP 
homepage. The Tullycarnet UPRG also maintained a mainly text based website, 
punctuated by pictures of its proposed development of a local park.131 In sum, although 
Republican political fronts achieved higher than average scores, the study suggested that 
both political fronts and political parties favour static websites over sophisticated 
presentation methods such as video streaming.  
 
DISCUSSION: 
 
Tactical frames 
 
The study suggested that each Northern Irish political party, irrespective of its links to 
terrorism, used tactical frames to articulate its position on the peace process. Levin 
(2005) asserts that social organisations use tactical frames to demonstrate to the public 
that their master frame is the “best definition of the reality that society is facing” (p.85). 
Northern Irish political parties used end-run, denial, and incorporation frames on their 
websites to express their opinions about the peace process. Constitutional political parties 
such as the Ulster Unionist Party employed end-run frames to reach out to potential 
supporters, claiming, “new considerations were necessary for decision-making” (p.86). 
For example, the ‘Disarmament for Peace’ policy document called for the completion of 
Provisional IRA decommissioning before the restoration of the power-sharing 
institutions. This reflected growing concern within the unionist community about the 
Provisional IRA’s capacity to resume its terrorist campaign. Loyalists and Republicans 
who supported the Belfast Agreement used incorporation frames, to “cut off support for 
others by absorbing their values” (p.87). The Sinn Fein website referred to the equality 
agenda traditionally associated with its rival, the Social Democratic and Labour Party. On 
the Loyalist side, the Progressive Unionist Party used its website to offer a new strand of 
‘liberal’ unionism, moving into the middle ground traditionally associated with the Ulster 
Unionist Party. 
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The peace frame did not influence the framing of all Northern Irish political parties. 
Denial frames, which claim that the values of the other side are ‘invalid,’ permeated the 
websites of anti-Agreement unionists and dissident Republicans, albeit for different 
reasons (p.86). While the Democratic Unionist Party condemned the Belfast Agreement 
for allowing ‘unreconstructed’ terrorist organisations into government, dissident 
Republicans criticised Sinn Fein for abandoning its armed struggle. One interpretation of 
these denial frames might be that it reflects the growth in opposition to the Belfast 
Agreement since 1998, particularly amongst the unionist community. Anti-Agreement 
Unionists have used incidents such as the Northern Bank robbery (December 2004) to 
cast doubt upon the validity of the Provisional IRA’s commitment to exclusively peaceful 
means.132 This has resonated with the unionist community, with the anti-Agreement 
Democratic Unionist Party becoming the largest unionist party after the Northern Ireland 
Assembly elections (November 2003).133 However, an alternative explanation might be 
that the Internet has provided a platform for anti-Agreement groups to choose their own 
frames, one that was not available to them in the period leading up to the Good Friday 
Agreement. Essentially, the political opponents of the Belfast Agreement have remained 
the same, with dissident Republicans and anti-Agreement unionists having opposed the 
peace process since 1998. The media’s adoption of the peace frame in the late nineties 
arguably left little space for these groups to voice their opposition to the Belfast 
Agreement. The study suggests that these groups have used their websites to choose their 
own frames, free from the editorial constraints of the mass media.  
 
Online framing and public opinion 
 
Online framing may only affect attitudes towards the peace process if the master frame is 
publicised heavily and resonates with the values of a large audience. As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, the strength and prevalence of a frame are critical determinants of its 
ability to affect public opinion. Individuals favour frames that are consistent with their 
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own values (Chong and Druckman, 2007:102). Campaigns with greater resources will be 
able to identify frames that appeal most to the public, and advertise these themes more 
frequently than groups who project opposing frames (p.102). The study found that the 
Internet provided political fronts, such as Sinn Fein and the Progressive Unionist Party, 
with a space in which they could demonstrate their democratic credentials - irrespective 
of their sincerity- to a potential global audience. For example, Sinn Fein published 
policies on its website that appealed not just to Republicans but also to the broader 
nationalist community. However, this online framing has not created public support for 
the master frame of Sinn Fein in and of itself. Rather, the Sinn Fein website holds a 
mirror to its political activism and electoral success in the offline world. The party has 
achieved unprecedented electoral success by adopting policies traditionally associated 
with the Social Democratic and Labour Party, such as the equality agenda. Sinn Fein has 
publicised these policies via a number of media platforms, including television, 
newspapers, and the Internet.  
 
The offline world also determines how the frames adopted by anti-Agreement groups 
affect public opinion. The Democratic Unionist Party’s framing has become increasingly 
influential, as it has achieved significant gains in consecutive elections at the expense of 
other pro-union political parties, such as the Ulster Unionist Party. In contrast, dissident 
Republicans remain “politically marginalised, short of weaponry and lacking in popular 
support” (Tonge, 2004:678). Therefore, these groups arguably require a large audience 
for their websites if their online framing is to affect public opinion towards the peace 
process, given their relative obscurity in the mass media. Yet, this proposition is based 
upon the assumption that these groups wish to influence public opinion using their 
websites. These groups remain committed to their ‘military’ campaigns to further their 
political objectives, a strategy that inevitably brings them into conflict with the majority 
of public opinion. In contrast to Sinn Fein, they do not need to convince the public that 
they are cultural democrats, nor seek to influence public opinion using their websites and 
the mass media. Therefore, dissident Republicans may be using their websites primarily 
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for intra-group communication, rather than to generate soft power amongst internet users 
who have no links to their respective organisations. In sum, online frames reinforce 
attitudes towards the Northern Irish peace process, leaving marginalised political groups 
outside the triangle of political communication that includes the government, the media 
and the public.  
 
Information vs. Interaction 
 
Northern Irish political parties use their websites to modernise their bureaucracies, as 
opposed to create a space for genuine political deliberation amongst its membership. This 
was similar to the findings of previous studies, such as the Gibson and Ward analysis of 
Australian political party websites (2003). Gibson and Ward characterised the level of 
web activity amongst Australian political parties as ‘patchy,’ some parties lacking an 
official web presence while other party websites were hard to locate on the Internet 
(p.152). The internet enabled Australian political parties to “feed information to the mass 
media, rather than rather than promote a “transparent, interconnected and interactive 
face” (p.152). In a similar vein to Australian parties, Northern Irish political parties used 
their websites primarily for top-down political communication and providing statements 
to the mass media. The study found that most political parties - irrespective of their 
terrorist linkages - favoured face-to-face recruitment strategies and traditional methods of 
disseminating propaganda. Many political parties chose to remain anonymous on their 
official website, directing potential supporters towards local constituency offices if they 
wished to join the organisation. Although groups such as the Socialist Workers Party did 
provide Bulletin Boards on their websites, the study produced insufficient evidence to 
suggest that minority political groups provide higher degrees of interactivity online than 
larger political parties do.  
 
Several of the political fronts arguably had no interest in promoting political deliberation 
on their websites. Political fronts such as the Tullycarnet Ulster Political Research Group 
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do not compete in local or national elections, and therefore have no need to attract voters 
on their websites. Moreover, the groups themselves may not wish to interact with Internet 
users. Dissident Republicans such as the 32 County Sovereignty Movement do not 
support democracy nor possess internal democratic structures, as demonstrated by the 
material posted on their websites. For example, the 32 CSM rules out the adoption of 
‘constitutional parliamentary sovereignty’ to achieve its aims, as it might ‘alienate’ them 
from the people on whose behalf they were organising.134 The 32 CSM remains 
committed to using armed struggle to achieving its political objectives, setting itself in 
opposition against the majority of public opinion that favour the peace process. 
Interaction with anonymous Internet users online might compromise the security of its 
members, thus hindering the future military operations of its respective terrorist 
organisation. Instead, these groups use their websites to issue statements to the 
conventional mass media. Internet users are invited to contact the organisation via 
telephone to obtain information about membership. Overall, Northern Irish political 
groups use their websites for top-down communication rather than encouraging 
interaction between its members and internet users. 
 
Organisational Linkage: Critical Multiplier Effect? 
 
The cyberoptimist model suggests that small sub-state groups may experience a critical 
multiplier effect in terms of their organisational linkage if they use information and 
communication technologies (ICTs). The study of constitutional political parties online 
provided limited evidence to support this proposition. There was no divergence between 
the large and small parties in terms of the scores received in this category. For example, 
both the Green Party of Northern Ireland and the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
shared the highest score in this category. Despite the Greens Party’s low media profile 
and lack of electoral success, there was little to differentiate between these two websites 
in the analysis of their ‘links’ section. In addition, the study found that political parties of 
all sizes were likely to provide no links on their websites, with the Democratic Unionist 
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Party and Alliance Party of Northern Ireland receiving no score in this category.  
 
Political fronts also demonstrated variable levels of organisational linkage on their 
websites. The study found that no evidence to suggest that Loyalist political fronts were 
using their websites to mobilise diaspora communities in North America, the Tullycarnet 
UPRG providing no links whatsoever on its website. Republican websites also achieved 
relatively low scores in this category in comparison to the constitutional political parties. 
The Irish Republican Socialist Party proved exceptional, as it was the only political front 
to provide links pointing towards the websites of international terrorist organisations. One 
interpretation of these results might be that these groups do not wish to publicise their 
links to ethno-nationalist terrorist groups such as Euskadi ta Askatasuna. Political fronts 
such as Sinn Fein have adopted frames on their websites that suggest they are cultural 
democrats rather than the propaganda wing of a terrorist organisation. The disclosure of 
links to groups that remain engaged in political violence would seem to be at odds with 
Sinn Fein’s commitment to the peace process, potentially souring relations with the 
influential Irish-American lobby. Alternatively, these groups may be experiencing a 
critical multiplier effect in terms of organisational linkage via other ‘less public’ aspects 
of the Internet, such as email. This would allow these groups to network with other 
terrorists without the risk of compromising the security of its members. In sum, the study 
would appear to cast doubt upon the enabling potential of information and 
communication technologies, as detailed in the cyberoptimist model. None of the groups 
appear to be experiencing a critical multiplier effect via their websites, although, this 
conclusion is based upon the organisational linkage that each group is willing to disclose 
on its website.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The study suggests that there is little to differentiate between terrorist-linked groups and 
constitutional political parties in terms of website function and online framing. All 
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Northern Irish political parties have yet to realise the potential of the Web as a tool for 
organisational linkage and mobilisation. These groups use their website primarily for 
disseminating information about their grass roots political activism to the mass media, 
rather than encouraging interaction between Internet users and the organisation itself. All 
Northern Irish political parties, irrespective of their links to terrorists, use tactical frames 
online to define their position vis-à-vis the peace process. Terrorist-linked parties such as 
Sinn Fein use their web presence to define themselves as cultural democrats rather than 
the propaganda machine of a terrorist organisation. Themes such as equality and shared 
responsibility permeate the websites of these groups, with little or no reference made to 
their terrorist sponsors. This framing has an antecedent in the peace frame projected by 
the mass media in the mid-nineties, which sought to build public support for a political 
process that included the political representatives of Loyalist and Republican terrorists. 
However, not all political parties subscribe to the peace frame. Anti-Agreement Unionists 
and dissident Republicans use their websites to attack the peace process and its 
supporters, albeit for different reasons. The Democratic Unionist Party suggests that Sinn 
Fein should be excluded from the power-sharing institutions, as they are not fully 
committed to using exclusively democratic means to achieve their aims. Meanwhile, 
dissident Republicans criticise Sinn Fein for abandoning Republican principles, believing 
that armed struggle is still necessary to remove British troops from the province. In 
contrast to Sinn Fein, dissident Republicans did reveal their links to terrorist 
organisations on their websites. These denial frames will only affect public opinion vis-à-
vis the peace process if they feature prominently in the mass media and resonate with the 
values of a large audience. Yet, dissident Republicans do not rely solely on the soft 
power generated by their websites to further their objectives. These groups use hard 
power to terrorise a target population, perpetrating atrocities to maximise publicity for 
their organisation and its goals. As such, they will make no effort to portray themselves 
as cultural democrats on their websites. In sum, the offline world determines not just the 
content and audience for a Northern Irish political party website, but also its likely effect 
upon public opinion.   
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Table 3.1: Northern Irish Political Parties, NI Assembly Election (November 2003) 
 
 
 
* Website no longer available (08/02/07). 
 
 
Political Party Website 
Alliance Party NI http://www.allianceparty.org/ 
 Conservative Party NI http://www.conservativesni.com/main_main.htm 
Democratic Unionist Party  http://www.dup.org.uk/ 
Green Party NI http://www.greens-in.org/tiki-index.php 
Independent Labour Party N/A 
NI Unionist Party  N/A 
NI Women’s Coalition* http://www.niwc.org/ 
 Social Democratic Labour Party  http://www.sdlp.ie/ 
Socialist Environmental Alliance http://socialistenvironmentalalliance.org/cgi-
bin/sea/index.pl 
 
Socialist Workers Party http://www.swp.ie/html/home.htm 
Ulster Unionist Party http://www.uup.org/ 
United Kingdom Unionist Party* http://www.ukup.org/ 
Workers Party http://www.workers-party.org/wphome.htm 
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Table 3.2: Northern Irish terrorist organisations and political fronts 
Terrorist Organisation Political Front Organisation 
Continuity Army Council 1 Republican Sinn Fein  
 
Cumann na mBan None 
Fianna na hEireann None 
Irish National Liberation Army Irish Republican Socialist Party  
Irish People’s Liberation Organisation  None 
Irish Republican Army Sinn Fein  
Loyalist Volunteer Force  None 
Orange Volunteers 
Real Irish Republican Army 
None 
32 County Sovereignty Movement  
Red Hand Commandos /  
Ulster Volunteer Force 
Progressive Unionist Party  
Progressive Unionist Party 
Red Hand Defenders None 
Saor Eire None 
Ulster Defence Association/ 
Ulster Freedom Fighters 
Ulster Political Research Group  
Ulster Political Research Group 
 
Sources: Independent Monitoring Commission First Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission 
(2004); Conflict Archive on the Internet, Loyalist and Republican Groups. 
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Table 3.3: Website registration data provided by Northern Irish political parties 
Website Host Location of 
Host 
Webmaster 
Name 
Webmaster 
Email 
Address 
Registered 
Postal 
Address 
Telephone 
/Fax Number 
 
Alliance Party NI Firenet UK NIA NIA IA IA 
 Conservative Party NI Bargain Hosts UK NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Democratic Unionist 
Party  
Direct IT UK NIA NIA IA NIA 
Green Party NI Kontent Germany IA IA IA IA 
Irish Republican Socialist 
Party 
Network Solutions USA NIA NIA IA IA 
NI Women’s Coalition UTV Internet UK NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Progressive Unionist 
Party  
Global.Net UK IA NIA NIA NIA 
Republican Sinn Fein IEDR Republic of 
Ireland 
IA NIA NIA NIA 
 Social Democratic 
Labour Party  
IEDR Republic of 
Ireland 
IA NIA NIA NIA 
Sinn Fein  IEDR Republic of 
Ireland 
IA NIA NIA NIA 
Socialist Environmental 
Alliance 
Supanet UK NIA NIA IA NIA 
Socialist Workers Party IEDR Republic of 
Ireland 
IA NIA NIA NIA 
32 County Sovereignty 
Committee 
Netfirms Canada IA IA IA IA 
Tullycarnet UPRG Hyperspace  Canada NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Ulster Unionist Party TIB UK NIA NIA IA IA 
Workers Party UTV Internet UK IA IA IA IA 
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IA- Information Available 
NIA- No Information Available 
 
Table 3.4 Coding Scheme. 
 
Interactivity 
 
Email Newsletter- (1) 
Bulletin Board/Chatroom - (1) 
Correspondence Address (Postal) (1) 
Telephone/Fax Number (1) 
Email Webmaster (1) 
Email Individual Members (1) 
Donations (1) 
Maximum Score Available : 7 
 
Online Recruitment 
 
Members Only Section- (1) 
Full Membership Advertised (1) 
Full Membership available (1) 
Public Relations “paraphernalia” Available for Download (poster, placards) (1) 
 
Maximum Score Available: 4   
 
Organizational Linkage 
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Solidarity Organisations/Websites- (1) 
International Terrorist Organisations/Websites- (1) 
Educational Websites (Universities, external news media) – (1) 
Commercial/non-political Links- (1) 
Number of Links >15 - (1) 
 
Maximum Score Available: 5   
 
 
Presentation 
Graphics (1) 
Frames (1) 
Sound (1) 
Video/Live Streaming (1) 
Pages available in PDF/alternative format- (1) 
 
Maximum Score Available: 5   
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Table.3.5. Organisational Linkage exhibited on official Northern Irish political websites 
Website Solidarity 
Links 
International  
Terrorist 
Links 
Educational  
Links 
Commercial/ 
Non-Political 
Links  
Number 
of Links 
(>15)  
Score 
(/6) 
Alliance Party NI 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Conservative Party NI 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Democratic Unionist Party  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Green Party NI 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Irish Republican Socialist Party 1 1 0 1 1 4 
NI Women’s Coalition 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Progressive Unionist Party  1 0 1 1 1 4 
Republican Sinn Fein 1 0 0 1 0 2 
 Social Democratic Labour 
Party  
1 1 1 1 1 5 
Sinn Fein  1 0 0 0 1 2 
Socialist Environmental 
Alliance 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Socialist Workers Party 1 1 0 0 1 3 
32 County Sovereignty 
Movement 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tullycarnet Ulster Political 
Research Group 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ulster Unionist Party 0 0 1 0 1 2 
United Kingdom Unionist Party 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Workers Party 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 0.5 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.47 2.14 
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Table.3.6. Interactive features available on official Northern Irish political websites  
Website Email  
Newsletter 
Bulletin  
Board 
Postal  
Address 
Telephone 
/Fax 
Number  
Email 
Webmaster 
Email  
Members 
Resource 
Solicitation 
Score 
Alliance Party NI 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 
 Conservative Party NI 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Democratic Unionist 
Party  
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Green Party NI 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Irish Republican Socialist 
Party 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 6 
NI Women’s Coalition 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Progressive Unionist 
Party  
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Republican Sinn Fein 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
 Social Democratic 
Labour Party  
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Sinn Fein  1 0 1 1 1 0 1 5 
Socialist Environmental 
Alliance 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Socialist Workers Party 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
32 County Sovereignty 
Movement 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Tullycarnet Ulster 
Political Research Group 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Ulster Unionist Party 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 
United Kingdom Unionist 
Party 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 
Workers Party 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Mean 0.47 0.24 0.94 0.88 0.94 0.65 0.53 4.65 
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Table.3.7. Online recruitment resources of official Northern Irish political websites  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Members 
Only 
Section 
Full 
Membership 
Advertised 
Full Membership 
Available via Online 
Application 
Downloadable Public 
Relations Material 
Score 
Alliance Party NI 0 0 0 0 0 
 Conservative Party NI 0 1 0 0 1 
Democratic Unionist Party  0 1 1 1 3 
Green Party NI 1 1 1 1 4 
Irish Republican Socialist Party 0 1 0 1 2 
NI Women’s Coalition 0 1 1 0 2 
Progressive Unionist Party  0 1 0 0 1 
Republican Sinn Fein 0 1 0 0 1 
 Social Democratic Labour Party  0 1 1 0 2 
Sinn Fein  0 1 0 1 2 
Socialist Environmental Alliance 0 1 1 0 2 
Socialist Workers Party 0 1 1 1 3 
32 County Sovereignty 
Movement 
0 1 0 0 1 
Mean 0.08 0.92 0.46 0.38 1.85 
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Table.3.8. Presentation and delivery of official Northern Irish political websites 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Graphics Frames Sound Video 
Streaming 
Pages Available in 
alternative format e.g. 
PDF 
Score 
Alliance Party NI 1 1 0 0 0 2 
 Conservative Party NI 1 1 0 0 1 3 
Democratic Unionist Party  1 1 1 1 1 5 
Green Party NI 1 1 0 0 1 3 
Irish Republican Socialist Party 1 0 0 1 1 3 
NI Women’s Coalition 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Progressive Unionist Party  1 0 0 0 1 2 
Republican Sinn Fein 1 1 0 0 1 3 
 Social Democratic Labour Party  1 1 0 0 0 2 
Sinn Fein  1 0 0 1 1 3 
Socialist Environmental Alliance 1 0 1 1 1 4 
Socialist Workers Party 1 0 0 0 1 2 
32 County Sovereignty Movement 1 1 0 0 1 3 
Tullycarnet Ulster Political Research Group 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Ulster Unionist Party 1 1 0 0 1 3 
United Kingdom Unionist Party 1 1 0 0 1 3 
Workers Party 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Mean 1.00 0.59 0.12 0.24 0.82 2.76 
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Chapter 4: Googling Terrorism: How visible are Northern Irish terrorists on the Internet? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Internet enables Northern Irish terrorists to choose their own frames and circumvent 
the ideological refractions of the conventional mass media. However, this framing may 
only affect the attitudes of the public if the master frame is publicised heavily and 
resonates with the values of a large audience. In this chapter, the online audience for 
Northern Irish terrorists will be discussed with reference to data already available in the 
public domain, such as Internet usage patterns and the ranking systems used by Internet 
search engines. Factors such as the number of Internet users who use the Web for 
political research will be included to determine the potential audience available to 
Northern Irish terrorists. As a majority of Internet users rely upon search engines for 
information retrieval, visibility on search engine listings is invaluable to political actors 
who wish to affect public opinion using their online frames. Internet users are more likely 
to click on links to the more ‘visible’ websites on Internet search engines, such as those 
listed on the first page of results generated by a search query. Factors that influence the 
ranking of websites, including the sale of priority retrieval to the highest bidder and 
website linkage, will be analysed to determine their potential impact upon the audience 
available to Northern Irish terrorists online. The study suggests Northern Irish terrorists 
are only visible on search engines if Internet users select the correct search terms. This 
limits the audience for Northern Irish terrorists to those Internet users who have prior 
knowledge about the links between these organisations and political fronts such as Sinn 
Fein.  
 
INTERNET USAGE PATTERNS: THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
In this section, the potential audience for Northern Irish terrorists will be examined using 
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Internet usage patterns. The analysis presented in this thesis suggests that the Internet 
provides a space in which dissident Republicans can use their own frames to reject the 
Good Friday Agreement (see chapter 3). For their frames to affect public opinion, groups 
such as Republican Sinn Fein require a large number of Internet users to access their 
websites. This is because people access the Internet in a qualitatively different fashion to 
the conventional mass media. Media ‘literacy’ is arguably a universal good in advanced 
industrialised nation-states. For example, television is a low - cost public medium 
available in virtually every household in advanced industrialized nation-states. In 
addition, newspaper penetration in advanced industrialized nations remains high. For 
example, in Northern Ireland, almost two - thirds of the adult population read at least one 
paid for newspaper on a daily basis (Wilson, 1997: 1). In contrast, ICTs require a new 
form of media literacy. Literacy comes with experience; the more familiar a person is 
with ICTs, the more fluent they become (Locke, 1999: 219). Existing evidence on 
Internet usage in the United Kingdom and the United States may provide some insight 
into these issues. 
 
Digital Divide and Internet Access 
 
In order to explore the potential audience for Northern Irish terrorist websites, one must 
first determine who has access to the Internet. The digital divide refers to the gap between 
“those able to benefit from digital technology and those who are not” (International 
Telecommunication Union, 2007). Evidently, private citizens are more likely to benefit 
directly from digital technology if they have access to the Internet. People can use the 
Internet for a variety of activities, including shopping, research, political activism, or the 
pursuit of hobbies and interests. The indications are that Internet consumption is growing 
rapidly across the globe, as more people begin to use the Internet on a regular basis. In 
January 2007, there were more Internet users (389 million) in Asia than in any other 
continent. Research also indicates that there were 33 million Internet users in Africa and 
19 million in the Middle East during this period (Internet World Statistics, 2007). Europe 
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and in particular North America have taken a ‘strong lead in realising digital opportunity’ 
(International Telecommunication Union, 2007). Despite having only 5.1 percent of the 
world’s population, North America provides 21.5 percent of the total number of Internet 
users worldwide. Meanwhile, Internet penetration in Africa remains low, with an 
estimated 3.5 percent of its population having access to the Internet. Although 14.2 
percent of the world’s population lives in Africa, it provides only 3 percent of the total 
number of Internet users worldwide (Internet World Statistics, 2007). This First World 
hegemony is reflected in the predominance of English as the vernacular of cyberspace. 
This suggests that so-called ‘fourth-generation rights’ are being denied to developing 
countries, for whom English is not the common tongue. These rights include the right to 
information and the right to communicate (Council of Europe, 1997:39). However, Africa 
has seen a 635.8 percent growth in Internet consumption between 2000 and 2007, as 
broadband services become available in countries such as Ghana (Internet World 
Statistics, 2007). The digital divide between the West [North America and Europe] and 
Africa may narrow if this rate of growth continues.   
 
The digital divide affects all nation-states, irrespective of their prosperity and the 
available digital infrastructure. In the United States, an estimated 27 percent of people 
have never accessed the Internet (Madden, 2006: 1). Meanwhile, 36 percent of Britons 
claim to have never used the Internet (Shepherd and Bryson, 2007:8). There is little to 
differentiate between men and women in terms of their use of the Internet in these 
countries. The Oxford Internet Survey (2005) found that 63 percent of men and 57 
percent of women claimed to have used the Internet (Di Gennaro and Dutton, 2006: 301). 
The socio-economic profile of Internet users provides greater insight into the digital 
divide within advanced industrialised nation-states. For example, only 40 percent of 
adults in the United States who have less than a high school education claim to use the 
Internet, compared to 64 percent of adults with a high school education (Madden, 2006: 
3). Research from the United Kingdom shows a similar correlation between educational 
attainment and Internet use. An estimated 88 percent of people with a degree 
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qualification, or higher, use the Internet in the United Kingdom. The same study 
suggested that only 22 percent of Britons with no qualifications use the Internet 
(Shepherd and Bryson, 2007:13).   
 
Annual income and age also influence whether people use the Internet. The wealthiest 
households in both countries are more likely to be online than the poorest households. 
For example, 80 percent of American households with annual income of between 
$30,000 and $50,000 per year are online, in comparison to 53 percent of households with 
income less than $30,000 (Madden, 2006:3). Internet use varies significantly across 
different age groups in these countries. While 88 percent of 18-29 year olds in the United 
States use the Internet, only 32 percent of those aged over 65 go online (Madden, 2006: 
3). Children and young people are also more likely to be Internet users than old people in 
the United Kingdom are. A recent study suggested that 84 percent of people aged 
between 16 and 24 years old use the Internet, in comparison to 15 percent of those aged 
65 and over (Shepherd and Bryson, 2007:12). Overall, it would appear that the online 
audience for Loyalists and Republicans is likely to come from Europe, North America, 
and Asia, given their high rates of Internet penetration. These Internet users are more 
likely to be educated to at least high school level, wealthy, and aged less than 25 years 
old. However, it is conceivable that these groups might attract support from Internet users 
who do not match this profile, depending on what people search for online.  
 
Internet usage patterns 
 
The online audience available to Northern Irish terrorists is diffuse, as people use the 
Internet as a private viewing box (Noveck, 1999: 30). Loyalist and Republicans might 
seek to mobilise support from the United Kingdom, as well as diaspora communities in 
the United States (see chapter 3). Internet usage patterns within both states suggest that 
the online audience may be limited to those Internet users who are familiar with Loyalism 
and Republicanism in the offline world. This is because people invariably use 
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information and communication technologies (ICTs) as a stimulus for ‘pursuing existing 
interests’ rather than creating new interests (Selwyn, Gorard, and Furlong, 2005: 13). 
Americans and Britons are most likely to check their email when they use the Internet. 
For example, 92 percent of Internet users in the United Kingdom used the Internet for this 
purpose in a recent survey (Di Gennaro and Dutton, 2006: 303). The next most common 
online activity was looking up information about products and services, while 61 percent 
of respondents reported that they used the Internet to look for information on current 
affairs (p.303). Only one in five Britons went online to obtain political information, 
suggesting that the potential for enhancing political engagement using the Internet 
remains unfulfilled (p.307). Moreover, people themselves perceive that the Internet is a 
means for pursuing their private interests, rather than a tool for political engagement and 
education. This was illustrated by the share of online Americans who claim that the 
Internet had greatly improved the way they pursue their hobbies and interests, rising from 
20 percent in 2000 to 33 percent in 2005 (Madden, 2006:2). Some commentators suggest 
that this is evidence that the Internet may not help generate social capital in liberal 
democracies, as was suggested in the cyberoptimist model. Shah, Kwak and Holbert 
(2001) assert that recreational uses of the Internet may “erode individual level production 
of social capital, as these activities are generally asocial or anonymous but foster a sense 
of social interaction” (p.144). 
 
Loyalists and Republicans may be able to reach out beyond their grass roots support to 
young people who use the Internet for research. Young people, who are under-
represented in ‘offline’ politics, appear more likely to engage in politics online (Di 
Gennaro and Dutton, 2006: 306). In addition, approximately 58 percent of people aged 
between 16 and 24 use the Internet to find information for their studies (Madden, 2006: 
48). Young people who study the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ may reference online sources, 
such as the websites of Loyalists and Republican political fronts, in their assignments. 
Owens (2006) suggests that young people in the United States have a high level of trust 
in Internet sources and produce political content online that has influenced mainstream 
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media reports (p.35). This suggests that young people who access the websites of 
Loyalist and Republican may accept their online framing unconditionally. However, only 
a minority of young people will turn to the Internet for political information or the latest 
news stories. The Pew Media Consumption survey (2006) suggests that only 25 percent 
of Americans aged between 18 and 25 will go online to follow news stories (Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press, 2007: 27). The survey respondents were 
more likely to follow news stories television news or in a newspaper. 
 
Nevertheless, Internet news consumers may be a potential target audience for Loyalist 
and Republicans. Recent studies suggest that people are increasingly likely to use the 
Internet for their political news sources. For example, data gathered from two recent US 
mid-term elections showed that the Internet news audience had more than doubled, from 
7 percent in 2002 to 15 percent in 2006 (Fallows, 2007:1). Yet, Internet news consumers 
may choose to access the same news sources they rely upon in the offline world. The Pew 
Media Consumption Survey found that 20 percent of people who get political news 
online use the websites of international news media organisations, with a further 25 
percent favouring state and local government websites (Fallows, 2007:6). Nonetheless, 
the survey did find that 25 percent of Internet news consumers would visit issue-oriented 
websites for an alternative viewpoint on a breaking news story (p.6). Conceivably, these 
people might access the websites of ‘primary definers,’ such as Loyalist and Republican 
political fronts, to follow a news event involving the group in question (Negrine, 1994: 
127). This news event would presumably be publicised first in the conventional mass 
media, prompting people to seek this information in the first place. In other words, 
Loyalist and Republican websites may attract more Internet news consumers if their 
subjects receive the ‘oxygen of publicity’ from the conventional mass media. In sum, 
there does appear to be an online audience for Loyalist and Republicans websites, one 
that does not consist solely of supporters and sympathetic diaspora communities. This 
audience may be receptive to the framing of Loyalist and Republican political fronts if 
they broadly agree with the values on their websites. If Internet news consumers have no 
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prior knowledge of the ‘Troubles,’ it is imperative for Loyalist and Republicans that their 
websites are accessible on the Internet. In particular, Internet users should be able to see 
these websites on search engines when looking for information on their respective 
organisations.  
 
SEARCH ENGINES: ROLE IN COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION 
 
The online audience for Northern Irish terrorists may depend upon the visibility of their 
websites on Internet search engines. In this section, the role of Internet search engines in 
computer-mediated communication will be discussed. Internet search engines can be best 
characterised as ‘digital librarians,’ as opposed to the ‘gatekeepers’ that are employed in 
the conventional mass media. Internet search engines index websites, having little or no 
direct influence on the tone and content of the websites in question. Nevertheless, the 
order of websites within a particular search engine directory is comparable to decisions 
made by editorial staff in the news media. Editors have to deliberate over which stories 
are worthy of greater coverage in conventional media products, such as television news 
bulletins or newspapers. On the one hand, they have to ensure that large numbers of 
media consumers access their products, particularly when advertising revenues are 
critical to the sustenance of their respective organisations. Advertisers are only likely to 
invest in media organisations that provide large numbers of readers or viewers that are 
able to purchase their products (Negrine, 1994: 67). On the other hand, editors have to 
make the decision to drop news stories, as they have finite resources and space with 
which to give equal coverage to all events that occur within their jurisdiction.  
 
In a similar vein to the mass media, Internet search engines are unable to give equal 
attention to the millions of websites contained in their respective directories, nor index all 
of the websites available on the Internet. One study suggested that all of the major search 
engines combined only covered 16 percent of the total number of ‘indexable’ websites on 
the Internet (Bar-Ilan, 1999:1). Consequently, by virtue of their criteria used to index a 
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website and their popularity with Internet users, search engines direct web traffic towards 
certain websites rather than others on the Web.  
 
Internet users, whether expert or non-expert, feel comfortable using Internet search 
engines as navigational ‘tools’ on the Internet. They rarely know the exact Universal 
Resource Locator (URL) of a website, typically entering ‘keywords’ into search engines 
to locate information relevant to their area of interest. Studies suggest that as much as 90 
percent of all traffic on the Internet comes directly from search engines (Submit Corner, 
2004). For example, Internet users across the globe spend a total of 13 million hours per 
month interacting with the Google search engine alone (Ntoulas, Cho, and Olson, 2004: 
1). Furthermore, Internet users are unlikely to look beyond the first 25 results generated 
by a particular search query. Similar to the content of newspapers, the most visible items 
are likely to receive more ‘hits’ than those situated on the third or fourth page of links 
generated by a search term. This suggests that search engines can influence the choices of 
Internet users in terms of which websites they access in order to pursue their private 
interests. Overall, the popularity of search engines suggests that the Internet enables new 
forms of ‘mediated interaction,’ as opposed to the ‘unmediated’ interaction that might 
benefit those who receive minimal coverage in the conventional mass media (Wouters 
and Gerbec, 2003: 4). The creation of a website will not necessarily lead to greater levels 
of popular recognition for actors that lack a visible presence in the conventional mass 
media. Conversely, visibility on Internet search engines appears to be equally as 
important as visibility in the conventional mass media. The websites of publicity-starved 
sub-state actors must consistently appear in the top 25 results generated by search 
engines, if they are to achieve a high degree of visibility online.  
 
HOW DO SEARCH ENGINES WORK? 
‘Googlearchy’ 
 
In this section, the factors that determine whether a website is ‘visible’ on Internet search 
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engines are analysed. Internet search engines do not behave like ‘objective, well informed 
librarians’ (Gerhart, 1994: 3). Instead, each individual search engine has a set of 
protocols that determine whether a website is included in its directory and its position vis-
à-vis other indexed websites. There is little specific information available on these 
protocols, also known as ‘algorithms.’ This is because the companies behind Internet 
search engines are reluctant to disclose information explaining how they rank websites to 
their competitors. Internet search engines compete not only to secure the patronage of 
Internet users but also to accrue revenue from companies wishing to place advertisements 
on their websites.  
 
Google remain the only search engine company to have published details of how they 
rank websites in their directory. The original Google algorithm ‘ranks’ a website in its 
directory through an assessment of the links pointing towards it, and an assessment of the 
‘standing’ of these linking pages themselves (Thelwall, 2001: 3). Google equates a link 
from one website to another as an endorsement of both websites, attributing an 
undisclosed value to each website (Walker, 2002: 3). For a website to receive a high 
ranking in the Google search engine, it clearly pays to reciprocate links with other 
websites, regardless of whether they share similar themes. This phenomenon, whereby 
the most heavily linked websites received the highest ranking in the Google directory, is 
also known as Googlearchy (Hindman, Tsioutliklis, and Johnson, 2003). It would appear 
to militate against the cyber-optimist conception of the Internet as a political 
communication device open to all sections of society. As small sub-state actors are 
unlikely to have large numbers of supporters, they are unlikely to reciprocate links with 
large number of actors online. Therefore, the websites of these actors are likely to be less 
‘visible’ on search engines than the sites of extensively linked organisations, such as 
government agencies, research institutes, and media outlets (Gerhart, 1994: 22).  
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Updating Frequencies 
 
Wouters, Helsten & Leydesdorff (2004) characterise Internet search engines as the 
‘clocks’ of cyberspace, representing the updating frequency of both the Web and the 
underlying Internet (p.15). The maintenance of search engine directories reflects the 
closure of websites, changes to the search engine algorithms, and the extent to which 
‘old’ pages remain in their databases (p.17). Internet search engines use a combination of 
automated website crawlers (or ‘spiders’) and human editors to index websites and 
update their directories. On the one hand, directory search engines, such as DMOZ 
(www.dmoz.org), employ as many as 50,000 human editors to decide whether a website 
should be included in their database and how it should be ranked in comparison to other 
sites (Search Engine Yearbook, 2003). On the other hand, the majority of commercial 
Internet search engines use browser like programs, like ‘spiders,’ to follow the links from 
one website to another, indexing everything that they find.  
 
Both human editors and automated web crawlers look for the same information on 
websites before deciding whether, or invariably where, they are to be included within 
their respective directories. Meta tags, containing information like the name of the 
webmaster and which ‘keywords’ best describe the content of the website, are used to 
determine whether a site should be indexed by an Internet search engine (Webopedia, 
2004). In this respect, Meta tags arguably perform a similar function to the ‘headlines’ 
deployed by conventional news media organisations to boost public consumption of their 
products. The Meta tag description is critical in determining how high a website will be 
‘ranked’ in the results generated by ‘keyword’ searches on search engines. Meta tags 
present the content of a website - in no more than 256 characters – in an effort to attract 
the attention of both human editors and automated web crawlers (Softsteel Solutions, 
2003).  
 
Internet users are more likely to access websites that are visible on Internet search 
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engines, defined in this chapter as websites that feature in the top 25 results generated in 
response to a particular search query. Yet, the visibility of websites is also subject to the 
constant updating of Internet search engine directories. Internet search engines have to 
update their databases constantly due to the high turnover of websites on the Internet, an 
estimated 80 percent of websites available today likely to be inaccessible after one year 
(Ntoulas, Cho, and Olson, 2004:2). Companies such as Yahoo, and even the market 
leader, Google, do not have the resources to index all available websites on the Internet, 
or to trawl through these websites in order to generate a list of results in response to a 
search query. The implication for marginalised sub-state political actors would appear 
stark. Failure to achieve a ‘high’ search engine ranking will inevitably lead to these actors 
remaining anonymous on the Internet, in effect replicating the paucity of coverage they 
receive in the conventional mass media. Consequently, webmasters that seek greater 
visibility online must market their websites at a target audience that not only includes 
Internet users, but also search engines.  
 
DO SEARCH ENGINES ‘SUPPRESS’ INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET? 
 
In this section, the proposition that search engines actively ‘suppress’ information on the 
Internet is analysed. As discussed earlier, search engines are more likely to direct Internet 
users towards the websites of extensively linked organisations than peripheral sub-state 
actors. Some analysts suggest that there may be an alternative explanation for 
controversial websites not featuring in the top 25 results generated by Internet search 
engines. Internet search engines may filter information with reference to many of the 
norms that inform the behaviour of the conventional mass media. The four media models 
[the authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility, and soviet models respectively] 
permit government censorship of the conventional mass media because a story might 
endanger national security, defame character, or offend public ‘decency.’135 Recent 
studies suggest that these norms also influence the editorial process within Internet search 
engines, particularly in the omission of controversial websites from certain search engine 
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directories. Zittrain and Edelman (2005) compared the availability of white supremacist 
websites on the French and German Google portals, google.fr, and google.de. The study 
concluded that 113 websites, such as ‘Stormfront White Pride World Wide’ 
(www.crusader.net), could not be located on both the French and German versions of 
Google, despite being listed on google.com (Zittrain and Edelman, 2005). Government 
legislation forced Google to remove these websites from their French and German 
portals. In December 2000, the German Supreme Court, the Bundesgerichtshof, had ruled 
that German laws against neo-Nazi propaganda would apply to websites maintained by 
both German citizens and foreign nationals (Bodard, 2003: 266).  
 
There is also some evidence to suggest that political actors may use legal sanctions to 
remove controversial websites from Internet search engine directories. In 2002, the 
Church of Scientology forced Google to remove references to websites that were critical 
of its religion. The Scientologists lobbied for the removal of these websites with 
reference to the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998), as they contained 
‘copyrighted material’ (Zittrain and Edelman, 2005). However, groups that lobby for the 
removal of websites are powerless to prohibit its transmission on the Internet, as 
webmasters are able register their domains in other nation-states. For example, the 
Chinese Ministry of Information has forced search engines such as Google to remove 
politically sensitive material from their directories. Thus, if an Internet user searches for 
information about Falun Gong on Google’s Chinese portal (www.google.cn), they will be 
directed towards government websites rather than websites that express support for the 
Falun Gong.136 However, if an Internet user accesses another Google portal, such as 
google.co.uk, they will be directed towards websites that are maintained by practitioners 
of these meditation exercises.137 
 
Yet, the norms of the libertarian media model may also contribute to the predominance of 
‘more of the same’ organisational websites on Internet search engine directories. In the 
conventional mass media, advertising revenue and private investment are critical to the 
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longevity of media organisations, particularly in the United States. Internet search 
engines also maintain their financial self-sufficiency through the sale of advertising space 
on their respective web portals. Search engines, like Geocities, have even sold ‘priority 
retrieval’ to companies, placing their websites first in the results generated by a relevant 
query. (Noveck, 2000: 24). This is often invisible to Internet users who use these web 
portals, as both private companies and search engines are reluctant to disclose this 
information to the public. As small sub-state actors are unlikely to be able to afford 
priority retrieval, they are likely to be less visible on search engine directories than the 
websites of large media companies. 
 
The filtering of information by search engines has implications for those Internet users 
who wish to research controversial political issues on the Internet. Some commentators 
suggest that Internet search engines reward ‘more of the same’ organisational websites at 
the expense of less popular content. Gerhart (1994) asserts that ‘controversy- revealing’ 
websites are only visible in search engine results through a combination of the right 
search ‘query’ and offline experience of the relevant subject (p.22). Internet users who 
lack background knowledge of a controversial political issue are increasingly likely to 
turn to Internet search engines for links to websites of interest. As discussed above, 
Internet search engines are likely to direct these Internet users towards the websites of 
extensively - linked organisations, many of whom have the capacity to purchase ‘priority 
retrieval.’ Therefore, the predominance of ‘more of the same’ organisations on Internet 
search engines reduces the ‘visibility’ of ‘controversy – revealing’ websites online. If the 
Internet user is not familiar with the actor behind a controversial website, they are likely 
to turn to the most ‘visible’ websites on Internet search engines. These websites are likely 
to be those of media organisations, which dominate the first page of results generated by 
their query.  
 
The algorithms of the major commercial search engines arguably perpetuate the 
suppression of ‘controversy – revealing’ websites on the Internet. If these websites do not 
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receive a large number of ‘hits’ from Internet users who lack relevant background 
knowledge of their subject, they are likely to remain a minority interest online. 
Consequently, webmasters that publish controversial opinions on their websites are likely 
to be communicating with people who share their views, as opposed to a potential global 
audience with no preconception of their particular subject. In sum, Internet search 
engines filter information with reference to some of the norms of the mass media models. 
Extensively - linked organisations are likely to populate the top 25 results generated by 
most search queries, often at the expense of ‘controversy - revealing’ websites. These 
organisations are more visible on search engines because a higher volume of web traffic 
passes through their websites, and, in some cases, because they have paid companies like 
Geocities to ensure a high search engine ranking.  
 
NORTHERN IRISH TERRORISTS AND INTERNET SEARCH ENGINES 
 
In this section, the potential online audience for Northern Irish terrorists is analysed with 
reference to the visibility of their websites on search engines. Internet news consumers 
and young people might use the Internet to look up information about Northern Irish 
terrorists, particularly if they are following a news event or studying the Northern Irish 
conflict. This study, conducted in 2004 and 2005, examined whether these Internet users 
would be directed towards the websites of Northern Irish terrorists if they used Internet 
search engines to locate this information. The online audience available to Republicans 
was expected to be much larger than that available to Loyalists, as their websites would 
be more visible to Internet users on search engine directories. Republican terrorists and 
their supporters would receive a higher search engine ranking than their Loyalist 
equivalents, as they provide more links on their website and receive more web traffic due 
to their higher international profile (see chapter 3). In addition, the study tested the 
hypothesis that ‘more of the same’ organisational websites would dominate the search 
results generated by a variety of Loyalist and Republican keyword searches. It was 
anticipated that websites that expressed support for Northern Irish terrorist organisations 
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would be vastly under-represented in the top 25 results generated by related search 
queries. Media organisations, with their greater volume of Internet traffic and the ability 
to purchase priority retrieval from search engines, were expected to feature prominently 
in the results generated by Loyalist and Republican search queries. 
 
SAMPLE 
 
The sample selected for the study consisted of four leading Internet search engines, 
namely DMOZ (www.dmoz.org), Google (www.google.co.uk), MSN (www.msn.co.uk), 
and Yahoo (www.yahoo.co.uk). The British versions of Google, MSN, and Yahoo were 
utilised for the study as they included results from their global directories. During the 
period of data collection, they were also the most regularly used Internet search engines 
across the globe.138 The three commercial search engines were included to test the rule of 
‘Googlearchy.’ As discussed earlier, search engines such as Google rank websites within 
its directory in accordance with the volume of web traffic that passes through each 
website. Therefore, the study was designed to test the hypothesis that extensively linked 
organisations would populate the top 25 results generated by these search engines, as 
opposed to ‘controversy-revealing’ websites, like those that expressed support for 
Northern Irish terrorists. The DMOZ search engine (www.DMOZ.org) was also included 
in the study to reflect the new generation of search engines based entirely upon human 
editorial, rather than automated Web crawlers. Consequently, the DMOZ search engine 
was expected to return more links to websites that could be characterised as either ‘pro-
Loyalist’ or ‘pro-Republican’ than the other search engines included in the study. Human 
editors would presumably be less likely to provide links to websites that had nothing to 
do with the terrorist organisations under analysis. 
  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
A series of keyword searches were conducted using the four Internet search engines in 
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October 2004. The names of the 14 Northern Irish terrorist organisations, proscribed 
under anti-terrorist legislation such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1984), were 
entered into the basic search facility of the four Internet search engines (See Table 4.1). 
Two ideological descriptions, ‘Ulster Loyalist’ and ‘Irish Republican,’ were also entered 
into the basic search facility of the four search engines. These phrases were selected as 
they were commonly used to describe the ideological position of Northern Irish terrorist 
organisations, as illustrated by the names of the 14 proscribed terrorist groups under 
review. It was anticipated that webmasters who projected ’pro-Loyalist’ or ‘pro-
Republican’ propaganda on the Internet would use these words, or the name of one of the 
proscribed terrorist organisations, in the Meta tag descriptions of their websites. The 
number of links generated by each individual search query was recorded for further 
analysis. These statistics provided a rudimentary method of comparing the number of 
websites whose Meta tags resembled Loyalist and Republican keywords.  
[Table 4.1 here] 
 
Searches were conducted using the two ideological descriptions and two terrorist group 
names, the Irish Republican Army and the Ulster Volunteer Force. These groups were 
selected on the basis that they were two of the most well known terrorist groups in the 
region. As such, it was anticipated that there would be numerous websites dedicated to 
these groups on the Web. The search results were then analysed to determine whether the 
most ‘visible’ websites belonged to organisations that supported Northern Irish terrorists. 
The top 25 results of these keyword searches were analysed as they were considered the 
results that most closely resembled the search terms entered in the respective Internet 
search engines. The websites that featured in these 25 results were then classified as one 
of eight categories (See Table 4.2). During the period of analysis, none of the 14 
proscribed Northern Irish terrorist groups maintained an official web presence under that 
particular name. Therefore, the category of official website was designed to include the 
websites of Loyalist and Republican political fronts in the study (see chapter 3). For 
example, the Sinn Fein and Progressive Unionist Party websites were considered 
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‘official’ Republican and Loyalist websites with reference to the First Report of the 
Independent Monitoring Commission (see chapter 3). The category of ‘solidarity’ 
websites referred to those websites that existed solely to provide support for Loyalist or 
Republican terrorist groups. This support could take many forms, including soliciting 
resources for paramilitary prisoners or issuing propaganda in favour of one of the terrorist 
groups under analysis.  
 
[Table 4.2 here] 
 
The other six categories incorporated websites that did not express support for Loyalist or 
Republican terrorist organisations. Personal webpages and blogs were defined as 
websites maintained by individual Internet users to express opinions on a variety of 
issues, such as terrorism. Although many ‘bloggers’ expressed opinions on Northern Irish 
terrorists, personal webpages were not considered to be ‘solidarity’ websites dedicated to 
the terrorist groups under analysis. It was anticipated that these websites were set up to 
record the opinions of their respective authors, rather than just issue propaganda in favour 
of Northern Irish terrorist organisations. It was expected that ‘pro-Loyalist’ and ‘pro-
Republican’ webmasters might use their websites to criticise the activities of their 
opponents. Many of these websites might use words relating to their opponents in their 
Meta tag descriptions, thus making their websites visible in results generated by searches 
conducted using the names of their rivals. Thus, the ‘Opposition Website’ category was 
created to incorporate ‘Republican’ websites in the analysis of Loyalist keyword searches 
and vice versa.  
 
The next three categories were designed to test the Gerhart hypothesis, namely that ‘more 
of the same’ organisational websites dominate search engine results at the expense of less 
popular websites. The websites of research institutes, external mass media organisations, 
and government agencies were all expected to receive high search engine ratings due to 
the rule of ‘Googlearchy.’ It was anticipated that research institutes and government 
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agencies, that analysed the Northern Irish conflict, would use keyword Meta tag 
descriptions on their sites that were similar to the keyword searches used in the study. 
External news media organisations, who reported on the activities of Northern Irish 
terrorists in newspaper, radio, and television formats, were expected to replicate this 
coverage on their websites. The category of ‘Other’ was used to describe websites that 
did not comment specifically on contemporary Northern Irish terrorist organisations. This 
category included websites that promoted cultural aspects of Loyalism and 
Republicanism but offered no overtly political analysis of contemporary Northern Irish 
terrorist organisations. It also included websites that did not explicitly refer to Northern 
Ireland, but had Meta tags that were similar to the keyword searches used in the study. 
For example, websites dedicated to the Irish language or Orange flute bands were 
considered cultural rather than political projections of the two traditions in Northern 
Ireland. 
 
The data was entered into SPSS for Windows and frequency tables were created to 
provide a breakdown of the top 25 results by website category. Inferential statistics were 
not used to analyse the data due to doubts over the suitability of using Internet search 
engines for creating data sets. It was anticipated that the stability of results could not be 
guaranteed, as the behaviour of search engines lacked transparency. As discussed in this 
chapter, the algorithms behind search engines such as Google are invariably shrouded in 
secrecy (Thelwall, 2001:12). The top 25 results could vary from one day to another due 
to the updating frequency of each individual search engine, prompted by the high birth 
and death rates of websites on the Internet. A second phase of data collection in October 
2005 was intended to allow a comparison of the descriptive statistics over a period of a 
year, but these comparisons were illustrative only and no generalisations could be made 
based upon them.  
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RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The study found that there were more results generated by searches conducted using 
‘Irish Republican’ than ‘Ulster Loyalist’ (See Table 4.3). As expected, the DMOZ search 
engine produced the fewest number of search results, although they appeared more stable 
as there was minimal deviation between the two phases of data collection, particularly in 
the ‘Irish Republican’ keyword search. The other descriptive statistics appeared to 
illustrate the problem of stability in using search engines to construct data sets. There 
were some notable differences in the number of search results returned by the other three 
search engines. For example, the mean score for the number of results generated by the 
‘Ulster Loyalist’ search rose from 32611.8 to 216930.8, between the two phases of data 
collection. 
 
[Table 4.3 here]  
 
Searches conducted using terrorist group names also cast doubt over the stability of 
results generated by search engines. The DMOZ search engine again produced the fewest 
number of links in response to searches conducted using the names of Northern Irish 
terrorist groups. Searches conducted using names such as the Continuity Army Council 
generated no links on the DMOZ search engine (See Table 4.4). Similar to the ideological 
descriptions, the mean scores across all four search engines for Republican group names 
varied greatly between the two phases of data collection. For example, searches 
conducted using ‘Saor Eire’ produced mean scores of 344.75 and 4681.25 in phases one 
and two respectively.  
 
[Table 4.4 here] 
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Searches conducted using Loyalist terrorist group names generated a larger number of 
links than their Republican counterparts did (See Table 4.5). The search conducted using 
‘Orange Volunteers’ received the highest mean score in both phases of data collection. 
However, searches conducted using Loyalist terrorist group names also showed wide 
variations between the two periods as data collection. For example, searches conducted 
using ‘Ulster Freedom Fighters’ produced mean scores of 8655.25 and 52864.75 in the 
two phases of data collection. 
 
[Table 4.5 here] 
 
Analysis of search engine results using website categories. 
 
Irish Republican 
 
The analysis of the type of websites generated by the ideological descriptions suggested 
that Republican political fronts were more visible on search engines than their Loyalist 
counterparts were. For example, while the Irish Republican Socialist Party featured 
prominently in the Republican search engines results, the Ulster Political Research Group 
was conspicuous by its absence from the Loyalist results. Overall, the majority of links 
generated by the ‘Irish Republican’ search pointed towards ‘pro-Republican’ websites 
(See Table 4.6). There was a high degree of convergence between the four search engines 
in terms of the results generated by this query. For example, all four search engines 
provided links pointing towards the Ireland’s Own website (www.irelandsown.net). 
Furthermore, the majority of websites generated by this search query could be 
characterised as either ‘pro-Republican’ or ‘more of the same’ organisational websites, 
all of which provided analysis of Republican terrorist groups. A low percentage of links 
generated by the four search engines pointed towards websites that offered no political 
analysis of the Northern Irish conflict. In addition, there were no Loyalist websites visible 
in the results generated by the ‘Irish Republican’ query. 
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[Table 4.6 here] 
 
Ulster Loyalist 
 
The majority of links generated by the ‘Ulster Loyalist’ search pointed towards websites 
that were supportive of Loyalist terrorist organisations (See Table 4.7). Loyalist solidarity 
websites, such as Swansea Loyal (www.swansealoyal.co.uk), featured prominently in the 
results generated by all four search engines. The study also found that there were no 
Republican websites visible in the results generated by the ‘Ulster Loyalist’ search query. 
In addition, a significant number of links pointed towards the websites of actors that 
appeared to have no direct affiliation with Loyalist terrorists. For example, the personal 
webpage of Philip Johnston (www.philipjohnston.com) featured prominently in the study, 
presumably because of one article he had published on his website that referred to the 
Northern Irish conflict. Overall, the study suggested that Internet users would be more 
likely to reach’ pro-Republican’ websites than ‘pro Loyalist’ websites if they used 
ideological descriptions as search terms.  
 
[Table 4.7 here] 
 
Terrorist Group Name 
 
Irish Republican Army 
 
Searches conducted using the ‘Irish Republican Army’ search query generated fewer 
links to ‘pro-Republican’ websites than those conducted using the ideological 
description, ‘Irish Republican’ (See Table 4.8). However, the percentage of ‘official’ 
terrorist organisation websites generated by the search query was distorted by a very 
small DMOZ sample. As expected, the DMOZ search engine returned fewer links than 
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the other Internet search engines, the ‘Irish Republican Army’ search generating a 
maximum of 16 links in both phases of data collection. Nevertheless, few links generated 
by the other search engines pointed towards the websites of Republican political fronts, 
such as Sinn Fein (www.sinnfein.ie). For example, the Google search engine sample did 
not provide any links to official Republican organisations during both phases of data 
collection. 
 
[Table 4.8 here] 
 
Republican solidarity websites, like the Irish Republican Movement 
(www.members.lycos.co.uk/taaraanois), were slightly more visible in these search results 
than Republican political fronts. Contrary to the initial hypothesis, the majority of links 
generated by DMOZ did not point towards websites that were ‘pro-Republican.’ The 
DMOZ search engine was more likely to provide links pointing towards the websites of 
external media organisations, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(www.bbc.co.uk), than those of ‘pro-Republican’ actors. Overall, the majority of links 
within each search engine sample pointed towards the websites of research institutes, or 
those that offered no political analysis of Northern Irish terrorist groups. For example, the 
MSN search engine generated links to websites such as Anagram Genius 
(www.anagramgenius.com) in response to this search. Furthermore, Loyalists received 
greater representation on the results generated by this search, in comparison to the results 
generated by the ‘Irish Republican’ search. Both the MSN and Yahoo search engines 
pointed Internet users seeking information on the Irish Republican Army towards 
Loyalist solidarity websites. 
 
Ulster Volunteer Force 
 
Searches conducted using the ‘Ulster Volunteer Force’ query generated fewer links 
towards the websites of Loyalist political fronts than the ‘Ulster Loyalist’ search (See 
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Table 4.9). Only the DMOZ search engine generated a link that pointed towards an 
official Loyalist organisation, namely the website of the Progressive Unionist Party 
(www.pup-ni.org.uk). It should be noted that the relatively high percentage of links (25 
percent) pointing towards official websites on DMOZ was mainly due to the small 
number of websites (four) generated by this search. However, this search did generate a 
larger number of links pointing towards Loyalist solidarity websites in comparison to the 
number of Republican solidarity websites generated by the ‘Irish Republican Army’ 
search. Once more, a large percentage of links generated by this search pointed towards 
websites that offered no political analysis of contemporary Northern Irish terrorism, such 
as the UVF Regimental Band (wwwuvfregimentalband.co.uk). There was some evidence 
to support the hypothesis that the DMOZ engine would generate a larger proportion of 
links to sites that dealt explicitly with Northern Irish terrorism. As expected, the DMOZ 
search engine generated fewer links than the other search engines under analysis, 
generating a maximum of four links in response to this query over both periods of data 
collection. However, the study found that all of the links generated by the DMOZ search 
engine pointed towards either the websites of Loyalist political fronts, or those 
maintained by their supporters.  
 
[See Table 4.9] 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Do search engines limit the audience for Northern Irish terrorists online? 
 
Overall, the results of the study provided some evidence to support the hypothesis that 
‘more of the same’ organisational websites are more visible on Internet search engines 
than ‘controversy-revealing’ websites. Internet search engines direct Internet users 
towards the websites of media organisations and universities, as opposed to the websites 
of Loyalist and Republican political fronts. These ‘more of the same’ organisations 
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appear more visible on Internet search engines, by virtue of the amount of web traffic that 
passes through their website, and, in some instances, due to their prior purchase of 
priority retrieval. Furthermore, ‘more of the same’ organisational websites are more 
likely to adhere to a set of informal rules that guarantee a high search engine rating for a 
website. Companies like Softsteel Solutions recommend that webmasters remove page 
redirects and place key information about the website towards the top of the page in order 
to secure a high search engine ranking (Softsteel Solutions, 2003). The webmasters of 
‘organisational’ websites are likely to possess the resources to hire companies to design 
their websites in order to maximise their search engine rating.  
 
Although some Northern Irish terrorist organisations may possess the necessary resources 
to purchase priority retrieval and hire web consultants, the prospect of government 
sanctions against search engines that facilitate the activities of terrorists is likely to lead 
them to offer priority retrieval to actors who have no tangible link to these terrorist 
organisations. National governments can also pressurise search engines to remove 
terrorist websites from their directories altogether, citing a perceived threat to national 
security as their justification for such censorship. In March 2005, Google was forced to 
remove an advertisement placed by the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas from its search 
engine following a barrage of criticism from the international media and diplomatic 
pressure from the US and Israeli governments (Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Center, 2005). These factors would appear to militate against official Loyalist and 
Republican terrorist organisations appearing in the top 25 results of Internet search 
engine results, particularly in response to searches conducted using the names of 
proscribed terrorist groups. The audience for these groups may therefore be limited to 
those who already were familiar with the Universal Resource Locator (URL) of their 
official website.  
 
Yet, the websites of ‘third party’ actors can generate soft power on behalf of a terrorist 
organisation. Soft power relies upon “the appeal of one’s ideas or culture,” as opposed to 
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the activities of one particular actor (Keohane and Nye, 1998: 86). Diverse groups such 
as political parties, the conventional mass media, and private individuals may use their 
web presence to project the ideology of the terrorist actor.139 If one of these websites 
remains online, terrorists may gain support through the exercise of soft power on their 
behalf. However, the extent of terrorist soft power still depends upon the attractiveness of 
their political ideologies, and the accessibility of websites that transmit propaganda in 
their favour.  
 
Have Internet users lost interest in Northern Irish terrorists? 
 
Loyalist and Republican websites may lack visibility on search engines because they 
receive fewer visitors than the websites of media organisations. The volume of traffic that 
goes through a website is one of the factors that determine its ranking on search engines. 
Terrorist atrocities often lead to increased web traffic, as people search for information 
about the perpetrators online. For example, an estimated 36 million Internet users in the 
United States went online looking for news in the first two days after the attacks on New 
York and Washington in September 11th 2001 (Pew Internet and American Life Project, 
2001:3). This temporarily increased the online audience for radical Islamists online, as 
people used search engines to look for information on what had motivated the 
perpetrators.  
 
Contextual factors might also explain why people are less inclined to search for 
information on Northern Irish terrorists online. The political process in Northern Ireland 
had stagnated during the period of data collection, as the British and Irish governments 
sought to restore devolution to the province. Nevertheless, paramilitaries on both sides 
continued to declare publicly their support for the peace process and did not renew their 
‘armed struggle’ to achieve their objectives. It could be argued that these groups were not 
as newsworthy as other ‘active’ international terrorist organisations, such as Al Qaeda, 
during the study. It is also reasonable to speculate that the number of people using search 
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engines to follow news stories involving Loyalists and Republicans declined during this 
period. As such, the volume of traffic through Loyalist and Republicans websites would 
decrease, leading to a lower profile on search engines in comparison to more popular 
media websites. This suggests that global search patterns, as well as the number of links 
available on their websites may limit the audience for these groups. Future research 
should consider how global search patterns influences the visibility of websites on 
Internet search engines. This research might utilise innovative research tools that were 
not available during the study, such as Google Trends (www.google.com/intl/en/trends). 
Google Trends enables Internet users to view the fastest growing search queries across 
the globe. This would enable researchers to determine whether terrorist atrocities lead to 
a rapid increase in the number of search queries about their perpetrators.   
 
Terrorist Framing and search engine visibility 
 
Loyalists and Republicans may not wish to appear visible on search engines when 
Internet users look for information on their respective terrorist organisations. Many of 
these groups have pursued their political objectives through their political representatives 
since the Belfast Agreement (1998). Parties such as Sinn Fein use their websites to 
differentiate themselves from their terrorist sponsors, suggesting they are cultural 
democrats. The content of political front websites is virtually indistinguishable from the 
content posted on the websites of constitutional political parties (see chapter 3). As such, 
these terrorist organisations are unlikely to maintain a website under the guise of their 
military organisation, as this would cast doubt upon their long-term commitment to the 
peace process. The low visibility of these groups on search engines might prove 
beneficial to these political fronts as they attempt to demonstrate their support for the 
peace process. These groups might not wish to attract an online audience that is looking 
for information on their military activities. 
 
Yet, low search engine visibility does not guarantee that Internet users will differentiate 
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political fronts from terrorist organisations. People who look for information on the 
‘Troubles’ include not just those who rely upon search engines to direct them towards 
relevant websites, but also those who have ‘offline’ knowledge of the Northern Irish 
conflict. Internet users with prior knowledge of Northern Irish terrorists groups will be 
able to locate their official websites by altering their search terms. In particular, 
knowledge of the link between political front and terrorist organisation will lead many 
Internet users to use different search terms than those employed in the study. Conversely, 
people who rely upon search engines will be directed towards the most visible websites, 
such as those of media organisations and universities. These Internet users are still likely 
to be made aware of the links between political fronts and terrorist organisations. The 
websites of media organisations are likely to provide information on the links between 
political fronts and their terrorist sponsors, as well as providing links to their websites. 
This suggests that the online framing of Loyalists and Republicans may have limited 
effect upon people who use search engines as research tools. Irrespective of their 
background knowledge, people who use search engines to research the Northern Irish 
conflict will be able to view the links between political fronts and their respective 
terrorist organisations.  
 
Dissident terrorists may not wish people to visit their websites if they have no link to 
their organisation. A higher profile on Internet search engines will inevitably lead to 
increased scrutiny of the group’s covert activities by intelligence agencies and the 
potential closure of the site by national governments. Weinmann (2004) suggests that 
terrorists might use the Web for a number of covert purposes like data mining and 
providing tutorials on sabotaging computer networks (p.7). Consequently, dissidents on 
both sides might seek to avoid a higher degree of exposure on Internet search engines. 
Many of these groups have continued to perpetrate acts of political violence since the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998. Dissident Republican groups, such 
as the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, use their websites to justify political violence 
and to make thinly veiled threats against supporters of the Belfast Agreement (see chapter 
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3). In addition, nearly all of the Loyalist terrorist organisations that initially supported the 
Good Friday Agreement have been ‘specified’ as ‘active’ terrorist organisations since 
1998. There is already some evidence to suggest that these groups use ICTs to plan and 
perpetrate atrocities in the ‘offline’ world. For example, the Ulster Freedom Fighters have 
used websites to select potential targets. In March 2001, a message posted on an ‘Ulster 
Loyalist’ website urged UFF members to attack a named bar where it claimed members 
of the Irish Republican Army regularly visited.140 For groups who use the web covertly to 
support their military operations, a high degree of visibility on search engines might 
prove a hindrance.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The online audience for Loyalists and Republicans consists primarily of Internet users 
who use the web for political research and supporters of these groups. While there is 
some evidence to suggest that the digital divide is narrowing, this audience is still likely 
to be male, middle class, well educated, and situated in Europe or North America. People 
without links to Northern Irish terrorists may use search engines to locate information 
about the Northern Irish conflict online. The analysis presented in this chapter suggests 
that search engines can also be characterised as ‘gatekeepers,’ albeit without the ability to 
shape the content of websites before it reaches Internet users. Internet search engines 
direct this audience towards ‘more of the same’ organisational websites rather than ‘pro-
Loyalist’ or ‘pro-Republican’ websites. The rule of Googlearchy and the sale of priority 
retrieval militate against a high search engine ranking for websites that express support 
for these terrorists. In addition, the study found that search engines did not provide links 
to the websites of political fronts when searches were conducted using the names of their 
respective terrorist organisations. This might actually benefit groups who wish audiences 
to differentiate their political front from the atrocities of their military wings. Internet 
users, with limited offline knowledge about the Northern Irish conflict, may accept the 
framing of pro-Agreement groups such as Sinn Fein if their websites are not visible on 
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these search results. However, media organisations - often the most visible websites on 
search engine results- will still direct people with limited knowledge about the Northern 
Irish conflict towards the websites of Loyalist and Republican political fronts. Thus, 
search engines enable a ‘mediated interaction’ between terrorist-linked groups and a 
potential global audience online. This might not be to the detriment of some Northern 
Irish terrorist organisations. Low visibility on search engines may prove beneficial to 
dissident Republicans who are still engaged in ‘armed struggle,’ such as the 32 County 
Sovereignty Movement. These groups may not wish to attract a large audience online for 
fear of compromising future military operations and the security of their members. 
Overall, the analysis suggests that the online audience for Northern Irish terrorists may 
fluctuate in response to events in the offline world. As these political fronts have 
committed to the peace process, they have arguably become less newsworthy. Internet 
users are more likely to use the Web to follow breaking news stories than look up 
information on Northern Irish terrorists, many of whom have declared a cessation to their 
military activities.  
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Table 4.1 Northern Irish Terrorist Groups currently proscribed in the United Kingdom.  
 
Group Estimated Strength  Pro/Anti Good 
Friday 
Agreement 
Website of Politically Linked 
Group 
Unofficial 
(Solidarity) 
Website 
Continuity Army Council1  Under 50 active 
members. 
Anti Yes 
(as Republican Sinn Fein) 
Yes 
Cumann na mBan No Data Available No Data 
Available 
No  No 
Fianna na hEireann Unknown Anti Yes No 
Irish National Liberation Army Under 50 active 
members. 
Anti Yes 
(As Irish Republican Socialist 
Movement) 
Yes 
Irish Peoples2 Liberation 
Organisation 
 
No Data Available No Data 
Available 
No No 
Irish Republican Army (aka 
PIRA)  
Several hundred 
active members. 
 
Pro Yes 
(As Sinn Fein) 
Yes 
Loyalist Volunteer Force 50-150 active 
members, 300 
supporters. 
 
Anti No Yes 
Orange Volunteers 20 active members3 Anti No Yes 
Red Hand Commandos No Data Available Pro No Yes 
Red Hand Defenders Up to 20 active 
members 
Anti No No 
Saor Eire No Data Available No Data 
Available 
No No 
Ulster Defence 
Association/Ulster Freedom 
Fighters4 
 Few dozen active 
members  
Pro Yes 
(As Ulster Political Research 
Group) 
Yes 
Ulster Volunteer Force   Few dozen active 
members 
Pro Yes 
(As Progressive Unionist Party) 
Yes 
                                                 
1
 Linked to Republican Sinn Fein, Continuity IRA, and according to some sources, the Real IRA. 
2
 The Irish Peoples Liberation Organisation (IPLO) announced its dissolution in October 1992 following an 
internal feud. 
3
 Security sources believe that Red Hand Defenders and Orange Volunteers are served by same pool of 
volunteers. 
4
 These two organisations are defined as autonomous terrorist organisations on the UK list of proscribed 
terrorist groups (2005). However, these groups are considered by many sources to be one and the same 
organisation. 
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Table 4.2 Categories of Website generated by search engines. 
 
 
Table.4.3. Results generated by words ‘Irish Republican’ and ‘Ulster Loyalist.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Official 
Terrorist 
Organisation/ 
Political 
 Front 
Solidarity 
Website 
Personal 
Webpage/Blog 
Research 
Institute/ 
University 
External 
News 
Media 
Opposition 
Website 
Government Other 
Group Name DMOZ 
 
04        05 
Google 
 
      04            05 
MSN 
 
    04                05 
Yahoo 
 
    04                05 
Mean 
 
    04                             05 
Irish 
Republican 
50 46 404000 3930000 160883 384124 867000 5040000 357983.3 2338542.5 
Ulster Loyalist 20 12 34200 290000 13127 59711 83100 518000 32611.9 216930.8 
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Table.4.4. Number of results for searches conducted using Republican group names. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group Name      DMOZ 
 
04           05 
Google 
 
04                  05 
MSN 
 
04                05 
Yahoo 
 
04                05 
Mean 
 
     04                    05 
Continuity 
Army Council 
0 0 105,000 1780000 25,413 188702 144,000 751000 68603.25 679925.5 
Cumann  
na mBan 
0 0 1,860 137 405 3648 383 2180 662.00 1491.25 
Fianna  
na hEireann 
0 0 640 9600 570 5434 1690 18900 725.00 6243.5 
Irish National 
Liberation 
Army 
1 1 59200 1430000 25696 136722 146000 807000 57724.25 593430.75 
Irish Peoples 
Liberation 
Organisation 
0 0 12900 724000 8898 111000 51,100 35371 18224.50 217592.75 
Irish 
Republican 
Army 
0 16 148000 2300000 66197 214159 366000 2430000 145049.30 1236043.75 
Saor Eire 0 0 592 13000 280 4215 507 1510 344.75 4681.25 
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Table.4.5. Number of results for searches conducted using Loyalist group names. 
Group Name    DMOZ 
 
04        05 
      Google 
 
04                 05 
        MSN 
 
04                05 
        Yahoo 
 
04                05 
             Mean 
 
      04                05 
Loyalist 
Volunteer Force 
0 0 13800 148000 5801 29292 33400 195000 13250.25 93073.00 
Orange 
Volunteers 
0 4 328000 5010000 154339 816841 857000 4790000 334834.80 2654211.3 
Red Hand 
Commandos 
0 1 53100 1790000 22157 130969 158000 732000 58314.25 663242.5 
Red Hand 
Defenders 
0 1 130000 1600000 71007 365944 398000 2100000 149741.80 1016486.25 
Ulster Defence 
Association 
0 3 48700 423000 9371 53011 58700 307000 29192.75 195753.5 
Ulster Freedom 
Fighters 
0 0 7920 92300 3401 17159 23300 102000 8655.25 52864.75 
Ulster Volunteer 
Force 
4 1 18200 222000 7711 43526 50800 241000 19178.75 126631.75 
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Table.4.6. ‘Irish Republican’ search results by website category. 
Category       DMOZ 
 
      Percent (%) 
 04                05 
      Google 
 
     Percent (%) 
04             05 
        MSN 
 
     Percent (%) 
04                05 
          Yahoo 
 
       Percent (%) 
04                 05 
Official  
Republican 
Organisation 
32 24 36 20 16 12 52 32 
Republican Solidarity 
Website 
24 32 28 24 24 24 12 44 
Personal Webpage/Blog 20 16 4 12 20 0 4 0 
Research 
Institute/University 
4 8 20 32 8 20 16 16 
External  
News Media 
12 16 4 8 8 16 0 40 
Loyalist 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Government 0 0 0 0 4 8 0 0 
Other 8 4 8 4 20 20 16 4 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table.4.7 ‘Ulster Loyalist’ results by website category. 
 
 
Category       DMOZ 
 
      Percent (%) 
   04             05 
      Google 
 
Percent (%) 
04             05 
        MSN 
 
    Percent (%) 
   04             05 
      Yahoo 
 
    Percent (%) 
   04             05 
Official  
Loyalist 
Organisation 
5 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 
Loyalist 
Solidarity Website 
50 58.3 36 12 48 36 48 36 
Personal Webpage/Blog 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 
Research 
Institute/University 
0 0 8 40 8 12 12 16 
External  
News Media 
0 0 4 8 12 8 16 8 
Republican 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Government 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 45 41.7 52 32 28 44 24 40 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table.4.8 ‘Irish Republican Army’ results by website category. 
 
 
Category       DMOZ 
 
       Percent (%) 
04                05 
      Google 
 
      Percent (%) 
04                 05 
        MSN 
 
     Percent (%) 
04             05 
      Yahoo 
 
      Percent (%) 
04                05 
Official Republican 
Organisation 
0 18.75 0 0 8 
 
4 8 8 
Republican Solidarity 
Website 
0 12.5 12 8 24 12 12 12 
Personal Webpage/Blog 0 0 4 0 12 0 4 0 
Research 
Institute/University 
0 56.25 40 68 12 48 28 60 
External  
News Media 
0 12.5 0 8 16 8 8 4 
Loyalist 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 4 
Government 0 0 0 0 0 12 4 0 
Other 0 0 44 16 16 16 36 12 
TOTAL N/A 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table.4.9 ‘Ulster Volunteer Force’ results by website category. 
Category       DMOZ 
 
     Percent (%) 
04                05 
      Google 
 
     Percent (%) 
04                 05 
        MSN 
 
     Percent (%) 
04                05 
      Yahoo 
 
     Percent (%) 
04                05 
Official Loyalist 
Organisation 
25 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
 
0 
Loyalist Solidarity 
Website 
75 100 16 8 24 24 32 20 
Personal Webpage/Blog 0 0 0 4 8 4 12 4 
Research 
Institute/University 
0 0 28 56 8 24 16 36 
External  
News Media 
0 0 8 12 12 4 8 4 
Republican 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Government 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 
Other 0 0 48 20 44 40 32 32 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Chapter 5: Amateur Terrorists? Loyalist and Republican solidarity actors online. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Hoffman (1998) suggests that the Internet has made terrorism “accessible to anyone with 
a grievance, an agenda, a purpose or any idiosyncratic combination of the above” (p.185). 
In this chapter, the above proposition is tested through an analysis of Loyalist and 
Republican solidarity websites. Solidarity websites are defined here as websites that 
project messages of support for Loyalist or Republican terrorist groups, but reveal no 
formal link between the webmaster and these organisations. The function and framing of  
solidarity websites will be examined in this chapter. Website function will be analysed to 
determine whether these groups have realised the potential of the Internet as tool for 
organisational linkage and mobilisation. The study will assess whether dissident 
Republicans were more likely to justify political violence on their websites than their 
respective political fronts. It will also examine to what extent the peace frame, which 
differentiates parties such as Sinn Fein from their terrorist organisations, influences the 
content of Loyalist and Republican solidarity websites. The study suggests that there is 
little differentiation between the online framing of amateur terrorists and political fronts. 
Furthermore, there is limited evidence on these websites to suggest their webmasters 
have links to terrorist organisations. The label ‘amateur terrorist’ may be inappropriate, 
given that many of these webmasters use their websites to focus upon the history of the 
Northern Irish conflict, rather than justify contemporary political violence.  
 
AMATEUR TERRORISTS AND THE INTERNET 
 
Tucker (2001) suggests that there has been a “proliferation of amateur terrorists” since 
the early nineties, many of whom have used the Internet to network with like-minded 
actors (p.2). The label ‘amateur terrorist’ can be applied to terrorists “who have little or 
no formal connection to an existing terrorist group” (Hoffman, 1998: 185). The 
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‘Unabomber,’ Theodore Kaczynski, and Timothy McVeigh, the lone terrorist responsible 
for the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, are probably the most well-known amateur 
terrorists. Kaczynski, a University of California mathematician, declared war on society 
as a whole. This was evident in the ‘Unabomber manifesto,’ which described the 
Industrial Revolution as a ‘disaster’ for the human race.141 During his seventeen - year 
campaign, Kaczynski sent homemade bombs to people associated with universities or the 
airline industry, killing three people and wounding twenty - three others (Hoffman, 1998: 
155). In contrast to Kaczynski, Timothy McVeigh was responsible for only one lethal act 
of terrorism. The US army veteran perpetrated the attack on Alfred P Murrah building in 
Oklahoma City in April 1995, which resulted in 168 fatalities. He had been a member of 
the American Christian Patriots, who believed that a secretive elite was planning world 
domination through institutions such as the United Nations. The Alfred P Murrah 
building was targeted because McVeigh believed it was to be a processing centre for 
detention camps in the region.142 These case studies suggest that there is no typical 
amateur terrorist. Any individual may perpetrate political violence if they have the will 
and capacity to do so.  
 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have greatly increased the pool of 
resources available to terrorists who have limited resources in the offline world (Tucker, 
2001:2). It has also enabled lone terrorists to network with established terrorist groups. 
Terrorist groups such as Hamas, have develped a network structure of loosely connected 
autonomous actors, which includes private individuals living outside the Middle East. 
While these individuals are not full members of the organisation, they nevertheless act to 
further the objectives of a terrorist group. Lone terrorists like Ramzi Yousef, the 
‘mastermind’ behind the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing, have often retrospectively 
been linked to decentralised terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda (p.1) Moreover, amateur 
terrorists may benefit from the low-cost communication available on the World Wide 
Web. Whereas terrorists previously required extensive training and knowledge in the 
offline world, this information can now be located online for a relatively low cost. 
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Terrorists may obtain bombmaking instructions from the World Wide Web, and mine 
data on potential targets using ICTs. In addition, terrorists can choose their own frames 
on the Internet, circumventing the ideological refraction of the conventional mass media. 
They no longer need to threaten violence in order for newspapers to print their 
manifestos, as was the case during the Unabomber campaign.143 Yet, amateur terrorists 
may not post incriminating material online which draws attention to their illegal 
activities. In a similar fashion to terrorist groups themselves, they are more likely to use 
the Web covertly for these purposes, while their websites conform to the norms of 
acceptable behaviour online.  
 
LOYALIST AND REPUBLICAN SOLIDARITY WEBSITES 
 
Sample 
 
The material posted on Loyalist and Republican websites was analysed to determine 
whether their webmasters were in fact amateur terrorists. The total population of Loyalist 
and Republican websites is probably undefinable, given the high ‘birth’ and ‘death’ rate 
of websites on the Internet. Therefore, a sample size of 40 websites - 20 Loyalist and 20 
Republican websites – was selected for the study (see Table 5.1). These websites were 
located by entering the names of the 14 proscribed Northern Irish terrorist organisations 
into the basic search facility of the Google and Yahoo Internet search engines.144 The 
links generated by the top 25 search engine results were then analysed to locate the 
websites of Loyalist and Republican solidarity actors.145 The term ‘solidarity actor’ 
referred to a political actor that expressed support for Loyalist or Republican terrorists. 
This did not include cultural projections of the two traditions in the province, such as 
Orange Order and Irish language websites.  
 
[Table 5.1 here] 
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Website Registration Data 
 
The majority of Loyalist websites under analysis were registered with Internet hosts 
based in the United States (see table 5.2). For example, Freewebs, an American company, 
hosted the websites of the Ulster Defence Association and the Birches Guerrilla 
Movement. Two websites, the UVF-The People’s Army and the British Ulster Alliance – 
were registered to a German Internet host, Schlund. In a similar vein to the constitutional 
political parties, few of the Loyalist solidarity websites provided registered postal 
addresses or telephone numbers for their respective webmasters on Whois.net. Only three 
Loyalist websites, including the British Ulster Alliance (www.britishulsteralliance.co.uk), 
provided the name of their respective webmaster. It should be noted that registration 
details for two Loyalist websites, the West of Scotland Ratpack and Yorkshire Loyal, 
could not be located on either Nominet or Whois.  
 
[Table 5.2 here] 
 
The majority of Republican solidarity websites were registered to Internet Hosts based in 
North America (see table 5.3). This reflected the large number of websites in the sample 
that were linked to Irish-American political organisations. For example, the Na Gael 
website (www.nagael.com) was registered via an American subsidiary of Yahoo. 
Whois.net gave Internet users the name of the webmaster and a postal address in the 
United States should they wish to contact the organisation.146 In contrast to the Loyalist 
websites, Republican solidarity sites provided extensive information about their 
webmasters on Whois.net. Five of the Republican websites provided comprehensive 
contact details such as a registered postal address and personal email address. For 
example, the Irish American Unity Conference website (www.iauc.org) provided a 
correspondence address in Washington DC for its webmaster.147 In sum, solidarity 
websites were more likely to be hosted outside the United Kingdom than websites 
maintained by constitutional political parties in the region. However, these websites were 
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not expected to offer support for terrorist organisations in a similar fashion to the ill-fated 
ULISNET website.148 As all of the websites were registered in the United States and 
Europe, they were expected to comply with the norms of acceptable behaviour online. 
 
[Table 5.3 here] 
 
Research Design: Framing 
 
The study was designed to test the hypothesis that some webmasters would purport to be 
members of proscribed terrorist organisations, despite evidence to the contrary on their 
websites. In order to test the amateur terrorist hypothesis, the study analysed how these 
solidarity actors identified themselves on their websites. The information provided by 
each webmaster was scrutinised to determine whether they had any links with a 
proscribed terrorist organisation. The study also examined to what extent the peace frame 
influenced the online framing of Loyalist and Republican supporters. Online framing was 
analysed by examining how each actor used language and images on their websites. It 
was anticipated that the framing of each solidarity website would reflect its webmaster’s 
support for one of the 14 proscribed Northern Irish terrorist groups. For example, actors 
that aligned themselves with the Provisional IRA, would project the peace frame 
espoused by its political front, Sinn Fein. Conversely, opponents of the Belfast 
Agreement on both sides would use their websites to criticise its supporters. Dissident 
Republicans would use their websites to attack Sinn Fein for abandoning the armed 
struggle and participating in the power-sharing institutions. These frames would be 
virtually indistinguishable from those employed by dissident Republican parties, such as 
Republican Sinn Fein. Loyalist amateurs would use identical frames to the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP), highlighting the links between Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA 
on their websites (see chapter 3). However, it was anticipated that solidarity websites 
would refer to the military campaigns of their nominated terrorist organisations. Amateur 
terrorists would use their websites to celebrate the lives of Loyalist and Republican 
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‘martyrs,’ and provide their own history of the Northern Irish conflict. In contrast to 
political fronts, these actors would not have to establish their credentials as democratic 
political parties, nor court the electorate online.  
[Table 5. 4 here] 
 
Research Design: Function 
 
Data was collected during April 2005 to enable a comparison of material posted online by 
these groups.149 These websites were located using the Google search engine and 
archived for future research.150 In order to assess their function, each website was scored 
with reference to the coding scheme used earlier in this thesis (see chapter 3). It enabled 
the websites to be ranked in terms of their interactivity, presentation, organisational 
linkage, and online recruitment. It also enabled a direct comparison between the websites 
of political fronts, amateur terrorists, and other Northern Irish societal groups. The study 
assessed whether Loyalists and Republicans solidarity actors have realised the potential 
of the Internet as a tool for organisational linkage and mobilisation. As discussed earlier 
in this thesis, no political party in Northern Ireland is experiencing a critical multiplier 
effect via their websites, particularly in terms of organisational linkage (see chapter 3). 
Cyberoptimists suggest that the Internet can provide a degree of organisational coherence 
to political actors that ordinarily are incapble of ‘punching above their weight’ in the 
international community. The study assessed to what extent amateur terrorists used the 
Internet to mobilise support for their cause around the globe, particularly in terms of 
recuitment and resource solicitation. It also tested the hypothesis that amateur terrorists 
on both sides would provide more links on their websites than their respective political 
fronts. Loyalist and Republican amateurs would not have to demonstrate their democratic 
credentials by removing all references to terrorism from their websites, such as links 
pointing towards the websites of ethno-nationalist terrorists, such as Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna. The study also determined how Loyalist and Republican actors present their 
frames online. It was anticipated that only large organisations, such as the Irish-American 
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Unity Conference, would possess the resources to afford innovations such as video 
streaming on their websites. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Online Framing:  Pro-Agreement Frames 
 
Few solidarity actors projected the peace frame on their websites. Cairde Sinn Fein, a 
support group for Sinn Fein, was the only Republican actor to express support for the 
peace process on its website. This group used identical online frames to its patron, calling 
for a United Ireland “based on internationally accepted democratic principles.”151 A 
similar pattern emerged from the analysis of Loyalist solidarity websites. Only two 
Loyalist actors expressed support for the peace process on their websites. The Red Hand 
Land website called on Loyalists to engage in the political process. Accordingly, the 
webmaster urged Loyalists to abandon their military campaigns and “use the Internet 
fully to spread our argument.”152 Similar sentiments featured on the Liverpool UDA 
website, although it adopted a more pragmatic approach towards the peace process. This 
group declared its continued support for the peace process, although its webmaster stated 
that the group “would defend Ulster if and when the need arises.”153 Overall, it appeared 
that only groups with close ties to political fronts used their websites to express their 
support for the peace process.  
 
 
Anti-Agreement Frames 
 
The majority of Republicans used their websites to reject the ‘peace frame,’ focusing 
instead on how Sinn Fein had ‘sold out’ the Republican movement. Dissident 
Republicans criticised Sinn Fein for abandoning core Republican values and 
“administering British rule in Ireland.”154 In the opinion of these actors, the Provisional 
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IRA ceasefire had left the Catholic community at greater risk of attack from Loyalist 
paramilitaries, and had failed to remove the ‘British imperialists’ from Ireland. These 
groups often referred to themselves as ‘Fenians’ on their websites, reinforcing the 
perception that Catholics still faced discrimination from the unionist community in 
Northern Ireland.155 For example, the New Republican Forum asserted on its website that 
they would have to “chart a course for the future of the republican struggle due to the 
Provisionals’ collaboration with the London and Dublin governments.”156 These anti-
Agreement sentiments were repeated on the Hardline IRA website. On this website, the 
webmaster declared that the PIRA ceasefire had “nullified the defense of catholics and 
nationalists, and left them vulnerable to brutal attacks from Loyalist paramilitaries.” 157  
 
Loyalist solidarity actors sought to unite the ‘Protestant/Loyalist people’ against the 
‘farce’ of a Good Friday Agreement.158 In a similar vein to anti-Agreement Unionists, 
these actors rejected the notion that political fronts should be differentiated from their 
respective terrorist organisations. Groups such as the British Ulster Alliance used their 
websites to highlight the links between Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA, often referring 
to them as one and the same organisation, ‘Sinn Fein/IRA.’159 These actors also used 
their websites to criticise unionists who supported the Belfast Agreement. For example, 
the webmaster responsible for the Loyalist Network website declared, “the sooner we are 
rid of Trimble and his followers the better for Ulster.”160 Pro-Agreement Unionists were 
criticised for allowing Sinn Fein to enter government before the completion of 
Provisional IRA decommissioning. The Ulster Protestant Movement for Justice 
encapsulated this sentiment in its slogan, ‘No Guns, No Government.”161 The Belfast 
Agreement was also rejected on the basis that it did little to reassure ‘besieged’ Protestant 
communities in Northern Ireland. This was particularly evident in the use of the term 
‘ethnic cleansing’ on Loyalist websites, such as the West of Scotland Ratpack. In one 
article on this website, it was alleged that ‘Sinn Fein/IRA’ were engaged in a campaign of 
intimidation, designed to force Protestants out of the Glenbryn district in North Belfast.162 
In sum, Loyalist and Republicans use their websites to suggest that the Belfast 
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Agreement has left their communities at greater risk from one another.  
 
Justification of political violence 
 
Loyalists and Republicans did not tend to justify contemporary political violence on their 
websites. Only three Republican solidarity actors provided a rationale for ‘armed 
struggle’ on their websites. For example, the webmaster who maintained the Ireland’s 
Own website did little to hide his or her support for the continued military activity of 
dissident Republican organisation, the Real IRA. In an article entitled ‘Guerrilla 
Warfare,’ the webmaster justified the Real IRA military campaign, asserting that Britain 
“has never left any of its so-called colonies without an armed struggle.”163 The support 
for terrorists was often implicit in statements posted on Republican websites, such as Eire 
Saor. The webmaster responsible for this website pledged to “support to any organisation 
fighting for a 32-County Irish Republic free of British imperialism.”164 Similar language 
was used on the website of the Hardline IRA, the organisation stating its desire to “drive 
out the British army in a war of attrition.”165 In general, none of the Republican websites 
carried statements on behalf of proscribed terrorist organisations, such as the Real IRA. 
This was perhaps to be expected, given that Republican terrorists issued press releases 
through the websites of their political fronts (see chapter 3).  
 
Only three Loyalist actors provided a justification for political violence on their websites.  
Loyalists groups also used language on their websites that implied they supported 
contemporary political violence. For example, the Birches Guerrilla Movement (BGM) 
used its website to respond to the growing numbers of Catholics who wished to reside in 
their area. In one statement, the BGM asserted that they would do their utmost to ensure 
that “Robinsonstown has not a single Catholic in its dwelling and shall never have 
either.”166 Two Loyalist solidarity actors appeared to act as intermediaries between the 
paramilitaries and the mass media. The Volunteer website carried a number of statements 
from the North Antrim Brigade of the Ulster Volunteer Force. In one of these statements, 
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the Brigade warned that “members [of the UVF] caught dealing drugs would be court-
martialed and severely dealt with.”167 This resonated with the material posted on the 
Loyalist Voice website, which reproduced statements from the Orange Volunteers. In one 
such article, entitled, ‘We will kill freed IRA, says group,’ the Orange Volunteers 
threatened to kill Republican prisoners who had been granted early release under the 
terms of the Belfast Agreement.168 In sum, the material posted on Loyalist and 
Republican websites did not appear to contravene the terms of anti-terrorist legislation, 
such as the UK Terrorism Act. Accordingly, few of these webmasters justified 
contemporary terrorist atrocities on their websites, or encouraged Internet users to 
perpetrate political violence themselves. 
 
Self-identification 
 
 
The study found that a clear majority of Loyalist and Republican actors chose to remain 
anonymous online. Only Irish-American groups, such as the Friends of Irish Freedom, 
provided extensive information regarding their leadership on their website. This 
organisation, based in New York City, provided the names of all of its high ranking 
officials, such as National Co-Chairmen John Hurley and Charles McLoughlin.169 The 
Irish Freedom Committee website also named all of its senior figures, including National 
Chairman Joe Dillon.170 Elsewhere, webmasters appeared reluctant to reveal their true 
identities on their websites. Most of the websites under analysis contained a disclaimer, 
possibly to prevent the webmaster from prosecution under the terms of anti-terrorist 
legislation, such as the US Patriot Act (2001). For example, the West of Scotland 
Ratpack website contained numerous references to the Loyalist Volunteer Force, 
including pictures of hooded gunmen that were allegedly members of the proscribed 
terrorist organisation. Yet, the website did not provide any information on the identity of 
its webmaster, and carried a disclaimer stating that it did “not speak for the Loyalist 
Volunteer Force.” 171 
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A number of websites in the study purported to be the official web presence of a 
proscribed Northern Irish terrorist organisation, or had Universal Resource Locators 
(URLs) that contained the names of these groups. Yet, upon further investigation, many 
of these websites contained disclaimers stating that they were not linked to proscribed 
terrorist organisations. On the Republican side, the Eire Saor website appeared to have no 
links to the terrorist organisation from which it took its name. This was apparent in the 
first line on the homepage, which described Eire Saor as a “web-based project dedicated 
to the traditional Irish Republican goal of a 32-County Irish Republic free of British 
imperialism.”172 There was also little evidence to suggest the Hardline IRA were a 
terrorist organisation. This webmaster appeared to support any Republican organisation 
that opposed the Belfast Agreement, providing links to a variety of dissident Republican 
political fronts including Republican Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Socialist Party. 
 
Four Loyalist actors in the study shared the name of a proscribed terrorist organisation. In 
a similar vein to the Republican websites, there was little evidence on these websites to 
verify their credentials as terrorist organisations. These websites invariably carried 
disclaimers stating that their webmaster was not a member of a proscribed terrorist 
organisation. For example, the Ulster Defence Association disclaimer stated that its 
webmaster “did not support any terrorist organisation.”173 The Ulster Volunteer Force 
website also contained a disclaimer that denied any links between the webmaster and the 
subject of the website.174In the case of the Fife Loyalists website, the webmaster 
appeared to have accidentally exposed himself as an ‘amateur terrorist.’ This website was 
alleged to be the official web presence of the Ulster Volunteer Force’s West Fife 
battalion. Yet, upon further inspection, the website turned out to be the personal webpage 
of a Fife teenager, known simply as ‘Euan.’ This was revealed through analysis of the 
photograph section of the website, in which ‘Euan’ was seen posing with a group of 
teenagers at a Glasgow Rangers FC football match.175 The Liverpool UDA proved 
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exceptional amongst the websites that shared the title of a terrorist organisation. There 
was no evidence on this website to refute the organisation’s claims that they were linked 
to the Ulster Defence Association.176 Overall, it appeared that Loyalist and Republican 
actors made a conscious effort to remain anonymous on their websites. Although few 
solidarity sites justified contemporary political violence, the majority of webmasters 
nevertheless chose to conceal their identities online. 
 
Images 
 
The images used on solidarity websites illustrated whether their respective webmasters 
supported or opposed the Good Friday Agreement. Pro-Agreement Republicans, such as 
Cairde Sinn Fein used similar images to those employed on the Sinn Fein website. 
Pictures of gunmen and the national flag of Ireland were conspicuous by their absence 
from this website, which featured pictures of Cairde Sinn Fein officials at fund-raising 
dinners on its homepage.177 Nevertheless, the majority of Republican actors used 
‘militaristic’ images on their websites to demonstrate their opposition to the peace 
process. For example, the Irish Freedom Committee used a recurring motif of a baseball 
bat on its website, a weapon associated with paramilitary ‘punishment beatings.’178 The 
Hardline IRA website also projected a violent image of Republicanism, the centrepiece of 
its homepage featuring a Union Jack flag being torn apart by two clenched fists.179 
Elsewhere, Republican actors used iconic Republican propaganda to demonstrate their 
opposition to the Belfast Agreement. For example, the Ireland For the Irish website was 
dominated by a mural of Margaret Thatcher sneezing across the island of Ireland, 
entitled, ‘Get the Brits Out.’180 Republicans also used their websites to laud fallen 
‘comrades,’ such as the ten Republican prisoners who died on hunger strike in the Maze 
prison in 1981. The Hungerstrike Commemorative Web Project  provided pictures of 
each of  the “ten men who died on the doorstep of the British government” during the 
hunger strike.’181 Although this might suggest that these actors supported a particular 
terrorist group, none of the Republican websites contained paramilitary emblems, or 
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pictures of hooded gunmen. 
 
Loyalists used more militaristic images on their websites than their Republican 
counterparts did. Paramilitary insignias were prominent on all of the Loyalist websites 
under analysis, such as the Red Hand Land. This website displayed an Ulster Volunteer 
Force badge on its homepage, leaving Internet users with little doubt that the webmaster 
supported ths proscribed paramilitary organisation. The Loyalist Volunteer Force and the 
Orange Volunteers were also lauded on many of the Loyalist websites under analysis. For 
example, the West of Scotland Ratpack homepage was dominated by a flag, with the 
Loyalist Volunteer Force emblem as its centrepiece.182 Eulogies for “fallen comrades” 
were also common on the Loyalist websites under analysis. For example, the Liverpool 
UDA provided a Ulster Defence Association Roll of Honour on its website, featuring 
pictures of members such as John McMichael who had been killed during the 
Troubles.183 In a similar vein, the Scottish Loyalists website provided articles on a host of 
slain Loyalist leaders, such as UDA Brigadier John Gregg and Loyalist Volunteer Force 
leader Billy Wright.184 Loyalist opposition to the peace process was also conveyed 
through the images of hooded gunmen that permeated their websites. This was 
particularly evident on the Loyalist Voice website, which carried statements from the 
Orange Volunteers. These press releases were listed below a picture of six hooded 
gunmen, all of whom were allegedly members of the Loyalist terror group.185 In a similar 
vein to Republicans, Loyalists turned to murals to demonstrate their opposition to the 
Belfast Agreement. The Greenock Loyalist website was in effect an archive of Loyalist 
murals in East Belfast. This homepage was dominated by a of picture of two gunmen, 
beneath the slogan “Prepared for Peace, Ready for War.”186 In sum, Loyalist and 
Republican amateurs employed more violent images on their websites than their 
respective political fronts. However, Loyalists were more likely to be use paramilitary 
emblems on their websites, perhaps to suggest that they were actual members of these 
organisations. 
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Website Function 
 
Organisational Linkage 
 
 
The study found that Republicans demonstrated the greatest range of organisational 
linkages on their websites. Five Republican websites, including the Irish Anti-Partition 
League, received the maximum score in this category (See Table 5.4). This website not 
only provided links to other Republican websites, such as the Sovereign Nation 
(www.members.aol.com/ir32s), but also to the websites of media organisations, such as 
Reuters (ww.reuters.com).187 Republican solidarity actors were also noteworthy for their 
reciprocation of links with actors engaged in ‘armed struggle’ elseswhere. For example, 
Coiste na n-larchimi was an umbrella organisation for groups and individuals who 
worked with former Republican prisoners. Reflecting the long-established links between 
the Republican movement and Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Coiste na n-larchimi 
website provided links to the websites of Basque separatist prisoner groups, such as 
Senideak (www.senideak.org).188 Yet, not all of the Republican solidarity websites 
provided such an array of links on their websites. Two Republican solidarity actors – 
Fourthwrite and the Irish Northern Aid Committee – did not provide any links on their 
respective websites. 
[Table 5.4 here] 
 
Loyalist actors also reciprocated links with like-minded groups online, including many of 
the actors analysed in the study (see Table 5.5). For example, the Scottish Loyalists 
website provided links to the websites of the West of Scotland Ratpack, Ulster Defence 
Association, and Greenock Loyalists.189 Yet, none of the Loyalist solidarity websites 
provided links to the websites of groups engaged in armed struggle outside the United 
Kingdom. In addition, Loyalist websites did not tend to provide links to the websites of 
universities or external agencies. Nevertheless, a few Loyalist websites did achieve high 
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scores in this section of the coding scheme. The Loyalist Network received the highest 
score of all the Loyalist websites included in the study. This website provided links 
pointing towards a diverse set of websites, including ‘The Ulster Loyalist,’ the Northern 
Ireland Executive, and the Belfast Telegraph.190 Furthermore, the study found that there 
was little to differentiate between Loyalist and Republicans in terms of the number of 
links on their websites. This was illustrated by the analysis of the Scottish Loyalists 
website, which revealed it provided the greatest number of links (142) in the study. In 
sum, amateur terrorists on both sides do not appear to have realised the potential of the 
Internet as a tool for organisational linkage. As was the case in the analysis of political 
front websites, Republicans were the most likely to provide links to the websites of 
external agencies and diaspora communities. However, there was limited evidence to 
suggest that these actors were experiencing a critical multiplier effect in terms of 
organisational linkage. 
 
[Table 5.5 here] 
 
Interactivity 
 
Both Loyalist and Republican solidarity actors offered a relatively low degree of 
interactivity on their websites. Overall, Republicans provided a higher degree of 
interactivity on their websites than their Loyalist counterparts. The Irish American Unity 
Conference received the highest score in this section of the coding scheme (See Table 
5.6). This website enabled Internet users to not just send correspondence to a registered 
postal address, but also to email individual members of its organisation.191 It also 
provided an innovative way for people to express their ‘solidarity’ with the organisation. 
Internet users were invited to add their personal details to a standard email in support of 
the Irish American Unity Conference. Once submitted, this email would be sent to the 
editors of over 400 daily newspapers in the United States.192 The Fourthwrite website 
also encouraged interaction between Internet users and its members. The Republican 
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magazine invited people to contribute to the latest edition of their online journal, 
providing postal addresses and telephone numbers for its editorial staff.193 However, it 
should be noted that two of the Republican websites under analysis – Mise Eire and 
Australian Aid for Ireland – received no score in this category.  
 
[Table 5.6 here ] 
 
Republicans were more likely to solicit resources from Internet users who visited their 
websites than Loyalists. In this respect, the research findings were similar to the pattern 
that emerged from the study of Loyalist and Republican political fronts (See chapter 3). 
The results suggested that some of the Republican solidarity actors were closely 
connected with their respective political fronts. These websites often had self-evident 
titles, drawing attention to the link between the solidarity actor and its nominated terrorist 
organisation. Consequently, it was perhaps no surprise that groups such as Cairde Sinn 
Fein would use their websites to directly solicit resources for the Republican movement. 
After all, Cairde Sinn Fein declared on its homepage that it was “a support group for Sinn 
Fein, the Irish political party striving for the acheivement of a united Ireland.”194 This 
group appealed for assistance from both the United Kingdom and North America on its 
website. The other Republican solidarity websites solicited resources on behalf of 
Republican prisoners and their families. For example, the Irish Republican Political 
Prisoners website provided links to a number of websites dedicated to Irish Republican 
“Prisoners of War.” This website raised funds for these prisoners through the the sale of 
Republican merchandise like books and audio cassettes.195 The Irish Northern Aid 
Committee also sold merchandise to raise funds for Republican prisoners. A range of 
videos and books were available for purchase on this website, along with a t-shirt with 
the slogan ‘Sniper at Work.’ 196 
 
Few of the Loyalist actors in the study provided interactive features like email 
newsletters, postal addresses or telephone numbers on their websites (See Table 5.7). 
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Interaction with most Loyalist actors was limited to an email to an anonymous 
webmaster, as was the case on the Birches Guerrilla Movement website.197 The West of 
Scotland Ratpack and Ulster Defence Association websites provided even less 
opportunity for Internet users to interact with their respective webmasters. On both 
websites, an email webmaster function was listed as “under construction.”198 However, 
these results arguably demonstrated the extent to which these actors were amateur 
terrorists. As discussed earlier, many Loyalist actors purported to be terrorist 
organisations despite compelling evidence on their websites that suggested they were 
private individuals. Thus, websites such as Fife Loyalists would be unlikely to provide 
email addresses for its members, as its membership was probably limited to one private 
individual, namely a Fife teenager known as Euan. 199 
 
[Table 5.7 here] 
 
Loyalist solidarity actors used their websites for the dissemination of propaganda rather 
than generating new revenue streams. Only two of the Loyalist solidarity actors under 
analysis sought to solicit resources from their supporters online. For example, the British 
Ulster Alliance sought to generate revenue through the sale of Loyalist memorabilia. A 
range of t-shirts, mugs, ties, and mousemats – all emblazoned with the Union Jack – 
could be purchased from the British Ulster Alliance, although these items could not be 
obtained direct from the website.200 In a similar vein to the Republican websites, Loyalist 
Voice solicited resources on behalf of prisoners and their families. This website appealed 
for Internet users to make a donation to the Dissident Loyalist Prisoners’ Aid, providing a 
postal address for this organisation.201 In sum, the analysis suggested that Republican 
websites offer more interactive features than their Loyalist counterparts. However, 
similar to political fronts, Loyalist and Republican solidarity actors do not use their 
websites to increase the transparency of their respective organisations.  
 
Online Recruitment Resources 
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Few of the websites under analysis allowed prospective members to apply for 
membership online. The Ulster Protestant Movement for Justice website received the 
highest score in this category, although it did not provide an online application form for 
prospective members (See Table 5.8). This website provided a correspondence address 
for those who wished to apply for membership.202 It was also the only Loyalist solidarity 
website to provide a ‘members only’ section, in wich members could submit a password 
to gain access to restricted material. A large number (14) of Loyalist solidarity websites 
received no score in this section of the coding scheme. As discussed above, it appeared 
that the majority of Loyalist solidarity actors were private individuals who purported to 
be terrorist organisations. For example, Loyalist View did not provide any information 
regarding its membership on its website. Instead, the disclaimer on this website asserted 
that it was for “informational, research purposes only.”203 In addition, Loyalist solidarity 
actors did not provide downloadable propaganda like posters on their websites. The 
Liverpool UDA was one of the few Loyalist solidarity actors to enable Internet users to 
download posters from its website. This website enabled Internet users to download a 
number of desktop backgrounds, one of which featured a group of masked Loyalist 
gunmen engaged in a paramilitary “show of strength.”204 
 
 
[Table 5.8 here] 
 
 
There was little to differentiate between Loyalists and Republicans in terms of online 
recruitment. Consequently, a large number (12) of Republican solidarity websites 
received no score in this section of the coding scheme (See Table 5.9). Yet, some 
Republican solidarity actors, such as the Irish Anti-Partition League, did use their 
websites to advertise the benefits available to those who joined their respective 
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organisations. This Derry - based organisation invited Internet users to apply for one of 
three categories of association with the organisation, namely registered societies, 
associate members, and external correspondents.205 The Irish Northern Aid Committee 
also sought to attract new members using its website. Internet users were able to join the 
organisation for as little as $25, with an online application form  provided on its website. 
206
 Republican websites were also unlikely to provide posters for Internet users to 
download and display in their homes. The Irish Freedom Committee was one of the few 
websites under analysis to provide downloadable propaganda. This website enabled 
Internet users to download a number of articles expressing sympathy for dissident 
Republican terrorists, as well as a list of correspondence addresses for “Republican 
P.O.Ws” that remained in British and Irish prisons.207 Overall, the results appear to 
suggest that Loyalist and Republicans prefer traditional methods of recruitment and 
distributing propaganda. However, an alternative interpretation of the results might be 
that these online terrorists may have no organisation to sustain, as they are private 
individuals masquerading as terrorist organisations.    
 
[Table 5.9 here] 
 
Presentation 
 
Both Loyalist and Republican solidarity actors used plain text and still photographs on 
their websites. This was in contrast to the more sophisticated presentation methods used 
by Northern Ireland’s mainstream political parties on their websites (see chapter 3). Only 
a few of Republican solidarity actors under analysis provided audio and video steaming 
on their websites. The Irish Freedom Committee website received the highest score of all 
the websites under analysis (see Table 5.10). This website provided streaming video 
images, including footage of the trial of Real IRA leader Michael McKevitt and a 
controversial Fox report on the death of the hunger striker Bobby Sands.208 The National 
Irish Freedom Committee website also received a high score in this category. This 
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website provided audio downloads of Radio Free Eireann broadcasts, one of which 
analysed the events surrounding Bloody Sunday.209 The other Republican solidarity 
actors did not provide audio or video facilities on their websites. For example, the 
Australia Aid for Ireland website consisted mainly of plain text punctuated with a few 
photographs, such as a picture of a Republican memorial outside Sydney.210 A similar 
basic web design was evident on the Ireland for the Irish website, which featured a few 
‘grainy’ pictures of Republican gunmen.211 
 
[Table 5.10 here] 
 
A similar set of results was generated by the analysis of Loyalist solidarity websites (See 
Table 5.11). Loyalist solidarity actors did not provide audio or video facilities on their 
websites. The United Loyalist Movement website was notable as it was the only website 
to receive no score in this category. This was partly explained by the fact that this website 
was in effect a Loyalist chat forum, in which Internet users could network with fellow 
Loyalists and discuss pertinent issues.212 There was arguably no need for the United 
Loyalist Movement to employ sophisticated presentation methods on its website, as the 
majority of people who visited it did so in order that they could post to its discussion 
forum. The Ulster Protestant Movement for Justice proved exceptional amongst the 
Loyalist solidarity websites under analysis, using audio streaming and pictures to convey 
their propaganda. This website enabled Internet users to sample music from Loyalist 
bands and download images of Republican atrocities, such as the aftermath of the Omagh 
bomb in August 1998.213 However, in a similar vein to the Republican actors, the other 
Loyalist actors tended to provide only still photographs on their websites. For example, 
only a few photographs of Loyalist ‘P.O.Ws’ punctuated the plain text on the Ulster 
Defence Association website.214 In sum, the study suggested that Loyalist and Republican 
solidarity actors favour static text-based websites over sophisticated methods like audio 
and video streaming.  
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[Table 5.11 here] 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Amateur terrorists? 
 
The study provided insufficient evidence to suggest that these actors were ‘amateur 
terrorists,’ although they did appear to use the Web in a similar fashion to terrorist-linked 
groups. In terms of website function, there was little to differentiate between these 
solidarity actors and political fronts such as Sinn Fein. The Internet provided a space in 
which Loyalist and Republican solidarity actors could define their political ideologies, a 
space that was unavailable to them in the conventional mass media. In addition, these 
actors used their websites to provide their own history of the Northern Irish conflict, 
invariably blaming the ‘other community’ for the Northern Irish conflict. However, 
solidarity actors differed from political fronts in terms of their online framing. Clearly, 
the peace frame had a negligible influence upon the online framing of many Loyalist and 
Republican actors. These solidarity actors criticised the Belfast Agreement on their 
websites, claiming that the peace process had left them at greater risk of attack from the 
‘other’ community. In contrast to political fronts, these actors did not have to convince 
Internet users of their democratic credentials, and could openly refer to terrorist 
organisations on their websites. Consequently, images of hooded gunmen and 
paramilitary insignias were frequently used on the websites of Loyalist and Republican 
supporters. In some cases, solidarity actors provided a justification for political violence 
on their websites, and paid tribute to dissident terrorist organisations that were still 
engaged in armed struggle. 
 
Yet, the webmasters themselves often revealed they were not amateur terrorists on their 
websites. Disclaimers on many of these websites informed Internet users that the 
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webmaster was not affiliated with a proscribed terrorist organisation. In other cases, the 
webmaster inadvertently revealed that they had no links to terrorism, as illustrated by the 
analysis of the Fife Loyalists website. One interpretation of the study might be that 
Loyalist and Republican amateur terrorists produced websites similar to those maintained 
by their respective terrorist organisations. Solidarity actors used their websites to show 
their support for terrorist organisations and their political representatives. In a similar 
vein to political fronts, none of the actors analysed in the study solicited resources for 
proscribed terrorist organisations, nor incited others to perpetrate terrorist atrocities. 
However, it is barely conceivable that terrorist organisations would directly shape the 
material posted on the websites of their supporters, particularly if they are not directly 
affiliated to their organisation. Ensuring that all amateur terrorists adhered to the editorial 
adopted by a political front would seem a tall order, given that many of the websites 
under analysis appeared to be maintained by private individuals based outside the United 
Kingdom. 
 
An alternative interpretation of the study might be that amateur terrorists are unlikely to 
highlight their illegal activity on their websites. The research hypothesis presented in this 
chapter assumed that Loyalist and Republican actors would post incriminating material 
on their websites. There were two factors that militated against these actors posting 
material online that revealed the extent of their terrorist linkages. Firstly, a number of 
websites under analysis did not focus upon the current activities of Loyalist and 
Republcian terrorist groups. In particular, websites dedicated to ‘Prisoners Of Wars,’ with 
self-evident titles such as the Irish Republican Political Prisoners, focused upon raising 
funds for their families. As such, these actors were unlikely to use their websites to 
suggest they themselves were members of a proscribed terrorist organisation. Secondly, 
the hypothesis failed to take account of the legal sanctions that might apply to a 
webmaster if they supported contemporary terrorism on their websites. As was the case 
with political fronts, these actors might face prosecution if they posted material online 
that contravened anti-terrorist legislation such as the UK Terrorism Act. Yet, the results 
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of the study are based upon the evidence that each webmaster is willing to disclose on his 
or her website. While the study suggested many webmasters were fraudulently claiming 
to be members of terrorist organisations, it did not rule out the possibility that these actors 
may be amateur terrorists. It is conceivable that many of these amateurs are using ‘less 
public’ forms of computer-mediated communication, such as email, to plan and 
perpetrate atrocities in the offline world.  
 
Cultural organisations and the peace frame 
 
This research also raises questions as to how the peace frame has influenced the 
worldview of Catholic and Protestant cultural organisations in Northern Ireland. Websites 
dedicated to the Orange Order and the Irish language were not defined as solidarity actors 
as they were considered cultural projections of Northern Ireland’s two main communities. 
Yet, cultural institutions may play a significant role in building support for the Belfast 
Agreement, particularly amongst the Protestant community. Whyte (1990) suggests that 
the Protestant community can be sub-divided into 50 religious denominations (p.28). 
These religious organisations may have a view on the Belfast Agreement that differs 
from that of the constitutional unionist parties. For example, recent studies suggest that 
the Orange Order has between 80,000 and 100,000 members.215 The Order has not had 
any tangible links to a political party since it severed its links to the Ulster Unionist Party 
(UUP) in March 2005, although there does appear to be significant overlap between its 
membership and that of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).216 Conceivably, the 
Orange Order may be influencing the opinion of not just the DUP but also its own 
membership vis-à-vis the peace process. Therefore, future research should consider how 
the online framing of cultural websites differs from the websites analysed in this chapter.  
 
The Zapatista Effect? 
 
These websites may be a manifestation of a social netwar strategy designed to build 
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support for Loyalist or Republican terrorists. Social netwar refers to a form of “conflict 
and crime at societal level, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists 
use network forms of organisation and related doctrines, strategies and technologies 
attuned to the information age” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001: 6). The Ejercito Zapatista 
de Liberacion National (EZLN) were the subject of the first successful social netwar. 
Curiously, the Zapatista netwar occurred with little or no premeditation on the part of the 
EZLN insurgents. Initially, there was little to differentiate between the EZLN military 
campaign in Chiapas and other traditional Maoist insurgencies of the period (Ronfeldt 
and Arquilla, 2001: 177). On 1 January 1994, a group of guerrillas seized control of 
several towns in the Chiapas region to highlight the Mexican government’s 
discrimination against the indigenous people of the Chiapas province. The clashes 
between the insurgents and the Mexican army lasted for 11 days before both sides agreed 
to cease military operations in the region. During the fighting and the subsequent peace 
negotiations, support for the Zapatistas began to mobilise on Internet newsgroups such as 
Chiapas-1 and other sympathetic websites hosted by American universities such as the 
University of Texas (Cleaver, 1997: 7).  
 
The dispersed ‘nodes’ that mobilised in favour of Subcommandante Marcos and the 
Zapatistas included activist non-governmental organisations and individuals from five 
continents, aligned together via a network structure rather than under a traditional top-
down hierarchy (Cleaver, 1997: 2). Arquilla and Ronfeldt use the term ‘swarm networks’ 
to describe these non-governmental organisations, reflecting the speed with which they 
descended upon the Chiapas region during the mid-nineties (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
2001:177). These ‘swarm networks’ raised the international profile of the EZLN 
insurgents within days of the first military skirmishes in January 1994, leading ultimately 
to a jointly agreed ceasefire and a three-year period of protracted peace negotiations. This 
online mobilisation led to increased international scrutiny of the Mexican government 
and a number of strategic gains for the Zapatistas and their supporters. The netwar led to 
two successive Mexican Presidents, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and Ernest Zedillo, halting 
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military operations in Chiapas and engaging in political negotiations with the insurgents 
(Ronfeldt and Arquilla, 2001: 188).  
 
The context in which sub - state actors operate determines whether netwar is a suitable 
vehicle for achieving their political or military objectives. The EZLN insurgents had no 
access to the Internet during their insurrection in January 1994.217 The activities of non-
governmental organisations drew the attention of the global media towards the Chiapas 
region of Mexico, highlighting the grievances of the EZLN insurgents in the process. 
Clearly, Northern Irish terrorists and their political fronts operate in a much different 
political context than the EZLN insurgents. While Subcommandante Marcos had to rely 
upon ‘swarm networks’ to convey EZLN propaganda to international audiences, 
Northern Irish terrorists face fewer restrictions on their use of the conventional mass 
media. Irish terrorism has created international headlines since the outbreak of the 
Troubles in the late 1960s, primarily as a result of the activities of influential Irish 
Diasporas scatttered across the globe. Irish-American support groups have lobbied in 
favour of the Republican movement for over three decades, acheiving some degree of 
influence over US policy vis-a-vis Northern Ireland. Furthermore, Loyalist and 
Republican political fronts have become regular fixtures in the conventional mass media 
since the late nineties, due to their support for the peace process (see chapter 2). In 
contrast to the EZLN insurgents, some political fronts now have the ability to influence 
government policy in the region. In particular Sinn Fein has grown increasingly 
influential as a result of the peace process, receiving two ministeral portfolios in the 
power-sharing institutions that were set up in 1998. Therefore, in some cases, Northern 
Irish terrorists may not need social netwar, as they already possess the means to turn 
government policy in their favour. 
 
Dissident terrorists would be the political actors most likely to benefit from social netwar, 
given their lack of electoral support and political clout. These groups have limited access 
to the conventional mass media, and limited influence over key decision-makers in 
  
 
 
 170 
   
 
Northern Ireland. Yet, dissident terrorists and their supporters are unlikely to attract the 
support of ‘swarm networks,’ a prerequisite for a social netwar. While these groups 
continue to use political violence, they are likely to remain a minority interest with 
limited ability to mobilise supporters across the globe. Political violence is now 
considered less permissible in the region, even amongst the Irish-American groups that 
provided logistical support to the Republican movement during the ‘Troubles.’  
Opposition towards dissident Republicans stirred after the Omagh bombing (August 
1998), which was condemned by groups such as the Irish American Unity Conference on 
their websites.218 Dissident Loyalist groups, such as the Loyalist Volunteer Force, are 
even less likely to persuade global non-governmental organisations to act on their behalf. 
To date, Loyalist terrorists have only been able to develop “weak and thin” support 
networks outside the United Kingdom, despite several million Americans having Ulster 
Protestant ancestry (O’Dochartaigh, 2003: 17). Dissidents on both sides may be unable to 
benefit from a social netwar strategy, as the international community is unequivocal in its 
support for the peace process. Moreover, these actors may be unable to attract an online 
audience for their websites, given their low visibility on Internet search engines and lack 
of regular access to the mass media (see chapter 4). 
 
Yet, netwar is perhaps better understood as a description of events surrounding the the 
Zapatista insurgency in 1994, which marked the first occasion that the Internet had 
facilitated mobilisation on a global scale. The ‘coordinated anarchy’ that characterised 
the pro-Zapatista mobilisation reflected the diverse non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) that took an interest in the Chiapas region of Mexico. For many activists, the 
Chiapas insurrection was a way of gaining greater media exposure for their own broad 
political objectives. Many of the swarm networks used the Chiapas insurrection to voice 
their opposition to the NAFTA treaty. In addition, groups that supported the rights of 
indigenous peoples in Latin America used the Zapatistas to highlight their own 
campaigns. Chiapas encapsulated many of the problems identified by non-governmental 
organisations that were already active in the region, highlighting the potential detrimental 
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effect of the NAFTA treaty upon indigenous people in Latin America. As the Zapatistas 
had struck a particular chord with these groups, they were more likely to use all forms of 
media - including the Internet – to project messages of support for Marcos and his 
insurgent army. Therefore, the Zapatista case study suggests that a successful netwar is 
contingent upon securing support amongst geographically dispersed groups, many of 
whom coalesce around high profile international issues. If a sub-state actor fails to secure 
support amongst such influential international actors, their netwar campaign is less likely 
to generate strategic gains. In sum, a netwar is unlikely to be perpetrated on behalf of a 
dissident Loyalist or Republican terrorist group, as they lack support amongst the 
international community. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Some actors were ‘amateur terrorists’ in the sense that they purported to be terrorists on 
their websites. Many of these webmasters used paramiliary insignias and pictures of 
hooded gunmen on their websites, providing eulogies for ‘fallen comrades.’ The framing 
of Loyalist and Republican amateurs was also clearly influenced by terrorist-linked 
groups, such as the 32 County Sovereignty Committee. Most of the webmasters under 
analysis criticised the Belfast Agreement and its supporters, claiming the peace process 
had left them at greater risk of attack from the ‘other’ community. In contrast to political 
fronts, these actors did not have to convince the electorate that they were cultural 
democrats. Consequently, Loyalist and Republican amateurs frequently highlighted the 
links between political fronts and terrorist groups, and used language which reflected 
their support for ‘armed struggle.’ However, there was negligible evidence on these 
websites to suggest these actors were actually involved in terrorist activity. Many of these 
websites appeared to have no links to the terrorist organisations from which they took 
their names. A large number of webmasters issued disclaimers on their websites, denying 
they had any links to a banned terrorist organisation. Furthermore, none of the 
webmasters risked potential legal sanctions by inciting others to perpetrate political 
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violence, or soliciting resources on behalf of terrorist groups. Yet, one cannot assume 
these webmasters have no links to terrorism whatsoever. Conceivably, they may be using 
more anonymous forms of computer-mediated communication, such as email, to plan and 
perpetrate terrorist atrocities. Irrespective of their links to terrorism, these actors did not 
appear to have realised the potential of the Web as a tool for organisational linkage and 
political communication. These websites did not constitute a new dimension of terrorist 
threat in the region. This form of web activism fell far short of constituting a social 
netwar, illustrating how dissident terrorists have become increasingly marginalised in 
post-conflict Northern Ireland. Indeed, the study suggests that social netwar is merely a 
description of the extraordinary political mobilisation in favour of the EZLN insurgents 
in Chiapas, as opposed to a durable conceptual tool for characterising online political 
activism. 
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 Table 5.1 Loyalist and Republican solidarity websites 
 
 
Loyalist Republican 
Birches Guerrilla Movement Australian Aid for Ireland 
British Ulster Alliance Cairde Sinn Fein 
Fife Loyalists Coiste na n-larchimi 
Greenock Loyalists Eire Saor 
Larne UVF/YCV/RHC Fourthwrite 
Liverpool UDA Friends of Irish Freedom 
Loyalist Network Give Ireland Back to the Irish 
Loyalist View Hardline IRA 
Loyalistvoice.co.uk Hungerstrike Commemorative Web Project 
Red Hand Land Ireland for the Irish 
Scottish Loyalists Irelands Own 
The Loyalist Irish American Unity Conference 
The Volunteer Irish Anti-Partition League 
Ulster Defence Association Irish Freedom Committee 
United Loyalist Movement Irish Northern Aid Committee 
Ulster Online Irish Republican Political Prisoners 
Ulster Protestant Movement for Justice Mise Eire 
UVF-The Peoples Army Na Gael 
West of Scotland Ratpack National Irish Freedom Committee 
Yorkshire Loyal New Republican Forum 
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Table 5.2: Website registration data provided by Loyalist solidarity actors. 
 
 
Website Host Location 
of Host 
Webmaster 
Name 
Webmaster 
Personal 
Email 
Address 
Registered 
Postal 
Address 
Telephone 
Number/Fax 
Number 
Birches Guerrilla 
Movement 
Freewebs USA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
British Ulster 
Alliance 
Schlund Germany IA NIA NIA NIA 
Fife Loyalists Pipex UK IA NIA NIA NIA 
Greenock 
Loyalists 
Yahoo USA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Larne 
UVF/YCV/ 
RHC 
Lycos UK NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Liverpool UDA Fasthosts UK IA NIA NIA NIA 
Loyalist Network Freeserve UK NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Loyalist View Bravenet USA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Loyalist 
Voice.co.uk 
Network 
Solutions 
USA NIA No 
IA 
NIA NIA 
Red Hand Land Freeserve UK NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Scottish Loyalists Calton 
Hosting 
UK NIA NIA NIA NIA 
The Loyalist Wanadoo UK NIA NIA NIA NIA 
The Volunteer Host 
Master 
USA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Ulster Defence 
Association 
Freewebs USA NIA  NIA NIA NIA 
Ulster Loyalist 
Movement 
Bravenet USA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Ulster Online Wanadoo UK NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Ulster Protestant 
Movement for 
Justice 
Pipex UK NIA IA NIA NIA 
UVF-The 
People’s Army 
Schlund Germany IA NIA NIA NIA 
West of Scotland 
Ratpack 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Yorkshire Loyal n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
IA- Information Available 
NIA- No Information Available 
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Table 5.3. Website registration data provided by Republican solidarity actors. 
 
Website Host Location 
of Host 
Webmaster 
Name 
Webmaster 
Personal 
Email 
Address 
Registered 
Postal 
Address 
Telephone 
Number/Fax 
Number 
Australian Aid 
For Ireland 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Cairde Sinn Fein UTV 
Internet 
UK NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Coiste na n-
larchimi 
IEDR Republic 
of 
Ireland 
IA NIA NIA NIA 
Eire Saor Network 
Solutions 
USA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Fourthwrite IEDR Republic 
of 
Ireland 
IA NIA NIA NIA 
Friends of Irish 
Freedom 
Geocities USA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Give Ireland Back 
to the Irish 
Wild 
West 
Domains 
USA IA IA IA IA 
Hardline IRA Geocities USA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Hungerstrike 
Commemorative 
Web Project  
Pairnic USA IA IA IA IA 
Ireland for the 
Irish 
Bravenet USA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Irelands Own Ipower NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Irish American 
Unity Conference 
Network 
Solutions 
USA IA IA IA IA 
Irish Anti-
Partition League 
Wild 
West 
Domains 
USA IA  IA IA IA 
Irish Freedom 
Committee 
Network 
Solutions 
USA NIA IA IA NIA 
Irish Northern Aid 
Committee 
Network 
Solutions 
USA NIA IA IA IA 
Irish Republican 
Political Prisoners 
Pairnic USA IA IA IA  IA 
Mise Eire Tripod USA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Na Gael Yahoo USA IA IA IA IA 
National Irish 
Freedom 
Committee 
Ipower USA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
New Republican 
Forum 
IEDR Republic 
of 
Ireland 
NIA NIA NIA NIA 
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IA- Information Available 
NIA- No Information Available 
 
Table.5.4. Organisational Linkage exhibited on Republican solidarity websites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Solidarity 
Links 
International  
Terrorist 
Links 
Educational  
Links 
Commercial/ 
Non-
Political 
Links  
Number 
of Links 
(>15)  
Score 
(/5) 
Australian Aid For 
Ireland 
1 1 1 1 0 4 
Cairde Sinn Fein 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Coiste na n-larchimi 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Eire Saor 1 1 1 0 1 4 
Fourthwrite 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Friends of Irish 
Freedom 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Give Ireland Back to 
the Irish 
1 1 0 0 0 2 
Hardline IRA 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Hungerstrike 
Commemorative Web 
Project 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
Ireland for the Irish 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Irelands Own 1 1 0 1 1 4 
Irish American Unity 
Conference 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
Irish Anti-Partition 
League 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
Irish Freedom 
Committee 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
Irish Northern Aid 
Committee 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Irish Republican 
Political Prisoners 
1 1 1 0 0 3 
Mise Eire 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Na Gael 1 0 0 0 0 1 
National Irish Freedom 
Committee 
1 0 1 1 0 3 
New Republican Forum 1 1 1 0 1 4 
Mean 0.85 0.6 0.55 0.4 0.45 2.85 
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Table.5.5. Organisational Linkage exhibited on Loyalist solidarity websites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Solidarity 
Links 
International  
Terrorist 
Links 
Educational  
Links 
Commercial/ 
Non-
Political 
Links  
Number 
of 
Links 
(>15)  
Score 
(/5) 
Birches Guerrilla 
Movement 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
British Ulster Alliance 1 0 0 1 1 3 
Fife Loyalists 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Greenock Loyalists 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Larne UVF/YCV/RHC 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liverpool UDA 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Loyalist Network 1 0 1 1 1 4 
Loyalist View 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Loyalistvoice.co.uk 1 0 1 1 0 3 
Red Hand Land 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Scottish Loyalists 1 0 0 1 1 3 
The Loyalist 0 0 0 1 0 1 
The Volunteer 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Ulster Defence 
Association 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
United Loyalist 
Movement 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ulster Online 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ulster Protestant 
Movement for Justice 
1 0 1 0 1 3 
UVF-The Peoples Army 1 0 1 0 1 3 
West of Scotland 
Ratpack 
1 0 1 1 1 4 
Yorkshire Loyal 1 0 0 0 1 3 
Mean 0.8 0 0.25 0.3 0.45 1.8 
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Table 5.6. Interactive features available on Republican solidarity websites 
 
Website Email  
Newsletter 
Bulletin  
Board 
Postal  
Address 
Telephone 
/Fax 
Number  
Email 
Webmaster 
Email  
Individual 
Members 
Resource 
Solicitation 
Score 
Australian Aid 
for Ireland 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cairde Sinn 
Fein 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 
Coiste na n-
larchimi 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Eire Saor 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Fourthwrite 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Friends of Irish 
Freedom 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Give Ireland 
Back to the Irish 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Hardline IRA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Hungerstrike 
Commemorative 
Web Project 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Ireland for the 
Irish 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Irelands Own 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Irish American 
Unity 
Conference 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Irish Anti-
Partition League 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Irish  Freedom 
Committee 
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 4 
Irish Northern 
Aid Committee 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 5 
Irish Republican 
Political 
Prisoners 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Mise Eire 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Na Gael 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
National Irish 
Freedom 
Committee 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 4 
New Republican 
Forum 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 
Mean 0.2 0.15 0.45 0.2 0.85 0.25 0.4 2.5 
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Table.5.7. Interactive features available on Loyalist solidarity websites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Email  
Newsletter 
Bulletin  
Board 
Postal  
Address 
Telephone 
/Fax 
Number  
Email 
Webmaster 
Email  
Individual 
Members 
Resource 
Solicitation 
Score 
Birches Guerrilla 
Movement 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
British Ulster 
Alliance 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 4 
Fife Loyalists 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Greenock Loyalists 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Larne 
UVF/YCV/RHC 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Liverpool UDA 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Loyalist Network 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Loyalist View 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Loyalistvoice.co.uk 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Red Hand Land 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Scottish Loyalists 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
The Loyalist 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 
The Volunteer 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Ulster Defence 
Association 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
United Loyalist 
Movement 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Ulster Online 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Ulster Protestant 
Movement for 
Justice 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
UVF-The Peoples 
Army 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
West of Scotland 
Ratpack 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yorkshire Loyal 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Mean 0.05 0.4 0.2 0 0.8 0 0.15 1.55 
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Table.5.8. Online recruitment resources on Loyalist solidarity websites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Members 
Only 
Section 
Full 
Membership 
Advertised 
Full Membership 
Available via 
Online 
Application 
Downloadable 
Public Relations 
Material 
Score 
Birches Guerilla 
Movement 
0 0 0 0 0 
British Ulster Alliance 0 0 0 1 1 
Fife Loyalists 0 0 0 0 0 
Greenock Loyalists 0 0 0 0 0 
Larne UVF/YCV/RHC 0 0 0 0 0 
Liverpool UDA 0 0 0 1 1 
Loyalist Network 0 0 0 0 0 
Loyalist View 0 0 0 0 0 
Loyalistvoice.co.uk 0 0 0 1 1 
Red Hand Land 0 0 0 0 0 
Scottish Loyalists 0 0 0 0 0 
The Loyalist 0 0 0 0 0 
The Volunteer 0 0 0 0 0 
Ulster Defence 
Association 
0 0 0 0 0 
United Loyalist Movement 0 1 0 0 1 
Ulster Online 0 0 0 0 0 
Ulster Protestant 
Movement for Justice 
1 1 0 1 3 
UVF-The Peoples Army 0 0 0 0 0 
West of Scotland Ratpack 0 0 0 0 0 
Yorkshire Loyal 0 0 0 0 1 
Mean 0.05 0.1 0 0.2 0.4 
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Table.5.9. Online recruitment resources on Republican solidarity websites 
 
 
 
 
Website Members 
Only 
Section 
Full 
Membership 
Advertised 
Full Membership 
Available via 
Online 
Application 
Downloadable 
Public Relations 
Material 
Score 
Australian Aid for 
Ireland 
0 0 0 0 0 
Cairde Sinn Fein 0 1 1 0 2 
Coiste na n-
larchimi 
0 0 0 0 0 
Eire Saor 0 0 0 0 0 
Fourthwrite 0 0 0 0 0 
Friends of Irish 
Freedom 
0 0 0 0 0 
Give Ireland Back 
to the Irish 
0 0 0 0 0 
Hardline IRA 0 0 0 0 0 
Hungerstrike 
Commemorative 
Web Project 
0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland for the Irish 0 0 0 0 0 
Irelands Own 0 0 0 0 0 
Irish American 
Unity Conference 
0 1 0 1 2 
Irish Anti-Partition 
League 
0 1 0 0 1 
Irish  Freedom 
Committee 
0 1 0 1 2 
Irish Northern Aid 
Committee 
1 1 1 0 2 
Irish Republican 
Political Prisoners 
0 0 0 0 0 
Mise Eire 0 0 0 0 0 
Na Gael 0 0 0 1 1 
National Irish 
Freedom 
Committee 
0 1 0 1 2 
New Republican 
Forum 
0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 0.05 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.6 
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Table.5.10. Presentation methods used on Republican solidarity websites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Graphics Frames Sound Video 
Streaming 
Pages Available in 
alternative format 
e.g. PDF 
Score 
Australian Aid for Ireland 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Cairde Sinn Fein 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Coiste na n-larchimi 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Eire Saor 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Fourthwrite 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Friends of Irish Freedom 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Give Ireland Back to the 
Irish 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Hardline IRA 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Hungerstrike 
Commemorative Web 
Project 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Ireland for the Irish 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Irelands Own 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Irish American Unity 
Conference 
1 1 0 0 0 2 
Irish Anti-Partition League 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Irish Freedom Committee 1 0 1 1 1 4 
Irish Northern Aid 
Committee 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Irish Republican Political 
Prisoners  
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Mise Eire 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Na Gael 1 0 0 0 0 1 
National Irish Freedom 
Committee 
1 0 1 0 1 3 
New Republican Forum 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Mean 1 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.2 1.55 
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Table.5.11. Presentation methods used on Loyalist solidarity websites 
 
Website Graphics Frames  Sound Video 
Streaming 
Pages 
Available 
in 
alternative 
format e.g. 
PDF 
Score 
Birches Guerilla Movement 1 1 0 0 0 2 
British Ulster Alliance 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Fife Loyalists 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Greenock Loyalists 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Larne UVF/YCV/RHC 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Liverpool UDA 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Loyalist Network 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Loyalist View 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Loyalistvoice.co.uk 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Red Hand Land 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Scottish Loyalists 1 1 0 0 0 2 
The Loyalist 1 1 0 0 0 2 
The Volunteer 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Ulster Defence Association 1 0 0 0 0 1 
United Loyalist Movement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ulster Online 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Ulster Protestant Movement 
for Justice 
1 1 1 0 0 3 
UVF-The Peoples Army 1 1 0 0 0 2 
West of Scotland Ratpack 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Yorkshire Loyal 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Mean 0.95 0.5 0.1 0 0 1.55 
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Chapter 6: Competing Victimhoods: the websites of Northern Irish residents’ groups 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Cyberoptimists believe that the Internet reduces social context “in or around a message 
transmitted from sender to receiver” (Spears and Lea, 1994: 431). In this chapter, the 
cyberoptimist model will be tested using Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups, 
many of whom are separated by ‘peacelines’ in the ‘offline’ world. Giddens (1995) 
asserts that a positive spiral of communication could reduce inter-communal tensions 
between interface communities in Northern Ireland (p.16). The online framing of these 
groups will be analysed to determine whether they are using their websites to generate 
social capital. The analysis will determine whether these groups are using the Web to 
strengthen in-group identities, or to engage in dialogue with rival interface communities. 
The study also considers whether these groups reveal their links to paramilitary groups on 
their websites, or whether they conceal terrorist linkages in a similar vein to Loyalist and 
Republican political fronts. Website function will also be measured to determine whether 
these groups have realised the potential of the Internet as tool for organisational linkage 
and mobilisation. The study suggests that residents’ groups use their websites to further 
their ‘competition’ of victimhood. Both Loyalist and Republican groups post material on 
their websites that suggests they are constantly under attack from communities situated at 
the other side of the ‘peaceline.’ There is no evidence on the websites of residents’ 
groups to suggest they are using the Internet to promote better community relations in 
interface areas. However, these groups may be using ‘less public’ forms of computer-
mediated communication, such as email, to manage conflict between interface 
communities.  
 
Segregation:  An Inevitable product of Consociationalism? 
 
In this section, the impact of the peace process upon community relations will be 
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discussed. A form of ‘benign apartheid’ has developed in Northern Ireland since the mid 
nineties (O’Connor, 1993: 195). The Good Friday Agreement promoted multiple layers 
of identity and representation, allowing Catholics to identify themselves as Irish while 
their Protestant neighbours could identify themselves as British (Williams & Jesse, 2001: 
571). Societal cleavages were to be recognised, and even encouraged, through the ‘single 
identity’ community development projects that followed the Belfast Agreement. This has 
entrenched divisions between Northern Ireland’s two communities, with some 
commentators claiming that the province can now be divided into two separate Unionist 
and Nationalist polities.219 This ‘benign apartheid’ is evident in the attitudes held by 
Protestant and Catholics towards one other. The early nineties had seen increasing 
numbers of people from both communities express a preference for mixing with members 
of the ‘other’ community (see chapter 2). The early indications are that the Good Friday 
Agreement has reversed this trend. Evidence from the Northern Ireland Life and Times 
Survey (2004) suggests that the two communities have become more ‘isolationist’ since 
1998. For example, the total number of respondents wishing to live in mixed religion 
neighbourhoods fell from 82 percent in 1996 to 73 percent in 1999. The Protestant 
community has seen the biggest shift in attitudes towards the ‘other’ community. A 
higher proportion of Protestants (26 percent) than Catholics (18 percent) said that they 
would prefer to live in neighbourhoods with only their own religion (Hughes and 
Donnelly, 2001). This reflects the widely held perception amongst the Protestant 
community that the Catholic community has been the prime beneficiary of the Good 
Friday Agreement (Hughes and Donnelly, 2004: 573). Polarisation has also been viewed 
in the voting patterns of the two communities since the Agreement was signed in 1998. In 
the most recent Northern Ireland Assembly elections (November 2003) there was a 
notable decline in support for moderate political parties such as the Ulster Unionist Party 
(UUP) and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The anti-Agreement 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein emerged from this election with an 
increased electoral mandate (Wilson and Fawcett, 2004).  
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Increased segregation is possibly the logical outcome of a consociationalist political 
settlement. Consociationalism seeks to ‘manage rather than eliminate’ differences in 
ethnically divided societies (Peleg, 2004: 21). Differences are managed through elite 
cooperation within an inclusive power-sharing executive at national level. At sectarian 
interfaces, consociationalists argue, “good fences make good neighbours” (Lijphart, 
1977: 140). In theory, the potential for conflict in ethnic cleavages is reduced if ethnic 
communities chose to isolate themselves from each other. Thus, voluntary segregation in 
local districts provides an effective method of managing differences between ethnic 
communities. Furthermore, the voluntary nature of this segregation is compatible with the 
civil liberties embedded in pluralist liberal democracies. In pluralist democracies, people 
are free to purchase property in areas that they perceive as being ‘safe’ neighbourhoods.  
 
In Northern Ireland, the majority of people choose to live in politically and religiously 
homogeneous areas that do not include members of the ‘other’ community. In the words 
of a resident of the Fountain enclave in Londonderry, people feel “safe and secure within 
the [interface] area especially with the walls and barricades” (Templegrove Action 
Research Ltd, 1996: 29). The ‘benign apartheid’ critique reflects the continued high 
levels of mistrust and suspicion between the two communities. It also suggests that the 
Good Friday Agreement has perpetuated the ‘zero-sum’ model of Northern Irish politics. 
Yet, the framework of the Good Friday Agreement has not generated segregation and 
polarisation. Residential segregation can be traced back as far as the 17th century 
plantation of Ulster. Hepburn (1994) suggests that patterns of segregation in Northern 
Ireland have increased more in ‘bad times’ than they decrease in good times (p.93). 
Therefore, the Good Friday Agreement may represent a ‘bad time’ in which people have 
returned to the ‘trenches’ of their own communities.   
 
DEFINING THE PROBLEMS OF INTERFACE COMMUNITIES 
 
What is an Interface? 
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An interface is a “conjunction or intersection of two or more territories or social spaces 
which are dominated, contested, claimed by some or all members of the differing ethno-
national groups” (Jarman, 2004: 8). Interfaces are typically located in urban working 
class districts, where Protestant and Catholic populations are highly interspersed. The 
Belfast Interface Project (2004) identifies three different types of interface area in 
Northern Ireland. ‘Enclaves’ are ‘island’ communities like the Short Strand in East 
Belfast. This staunchly Republican area is situated in the middle of an area populated 
predominantly by the Protestant community. ‘Split’ interfaces can be defined as walls or 
boundaries evenly separating two communities. For example, the Westlink motorway 
junction forms a barrier between the Protestant and Catholic residents of the Donegal 
Road in South Belfast. A ‘buffer zone’ is a mixed area, such as the Ballynafeigh district 
in South Belfast that provides a barrier between the two communities (O’Halloran, 
Shirlow, and Murtagh, 2004: 6). Interface areas have suffered disproportionate levels of 
political violence since the outbreak of the ‘Troubles’ in the late 1960s. Approximately 
one third of the victims of political violence between 1966 and 2001 were killed within 
250 metres of an interface (Shirlow, 2003: 81).   
 
Cross-Community Contact 
 
In this section, the problems affecting interface communities are analysed. The erection 
of physical barriers to reduce inter-communal tensions has amplified the ‘siege mentality’ 
of opposing interface communities. Shirlow (2003) asserts that these ‘peacelines’ appoint 
the opposing community as a “menacing spatial formation” (p.81). In particular, there is a 
lack of ‘bridging’ social capital between Loyalist and Republican interface communities. 
Social capital refers to the “institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality 
and quantity of a society’s social interactions” (Griffiths, 2004: 4). Common interests, 
such as language and social class, do not transcend the ethno-political identities of 
communities situated at sectarian interfaces. Consequently, interface communities do not 
  
 
 
 188 
   
 
often interact with their counterparts situated on the other side of the ‘peaceline.’ A 
survey of adults in the Ardoyne and Glenbryn districts of North Belfast illustrates the low 
levels of cross - community interaction across these ‘peacelines.’220 Only 20 percent of 
the Glenbryn residents surveyed used shopping facilities situated in the Ardoyne, while 
18 percent of the Ardoyne residents used the nearest sports complex, situated in the 
Glenbryn district (Shirlow, 2003: 81). Both Catholic and Protestant residents cited the 
fear of attack as the primary reason for their low level of interaction with the ‘other’ 
community (p: 85).  
 
Perceptions of the ‘Other’ Community 
 
Low levels of cross-community interaction have reinforced the negative stereotyping of 
the ‘other’ community amongst interface communities. Protestant residents believe that 
an ‘expansionist’ Catholic community is trying to force them out of areas like North 
Belfast. The Protestant community perceives that their areas are turning ‘green,’ as a 
young Catholic community displaces an ageing Protestant community (Jarman, 2002: 
16). The murals in Loyalist interface areas illustrate this ‘siege mentality.’ Loyalist 
interface communities are demarcated via red, white, and blue kerbstones, the flying of 
Union Jacks, and murals that celebrate Loyalist terrorist groups such as the Ulster 
Volunteer Force. These ‘militaristic’ murals invariably depict men in balaclavas 
brandishing AK47s, alongside provocative political statements such as ‘No Surrender.’221 
Loyalist residents invariably resist efforts by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive to 
allocate houses in their areas to members of the Catholic community. For example, an 
estimated six percent of public sector houses in North Belfast remained unoccupied 
throughout the calendar year of 2004 (North Belfast Community Action Group, 2002: 
27). The majority of these empty houses were located in Loyalist interface areas. In 
March 2004, The Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) had a waiting list of 951 
applicants who wished to move into the North Belfast constituency, the majority of 
whom (82 percent) were members of the Catholic community. (O’Halloran, Shirlow, and 
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Murtagh, 2004: 42). The decision to leave these houses vacant was presumably 
influenced by the objections of local residents, and the potential conflict that might arise 
from Protestants and Catholics living in the same district.   
 
Hughes and Donnelly (2004) assert that Catholics have become more confident about 
their equal status in Northern Ireland since the Belfast Agreement (p.588). This 
confidence is projected via the murals that demarcate the boundaries of Republican areas. 
Republican murals project a more nuanced image of their community than the images of 
‘gunmen in balaclavas’ that greet visitors to Loyalist interface areas. These murals 
convey local opposition to contentious Orange Order marches, and highlight the 
perceived ‘oppression’ of the Catholic community at the hands of the British security 
forces (Rolston, 1995: 5). Nevertheless, this propaganda is underpinned by a high level of 
mistrust towards the Protestant community. The Protestant community is frequently 
accused of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in contested areas like North Belfast. This negative 
stereotyping is often influenced by people’s memories of living under Unionist rule in the 
1960s. Many of the Catholic residents in interface areas have vivid memories of being 
driven out of their homes in the late 1960s, primarily due to the violence of their 
Protestant neighbours (O’Connor, 1993: 160). Furthermore, the Catholic community also 
faced discrimination in terms of public housing provision in the late sixties, as 
highlighted during the Caledon protest in June 1968.222 In sum, the physical barriers at 
interfaces have entrenched the hostility and mistrust between Loyalist and Republican 
communities.  
 
MANAGING INTERFACE VIOLENCE 
 
‘Good Fences Make Good Neighbours’ 
 
In this section, the management of inter-communal violence at sectarian interfaces is 
discussed. There have been two approaches to the management of violence at interface 
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areas since the mid-1990s. The consociationalist model suggests that ‘segmental 
isolation’ can reduce inter-communal violence in ethnically divided societies (Lijphart, 
1977: 140). The construction of ‘peacelines’ between Loyalist and Republican areas is 
congruent with the consociationalist principle that ‘good fences make good neighbours.’ 
This process has continued unabated throughout the nineties, with security barriers 
erected between the White City and Whitewell areas of North Belfast just a few weeks 
after the Good Friday Agreement was signed in June 1998. Security measures have also 
been increased at the ‘peacelines’ themselves. Closed Circuit Television Cameras 
(CCTV) have been deployed to monitor the ‘peacelines,’ and to deter violence between 
the two communities. This has reduced the number of violent incidents in sectarian 
interfaces like Duncairn Gardens in North Belfast. Yet, in many cases, the violence has 
been displaced to nearby streets, creating new interfaces such as Whitewell within the 
same area (Jarman, 2002: 10). The level of violence across interface areas has also 
remained high despite these increased security measures. For example, there were 1,444 
cases of criminal damage, 409 assaults, and 316 cases of rioting recorded in North Belfast 
between 1996 and 1999 (p: 10). The continued high levels of inter-communal violence 
suggest that the consociationalist model is not a ‘good fit’ for the regulation of inter-
communal violence in interface areas. This reflects the absence of certain conditions 
conducive to ethnic conflict regulation under the consociationalist model. There is no 
history of ‘elite’ compromise between Republican and Loyalist interface communities. 
This was demonstrated by the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement in May 1974 (see 
chapter 2). In addition, intra-segment stability has not been achieved despite the 
population transfers of the late 1960s. Loyalist and Republican communities remain 
highly interspersed in contested interface areas like North Belfast.   
 
The Civil Society Paradigm: Community Development 
 
Many community activists suggest that community development is ‘a more pressing 
need’ for the communities they represent, as opposed to the construction of cross -
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community relationships (Hall, 2001: 7). Interfaces tend to be located in urban areas with 
high levels of social and economic depravation. For example, most of Northern Ireland's 
‘peacelines’ are located within the North Belfast electoral constituency. Ten of the wards 
within the electoral constituency are ranked in the 20 percent most deprived areas within 
Northern Ireland (p: 26). In particular, North Belfast has high levels of unemployment, 
and poor public sector housing provision in comparison to the rest of Northern Ireland. 
The North Belfast Community Action Group (2002) reported that 9.4 percent of houses 
in the constituency were ‘unfit’ throughout 2002, compared to the average of 7.3 percent 
across Northern Ireland (p: 26). During the same period, the unemployment level 
recorded in North Belfast (24.1 percent) was over twice the level (9.8 percent) recorded 
across the jurisdiction of Belfast City Council (O’Halloran, Shirlow and Murtagh, 2004: 
11). The Protestant community in North Belfast has been disproportionately affected by 
this social and economic depravation. Recent studies suggest that that Protestants are 30 
percent more likely than Catholics to live in unfit houses in the constituency (p.26).  
 
Many community groups argue that efforts to reduce inter-communal tension are 
undermined by the high levels of social depravation that blight sectarian interfaces. 
Young people living in the shadow of interfaces invariably lack skills, jobs, money, and 
access to facilities such as community centres. This has contributed to a pattern of 
‘recreational violence’ amongst teenagers in interface areas (Jarman, 2002: 29). 
Throwing stones at people living on the other side of an interface may represent a ‘cheap 
night out’ for teenagers in these areas. Consequently, the levels of violence at interface 
areas tend to peak during the school holidays (p.32). Community activists suggest that 
young people who engage in recreational violence might desist if they were given greater 
access to facilities, training, and employment. (Hall, 2001: 25). The ‘siege mentality’ of 
both communities might be relieved if improvements were made to public sector housing 
and local infrastructures.  
 
Yet, not all interfaces are situated in working cla
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and unemployment. Interfaces have developed in rural areas, middle class suburbs, parks, 
open spaces, and shopping centres (Jarman, 2004: 7). These interfaces are often 
demarcated by a turn in the road or a local landmark, rather than a physical structure such 
as a ‘peaceline.’ Some commentators suggest that the existence of segregated working 
class areas allows the middle class to project onto such areas “the image of the bad area 
where bigots live and violence happens as a result” (Smyth, 1996: 45). Evidence from the 
Belfast Interface Project suggests that while working class interface communities are 
more likely to be the victims of violence, they are usually not responsible for these 
attacks (O’Halloran, Shirlow, and Murtagh, 2004:9). The perpetrators of inter-communal 
violence tend to come from the hinterland of interface communities. The emergence of 
middle class interfaces also suggests that community development can only partially 
relieve the ‘siege mentality’ of interface communities. Inter-communal violence in 
middle class suburbs is caused by a variety of non-economic factors, such as contentious 
Orange Order demonstrations. These issues are arguably irresolvable unless there are 
open channels of communication between Loyalist and Republican interface 
communities. 
 
Community Relations and Dialogic Democracy 
 
Community activists assert that the term ‘community relations’ is better understood as 
‘cross-community’ relations (Hall, 2001: 5). In contrast to the community development 
model, community relations projects can be applied to any type of sectarian interface. 
Community relations projects aim to generate ‘bridging’ social capital between interface 
communities. In the summer of 1997, a mobile phone network was piloted to try to 
reduce the inter-communal tensions generated by the contentious ‘Tour of the North’ 
march in North Belfast. Mobile telephones were distributed to nominated individuals 
within both Loyalist and Republican communities in North Belfast. The phones enabled 
these individuals to inform their opposite numbers of potential ‘flashpoints’ when crowds 
gathered on either side of the interface (Jarman, 2002: 43). By 2000, there were similar 
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mobile phone networks in 25 interface areas across Belfast. The mobile phone network 
created a dialogue between Republican and Loyalist interface communities. Nevertheless, 
the network has limited utility in relieving the ‘siege mentality’ of the two communities. 
Indeed, it is conceivable that mobile telephones may be used to organise recreational 
rioting between young people living on either side of an interface.  
 
Loyalist and Republican interface communities are often critical of the coverage they 
receive in the conventional mass media. Protestants feel that the media only want the 
opinions of Catholics (Jarman, 1997: 91). Catholics perceive that the media favour the 
police version of events, and fabricate stories about civil unrest in interface areas (p.64). 
Giddens’ ‘dialogic democracy’ could provide a context in which residents' groups could 
address the causes of inter-communal violence. Giddens asserts that in an ethnically 
divided society, such as Northern Ireland, the creation of a public arena could help 
constrain inter-communal violence (Giddens, 1995: 16). The Internet could provide an 
arena in which these communities could ‘frame’ their own stories and communicate 
directly with members of the ‘other’ community. This has been highlighted as an action 
point for community activists working in interface areas. The North Belfast Community 
Action Group (2002) suggests that an extension of broadband cabling networks could 
provide a means for developing intra and cross-community dialogue (p.80). The Internet 
has the potential to build bridging social capital between communities that are suspicious 
of each other’s intentions. 
 
INTERFACE COMMUNITIES AND THE INTERNET 
 
In this section, the websites of Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups are examined. 
The websites were selected with reference to the conclusions of the Belfast Interface 
Project publication ‘A Policy Agenda for the Interface’ (O’Halloran, C, Shirlow, P, and 
Murtagh, 2004). The names of residents’ groups were entered into the British versions of 
two search engines, Google (www.google.co.uk) and Yahoo (www.yahoo.co.uk), to 
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locate their official websites. The sample [three Loyalist and three Republican] 
represented the total population of Northern Irish residents’ groups available during the 
period of the study (see Table 6.1). The study refers to these groups as either Loyalist or 
Republican with reference to the rhetoric used on their websites, as well as evidence 
presented in the Belfast Interface Project publication.  
 
[Table 6.1 here] 
 
Website Registration Data 
 
Only three of the websites under analysis provided registration details on Nominet.co.uk 
or Whois.net. The Cluan Place was the only residents’ group to register its website with a 
British company, namely Fasthosts. In a similar vein to Republican solidarity actors, the 
Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition registered its website in the United States, with a 
company called Go Daddy. Meanwhile, the Greater Glenbryn Community Initiative 
websites was registered to Schlund, the German host of Loyalist websites such as the 
British Ulster Alliance. In contrast to Loyalist and Republican solidarity websites, the 
webmasters did reveal their identities on the Whois and Nominet websites. For example, 
the webmaster responsible for the Cluan Place website provided both his name and a full 
Belfast postal address for Internet users to contact the organisation. Meanwhile, a contact 
was given for the Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition on its Whois entry. As these 
websites were registered in Europe or North America, it was anticipated that their 
webmasters would self-regulate to comply with the norms of acceptable behaviour 
online.  
 
[Table 6.2 here] 
Research Design: Online Framing 
 
The framing and function of websites maintained by residents’ groups was analysed 
  
 
 
 195 
   
 
during the study. Data was collected during February 2005 to enable a comparison of 
material posted online by these groups.223 Online framing was analysed by examining the 
language and images used by these groups on their websites.224 The study focused upon 
whether these groups were trying to generate bridging social capital via their websites. 
Both Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups claim that they have no real voice in the 
conventional mass media. In addition, the lack of cross-community contact militates 
against the resolution of local disputes, like the route of contentious Orange Order 
demonstrations. The study was designed to test whether Loyalist and Republican 
residents’ groups would use their official web presence to communicate with their 
counterparts on the other side of the ‘peaceline.’ Conceivably, these websites might 
facilitate a form of ‘megaphone diplomacy’ between Loyalist and Republican interface 
communities. In the absence of open channels of communication, residents’ groups might 
use their websites to present information to the media in newsworthy formats. This would 
facilitate communication with community representatives who lived on the other side of 
the ‘peaceline,’ in a similar vein to the interaction between Sinn Fein and the UK 
government during the mid – nineties (see chapter 2).  
 
The study also examined whether residents’ groups would reveal links to proscribed 
terrorist organisations on websites. Anecdotal evidence, which is rarely reported in the 
conventional mass media, suggests that these residents’ groups are manipulated by 
paramilitary organisations. Local journalist Malachi O’Doherty, attending a meeting of 
the Lower Ormeau Concerned Community in July 1995, commented, “the people who 
had gone to call for an end to the protests might as well not have gone at all” (O’Doherty, 
1998: 130). In the meeting, approximately one third of the attendees declared themselves 
to be against further street protests against an impending Orange Order parade in the area. 
Gerard Rice, spokesperson for the residents’ group passed the motion without a vote, 
later declaring that there was a unanimous consensus against the parade.225  
 
Loyalist websites, such as “Sinn Fein and the so-called residents groups in Northern 
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Ireland,” also cast doubt upon the civil society ‘credentials’ of Republican residents’ 
groups. The webmaster responsible for this website asserts that Sinn Fein exerts an 
appreciable influence upon Republican residents’ groups. The paramilitary past of 
Garvaghy Road Resident Coalition spokesperson Brendan MacCionnaith [McKenna] is 
highlighted as evidence that Portadown Orangemen are on the “receiving end of a well 
planned and executed conspiracy.”226 Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has also contributed 
to the conspiracy theories about Republican residents’ groups in Northern Ireland. At a 
meeting in Athboy in 1997, Adams claimed that the Drumcree standoff was the 
culmination of 3 years hard work by [Sinn Fein] activists (O’Doherty, 1998: 176). In a 
similar vein to political fronts, it was anticipated that these residents’ groups would omit 
references to paramilitary organisations, in order to demonstrate their civil society 
credentials.   
 
Website Function 
 
Website function was analysed using the coding scheme developed earlier in this thesis 
(see chapter 3). A point was given to a website if it included one of the features identified 
in the coding scheme. These points were then complied to give an overall score in each of 
the four categories measuring website function, namely interactivity, target audience, 
presentation, and organisational linkage. The presentation, interactivity, and online 
recruitment categories determined how effective these websites were in delivering 
information to a target audience. This allowed a direct comparison between the websites 
of residents’ groups and those maintained by other Northern Irish societal groups, such as 
solidarity actors and political parties. Authors such as Bimber (1998) and Rheingold 
(1993) suggest that the Internet reduces the costs of political mobilisation for political 
groups. The study assessed whether Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups were 
realising the potential of the Internet as a tool for organisational linkage. It was 
anticipated that the Loyalist websites analysed in the study would reciprocate links with 
one another, as all three groups were based in Belfast. Loyalist residents in Glenbryn and 
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White City, separated by just a few streets, would presumably have common interests and 
regular contact with each other in the offline world. Republican residents’ groups were 
also expected to reciprocate links with each other online. In contrast to their Loyalist 
counterparts, Republicans were expected to provide links to a range of other websites. 
Foe example, it was anticipated that these groups would direct Internet users towards the 
websites of groups that opposed Orange Order demonstrations. This reflected the primary 
focus of groups such as the Lower Ormeau Concerned Community, namely to oppose 
contentious Orange Order demonstrations that passed through Republican areas.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Online Framing: Victimhood  
 
Roe, Pegg, Hodges, and Trimm (1999) assert that there are “competing psychologies of 
victimhood” between Northern Ireland’s Protestant and Catholic communities (p.125). 
The study suggested that the Internet perpetuated this competition. In a similar vein to 
solidarity actors, residents’ groups used their websites to suggest they had suffered at the 
hands of the ‘other’ community (see chapter 5). Consequently, the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
featured on all of the websites under analysis. For example, the Short Strand under Siege 
website featured a ‘diary of attacks,’ which alleged that Loyalists from nearby Cluan 
Place were attacking residents on a daily basis between May and June 1998.227 The 
website repeated the threats that were posted on the walls of nearby Loyalist areas, such 
as “Short Strand taigs enter at your own risk.”228 The websites of the Lower Ormeau 
Concerned Community and the Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition focused upon 
contentious Orange Order demonstrations in their districts, highlighting alleged human 
rights abuses against their communities. These residents’ groups also portrayed Catholics 
as second-class citizens on their websites. Invariably, these residents’ groups alleged that 
their rights were suppressed by a combination of the Orange Order, the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (PSNI), and the institutions of the ‘Orange’ state. For example, the 
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Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition declared on its homepage “the residents continue to 
stand strong and struggle for their right to equality, freedom from sectarian 
discrimination and harassment.”229 This resonated with the material posted on the website 
of the Lower Ormeau Concerned Community. Its webmaster discussed the problems 
caused by ‘sectarian’ parades in the area, including “curfews for up to 25 hours, plastic 
bullets, and beatings.”230 
 
Loyalist residents’ groups also focused upon alleged ‘ethnic cleansing’ within their 
districts. Republicans were accused of intimidating local residents within Loyalist 
interface areas. For example, the Cluan Place residents’ group declared on its website, 
“Republicans are trying to ethnically cleanse the area. THEY WILL NOT 
SUCCEED!”231 This website also featured an article written by local MP, Peter 
Robinson, which described the “daily nightmare of living with orchestrated Sinn 
Fein/PIRA violence.”232 This article dismissed the material posted on the Short Strand 
under Siege website as Republican ‘spin.’ The other websites featured accounts of 
alleged Republican intimidation against members of the local community. The White 
City under Attack webmaster claimed that Republicans were responsible for graffiti 
sprayed on derelict houses in the area, questioning why the offenders had not been caught 
on CCTV situated nearby.233 In a similar vein to the Short Strand website, the website 
provided a chronology of alleged Republican attacks in the area. The Greater Glenbryn 
Community Initiative also highlighted vandalism on its website. The webmaster 
responsible for this website was scathing in his criticism of the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (PSNI), claiming “thugs are perfectly free to enter Glenbryn at will, do 
whatever damage they please, with absolutely no response from the muppets in the 
PSNI.“234 Overall, both Loyalists and Republicans used their websites to suggest they 
were victims of ethnic cleansing at sectarian interfaces. These groups did not use their 
websites to promote a dialogue with residents based on the other side of the ‘peaceline.’ 
 
Images 
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The theme of victimhood was also evident in the images used on the websites of 
residents’ groups. All of the Republican residents’ groups used their websites to publish 
pictures of local residents who had allegedly been ‘brutalised’ by either Loyalists or the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). For example, the Lower Ormeau Concerned 
Community website featured images of armoured British Army Saracen vehicles 
‘hemming in’ members of the Catholic community as an Orange Order parade passed 
through the area.235 Similar images featured on the website of the Garvaghy Road 
Resident Coalition. The first page of the Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition website 
featured an image of a woman comforting a man with an open head wound. As if to 
confirm that Northern Irish Catholics are an oppressed minority, the man in the picture is 
wearing a Glasgow Celtic football jersey.236 The Short Strand under Siege website also 
alleged that the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) had ‘brutalised’ the Catholic 
community. This website featured images of local residents displaying injuries attributed 
to PSNI attacks on a peace rally in the Short Strand. A 14-year-old boy appeared in one 
of these images displaying a scar [the site alleges was] caused by a PSNI plastic baton 
round.237 
 
Each of the Loyalist websites under analysis contained pictures of property allegedly 
vandalised by ‘Republican thugs.’ For example, a picture of a row of vandalised derelict 
houses welcomed visitors to the White City under Attack website. The slogan beneath 
these stark images read, “Who lives in houses like these? NOBODY!” 238 The homepage 
of the Greater Glenbryn Community Initiative also drew attention to Republican attacks 
on Loyalist residents. The menu at the top of the screen featured images of boarded up 
houses, PSNI armoured vehicles, and members of the loyalist community displaying 
injuries, presumably caused by Republicans.239 This website was notable as it published 
photographs of Republicans, who the webmaster alleged were involved in a campaign of 
intimidation against Loyalist residents in North Belfast.240 In a similar vein to the 
solidarity actors, the Cluan Place residents used pictures of murals and ‘peacelines’ on 
their website. The central image on this homepage was a mural painted on a gable wall at 
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the interface between Cluan Place and Short Strand. This mural contained a Union Jack 
and the sentence “Cluan Place - 20 families intimidated by Sinn Fein/IRA.”241 In sum, the 
study provided some evidence to support the notion that there is a competition of 
victimhood between loyalist and republican communities situated at sectarian interfaces. 
These groups used images and language on their websites that suggested the community 
situated at the other side of the ‘peaceline’ was besieging them. The online framing of 
these groups appeared more likely to strengthen the bonding social capital of their 
communities, as opposed to generate dialogue with rival residents’ groups. However, this 
observation was congruent with previous analyses of social capital. Putnam (2000) 
suggested that bonding social capital was good for mobilising solidarity in ethnic 
enclaves, as it provided “social and psychological support for less fortunate members of 
the community” (p.22).  
 
Self-Identification 
 
In a similar vein to dissident political fronts, residents’ groups did not reveal any links 
between themselves and terrorist organisations on their websites. Instead, these groups 
used their websites to refute claims that they were being manipulated by terrorist 
organisations. To varying degrees, the Loyalist residents’ groups claimed to be 
representatives of the people living in their areas. For example, the Cluan Place group 
claimed to be the voice of the “good British residents of Cluan Place.”242 The Greater 
Glenbryn Community Initiative issued a disclaimer on its website. In this disclaimer, the 
webmaster declared that “no part of this website has been supported either financially or 
otherwise by ANY companies, funding agencies whether government or private or by 
any individuals.”243 In the case of the White City under Attack website, the civil society 
credentials of the webmaster were less clear. The homepage merely described itself as the 
“official website for White City under attack online.”244 Yet, irrespective of how they 
defined themselves, Loyalist residents’ groups did not name their leadership on their 
websites.  
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A similar pattern emerged from the analysis of Republican websites. These groups also 
established their civil society credentials online, while simultaneously omitting 
information about their leaders from their websites. For example, the Garvaghy Road 
Residents’ Coalition described itself as an “umbrella group set up by the residents of the 
Catholic/Nationalist Garvaghy Road area of the town of Portadown.”245 The name of its 
leader, Brendan MacCionnaith, was conspicuous by its absence from this website. The 
Lower Ormeau Concerned Community also defined itself as a community group, 
asserting on its website, “It was set up solely to campaigns for civil rights for our 
community.” 246 The Short Strand website was remarkably similar to the White City 
under Attack website in terms of self-identification. It also gave no indication as to 
whether this website was sanctioned by a community group. One interpretation of these 
findings might be that local residents, who were not affiliated with residents’ groups in 
the area, maintained these websites. An alternative interpretation might be that these 
websites articulated the view of local residents in the absence of a formally constituted 
residents’ group. At the time of writing, there was no evidence to suggest that the people 
of the Short Strand and White City districts had formed a residents’ group in the offline 
world. In any case, there was insufficient evidence on their websites to make a judgement 
on the sincerity of their claims to represent their local communities. In sum, these groups 
sought to establish their civil society credentials on their websites. However, none of the 
websites under analysis provided information about their members online, despite this 
information already being in the public domain.  
 
WEBSITE FUNCTION 
 
Organisational Linkage 
 
Loyalist residents’ groups demonstrated a greater range of organisational linkages on 
their websites than Republican residents’ groups. The Cluan Place and Greater Glenbryn 
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Community Initiative achieved the highest score in this category of the coding scheme 
(see Table 6.3). These websites tended to provide links pointing towards the websites of 
external news media organisations, Loyalist solidarity organisations, and Northern Irish 
political parties. For example, the Greater Glenbryn Community Initiative website 
provided links to such diverse groups as Disability Action, NHS Direct, and the Ulster 
Protestant Movement for Justice.247 This website was also noteworthy as it was the only 
one to provide links to the websites of the other Loyalist residents’ groups under analysis. 
The Cluan Place website also provided links pointing towards the websites of external 
agencies, organisations such as the Belfast Telegraph, and the University of Ulster’s 
Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN).248 However, there was limited evidence to 
suggest that these groups were using the web to mobilise support from groups based 
outside the United Kingdom. As such, none of the Loyalist websites received a point in 
the ‘International Terrorist Link’ section.  
 
[Table 6.3 here] 
 
Surprisingly, Republicans achieved a lower average score in this category. In contrast to 
Republican amateurs and political fronts, these groups did not provide a broad range of 
links on their websites (see chapters 3 and 5). Like their Loyalist counterparts, these 
residents’ groups did not offer links to ‘international solidarity’ websites. The links 
provided by Republican residents’ groups tended to reflect the ‘single issue’ around 
which these groups formed, namely to oppose Orange Order demonstrations that passed 
through Republican areas. The Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition shared the highest 
score in this category (see Table 6.4). It provided links to websites maintained by groups 
involved in the debate over ‘sectarian’ marches, including the Irish Parades Emergency 
Committee and Orange Watch.249 The Lower Ormeau Concerned Community also used 
its web presence to direct Internet users towards websites that addressed the marching 
issue, such as the Parades Commission for Northern Ireland.250 Short Strand was the only 
group under analysis to receive no score in this section, as it provided no links on its 
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website. Overall, the links page of these websites reflected the single issue around which 
these groups formed. In a similar vein to the analysis of political fronts and amateur 
terrorists, there was limited evidence here to suggest that residents’ groups were 
experiencing a critical multiplier effect in terms of organisational linkage.  
 
[Table 6.4 here] 
 
Interactivity 
 
Republican residents’ groups achieved a higher score in this category than their Loyalist 
counterparts. The websites of the Lower Ormeau Concerned Community and the 
Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition contained the largest number of interactive features 
in the study (see Table 6.5). The Lower Ormeau Concerned Community solicited 
donations from Internet users on its websites, providing bank details and a postal 
address.251 The Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition provided a similar ‘donation’ facility 
on its website. The Friends of Garvaghy Road USA encouraged people living in North 
America to provide material support for the Garvaghy Road community group.252 In 
addition, both these residents’ groups provided postal addresses and telephone numbers 
for Internet users who wished to contact their respective organisations for further 
information. However, despite these websites promoting interaction between Internet 
users and their respective organisations, none of the Republican groups provided details 
about their leadership online. The Short Strand under Siege website received the lowest 
score in this category. It limited interactivity on its website to an ‘Email Webmaster’ 
facility, and did not provide a postal address for written correspondence.253  
 
[Table 6.5 here] 
 
Loyalist residents’ groups provided limited interactivity on their websites (See Table 
6.6). Inclusive of political fronts and amateur terrorists, these websites received the 
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lowest score in this category of all the websites analysed in the thesis. The White City 
under Attack website proved the most interactive of the Loyalist websites analysed in the 
study, providing an ‘Email Webmaster’ facility and a bulletin board.254 The other 
Loyalist residents’ groups limited interactivity on their websites to an ‘Email Webmaster’ 
facility. None of the groups under analysis used their websites to solicit resources from 
sympathisers. Overall, both Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups provided limited 
opportunity for Internet users to contact their organisations online.   
[Table 6.6 here] 
 
Online Recruitment Resources 
 
Both Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups achieved low scores in this category of 
the coding scheme. The analysis suggested that Loyalist residents’ groups did not use 
their official web presence to recruit new members (See Table 6.7). Furthermore, none of 
the websites included a ‘Members Only’ section. This was perhaps to be expected, given 
that none of the Loyalist residents’ groups under analysis referred to their membership on 
their website. Both the Cluan Place and White City under Attack websites did enable 
Internet users to download propaganda onto their desktops. The Cluan Place website 
enabled Internet users to download a Cluan Place booklet, which told the ‘tale of the 
trouble’ at the sectarian interface.255 The White City under Attack website also provided a 
series of posters for Internet users to display, including one drawing attention to the 
murder of a local resident. 256  
 
[Table 6.7 here] 
 
There was little to differentiate between Loyalists and Republicans in terms of online 
recruitment resources. Republican residents’ groups also received low scores in this 
category (See Table 6.8). None of these groups used online recruitment strategies, or 
provided a ‘Members Only’ section. Yet, Republican residents’ groups did enable 
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Internet users to download material from their website in an alternative format. For 
example, the Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition website provided a downloadable map 
of the contentious Orange Order parade, along with a Peace Watch report containing 
statements from local residents.257 Overall, residents’ groups did not appear to use their 
official web presence to draw Internet users into their respective organisations. However, 
this reflected the fact that these groups were essentially a ‘closed shop,’ with membership 
limited to people who lived in Loyalist and Republican areas.   
[Table 6.8 here] 
 
Presentation 
 
Overall, residents’ groups provided little innovation in terms of information delivery 
online, receiving lower scores than both political parties and solidarity actors in this 
category (see chapters 3 and 5). Loyalist residents’ group websites achieved a higher 
score in this category than their Republican counterparts. The Greater Glenbryn 
Community Initiative website received the highest score in this section of the coding 
scheme (See Table 6.9). This website contained a section entitled ‘Media Files,’ which 
included a recorded video statement by local Democratic Unionist Party MP, Nigel 
Dodds. The website also provided video footage of nationalist ‘thugs’ attacking young 
[Protestant] children as they waited to board a school bus.258 The White City under 
Attack also provided video streaming on its website. The documentary film ‘Victims of 
Sinn Fein/IRA,’ produced by the Ulster Protestant Movement for Justice (UPMJ), was 
available for free download on its website. In contrast, the Cluan Place website was 
devoid of multimedia facilities and received a low score in this category.  
 
 [Table 6.9 here] 
 
Republican residents’ groups received low scores in this category (See Table 6.10). These 
groups relied upon text and scanned pictures for information delivery on their websites. 
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As discussed earlier, the Lower Ormeau Concerned Community website contained 
pictures of local residents who were allegedly attacked by the PSNI. This resonated with 
the images used on the websites of the other Republican residents’ groups under analysis. 
For example, pictures of local residents’ protesting against an Orange Order 
demonstration dominated the Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition website.259 Overall, 
the study suggested that residents’ groups provide ‘basic’ websites, devoid of 
technological innovations such as live video streaming.  
 
[Table 6.10 here] 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Why might residents’ groups conceal their links to terrorist organisations online? 
 
There are several reasons why Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups might omit 
leadership details from their websites. A personal email address or phone number could 
be used to issue threats to leaders of these organisations. The fear of being ‘exposed’ as a 
community activist, and subject to attack by the ‘other’ community has been identified as 
a key factor inhibiting community relations’ projects in interface communities (Jarman, 
1997: 102). As discussed in this chapter, North Belfast has seen disproportionately high 
levels of criminal assault and murders compared to Northern Ireland as a whole during 
the ‘Troubles.’ Therefore, members of local residents’ groups might prefer to remain 
anonymous in order to avoid any violent repercussions for themselves, or their families. 
Yet, the appearance of Republican residents’ leaders on television, particularly during 
periods of civil unrest, suggests that fear of personal attack does not explain the omission 
of leadership details from their websites.  
 
The impact on international audiences is arguably of greater concern to Republican 
residents’ groups. Online framing is more likely to have an impact on audiences that do 
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not have access to the Northern Irish media (see chapter 3). Conceivably, international 
audiences might look less favourably upon these residents’ groups if their links to 
paramilitary organisations were publicised on their websites. As a result, residents’ 
groups are unlikely to reveal on their websites that their membership include former 
paramilitary prisoners, such as Brendan MacCionnaith. If they were to reveal terrorist 
linkages, whether historic or contemporary, they might lose support from influential 
diasporas. In sum, residents’ groups are less transparent on their websites than they 
appear to be in the conventional mass media. The websites analysed in the study cast 
little light upon the membership of Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups. Although 
concerns for the personal safety of members might be relevant, the study suggests that 
these groups omit references to terrorism in order to demonstrate their civil society 
credentials. 
 
Bonding or Bridging Social Capital? 
 
Despite allegations of paramilitary orchestration, residents’ groups do appear to articulate 
the interests of their local communities on their websites. In terms of social capital, these 
websites appeared to promote ‘bonding’ social capital within Loyalist and Republican 
communities, as opposed to ‘bridging’ social capital between rival residents’ groups. 
Bonding social capital can be characterised as a form of “sociological superglue that 
creates strong in-group loyalty and occasionally strong out-group antagonism” (Putnam, 
2000: 23). This was illustrated in the study, as residents’ groups invariably blamed the 
‘other’ community for their communal problems. The ‘other’ community, situated at the 
other side of the ‘peaceline,’ was portrayed as an expansionist, invariably violent, and 
homogeneous political entity. The websites allowed residents’ groups to further define 
rather than solve the problems facing their respective communities. The study suggests 
that prospects for ‘dialogic’ democracy are not enhanced via these websites, as they 
represent a series of monologues rather than a dialogue between the two communities.  
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Yet, this also reflects the intended audience for each website, namely members of the 
local community and their supporters. Internet users who visit these websites are likely to 
be sympathetic towards the plight of interface communities (see chapter 4). As discussed 
in this thesis, Northern Irish political actors, whether they are political fronts, amateur 
terrorists, or residents’ groups, use the Web primarily for intra-group communication. 
These actors use their websites to choose their own frames, to circumvent the ideological 
refraction of the conventional mass media. Therefore, it is perhaps no surprise that 
residents’ groups, who feel both the media and policymakers ignore them, use their 
websites to air their grievances. In sum, the webmasters responsible for these websites 
use ‘victimhood’ to generate bonding social capital in interface communities. Bridging 
social capital can only be generated in a neutral political space online, one that can be 
accessed by both Loyalist and Republican communities. Conceivably, these residents’ 
groups may be using less public forms of computer-mediated communication, such as 
email, to facilitate dialogue across sectarian interfaces. 
 
Are these websites a manifestation of consociationalism? 
 
Consociationalists believe that segmental isolation and intra-segmental stability are 
critical to the management of conflict in ethnically divided nation-states. The study 
suggested that the residents’ groups themselves favoured the ‘good fences make good 
neighbours’ principle, with groups such as Cluan Place calling for ‘peacelines’ to be 
strengthened in interface areas. However, Loyalist and Republican interface communities 
are different in character to civil society groups in pluralist democracies, such as the 
Netherlands. The theory of consociationalism was based upon the management of 
societal cleavages in Holland during the late 1960s. Lijphart (1968) asserted that Holland 
was “a nation divided, but not one divided versus itself” (p.59). There were four blocs 
within the Netherlands, each with their own political and social organisations. Yet, 
differences between the blocs were relatively easy to manage, as Holland was a racially 
homogeneous nation, and had a stable and viable democracy (p.59). It is perhaps 
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premature to suggest that Northern Ireland is an example of a consociationalist 
democracy, in a similar vein to the Netherlands. While this may be the logical outcome 
for the peace process, many of the necessary preconditions for a consociationalist 
political settlement have yet to be achieved. Ideally, a balance of power between at least 
three segments, all of equal size, is required to sustain a consociationalist democracy 
(Lijphart, 1977: 55). In Northern Ireland, there are only two segments of almost equal 
size, namely the Protestant and Catholic communities. In addition, intra-segmental 
stability remains elusive, as inter-communal violence has continued unabated at sectarian 
interfaces since the Belfast Agreement. There is also no history of elite cooperation in the 
region (O’Duffy, 1992: 128). Instead, Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland form 
“two quite distinct and separate segments, each with their own social, educational, and 
recreational organisations” (Lijphart, 1977:134).  
 
These websites are perhaps better understood as a manifestation of community relations 
in post-conflict Northern Ireland. The websites analysed in the study provide an outlet for 
the peripheral political actors within Northern Irish civil society, for whom the peace 
process has made little difference. As such, Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups 
use their websites to focus upon grievances that have festered for decades, such as social 
depravation and Orange Order demonstrations. Furthermore, these websites held a mirror 
to a political context that is without precedent. A ‘benign apartheid’ has developed in the 
province since the Belfast Agreement, as Catholics and Protestants increasingly wish to 
live in ‘single identity’ neighbourhoods. Meanwhile, interface communities continue to 
endure inter-communal violence, in much the same way as they did before the Good 
Friday Agreement. There are no residents’ groups based outside the province that have 
operated in a comparable political context, in which ‘low-intensity’ conflict has existed 
for such a long period between highly interspersed ethnic communities.  
 
The Internet: A primary tool of political communication? 
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The frequency of updates on these websites suggests that residents’ groups have yet to 
realise the potential of the Internet as a tool for political communication. The study found 
that there had been no updates on each of the Republican websites for several years. The 
Lower Ormeau Concerned Community could be characterised as an archive, with the last 
update recorded on 9 July 1998.260 This was also evident in the chronology of events 
provided on these websites. The Lower Ormeau Concerned Community and Garvaghy 
Road Residents’ Coalition websites focused upon the Orange Order ‘marching seasons’ 
of 1995-1997, a few months before the Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the political 
reforms that accompanied it. In addition, these websites frequently referred to the police 
as the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), rather than the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (PSNI) that was established in its place in 2001. The Short Strand under Siege 
website was the only Republican site to have been updated since 2003. The most recent 
entry on this website referred to Loyalist attacks on the area that took place in July 
2003.261  
 
Although the White City under Attack provided a UPMJ documentary on its website, 
presumably for journalists to download and incorporate into their media packages, a 
similar pattern emerged in the study of Loyalist residents’ groups. None of these websites 
had been updated in the 12 months prior to the study, as illustrated by the Cluan Place 
website, which had last been updated in January 2003.262 The Greater Glenbryn 
Community Initiative website was the most recently updated, with an article on a Loyalist 
rally uploaded in March 2003.263 Therefore, the study suggests that residents’ groups do 
not use the Internet as a primary tool of political communication. The lack of regular 
updates on these websites suggests that residents’ groups still prefer to use the 
conventional mass media as a tool of political communication. This may reflect the fact 
that the mass media provides a larger audience to residents’ groups than the websites 
analysed in this chapter. Indeed, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the 
online audience for residents’ groups is likely to consist of sympathisers and journalists, 
as opposed to the large audience available to these groups if they gain the attention of the 
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mass media (see chapter 4). In sum, Northern Irish residents’ groups do not appear to 
have realised the full potential of the Internet as a communication device. Although there 
is some evidence to suggest these residents’ groups are using their websites to offer 
support for one another, this does not in itself constitute a critical multiplier effect.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
These websites illustrate the ‘competition of victimhood’ between interface communities. 
In a similar vein to political fronts, residents’ groups use their web presence to portray 
themselves as legitimate members of civil society. In order to achieve this, these groups 
used their websites to refute accusations that they were manipulated by terrorist 
organisations, despite often compelling evidence to the contrary in the conventional mass 
media. Irrespective of their terrorist linkages, these groups did articulate the interests of 
their local communities online. Loyalists highlighted the social and economic 
depravation that blights their local communities, while Republicans focused upon the 
disruption caused by Orange Order demonstrations passing through their communities. 
Both Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups used their websites to suggest that the 
community situated on the other side of the ‘peaceline’ was responsible for inter-
communal violence. Consequently, the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ appeared on all of the 
websites under analysis, usually accompanied by pictures of local residents’ who had 
allegedly been attacked by people from the ‘other’ community. Contrary to the assertions 
made by cyberoptimists, this study suggests that the Internet may erode social capital 
between rival interface communities. Rather than facilitate dialogue between residents’ 
groups, these websites were more likely to generate bonding social capital amongst these 
communities. Yet, these websites were only likely to be viewed by people who are 
sympathetic to the plight of interface communities. The study suggests that these 
websites are a manifestation of the ‘benign apartheid’ that has spread across the province 
since the Good Friday Agreement. Therefore, bridging social capital can only be created 
in an independent arena online, where residents’ groups can freely discuss solutions to 
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communal problems rather than simply redefine their problems.  
 
 
 
Table 6.1 Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loyalist Republican 
Cluan Place Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition 
Greater Glenbryn Community Initiative Lower Ormeau Concerned Community 
White City Under Attack Short Strand Under Siege 
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Table 6.2 Website registration data provided by Northern Irish residents’ groups 
 
 
 
IA – Information Available NIA – No Information Available 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Host Location 
of Host 
Webmaster 
Name 
Webmaster 
Personal 
Email 
Address 
Registered 
Postal 
Address 
Telephone 
Number/Fax 
Number 
Cluan Place Fasthosts UK IA NIA NIA NIA 
Garvaghy 
Road 
Residents’ 
Coalition 
Go 
Daddy 
USA IA NIA IA IA 
Greater 
Glenbryn 
Community 
Initiative 
Schlund Germany NIA NIA IA NIA 
Lower Ormeau 
Concerned 
Community 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Short Strand 
Under Siege 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
White City 
Under Attack 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
  
 
 
 214 
   
 
 
Table 6.3 Organisational Linkage visible on Loyalist Residents’ Group Websites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Solidarity 
Links 
International  
Terrorist 
Links 
Educational  
Links 
Commercial/ 
Non-Political 
Links  
Number 
of Links 
(>15)  
Score 
(/5) 
Cluan Place 1 0 1 1 0 3 
Greater 
Glenbryn 
Community 
Initiative 
1 0 1 1 1 3 
White City 
Under Attack 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Mean 1 0 0.67 0.67 0.33 2.33 
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Table 6.4 Organisational Linkage visible on Republican Residents’ Group Websites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Solidarity 
Links 
International  
Terrorist 
Links 
Educational  
Links 
Commercial/ 
Non-Political 
Links  
Number 
of Links 
(>15)  
Score 
(/5) 
Garvaghy Road 
Residents 
Coalition 
1 0 0 1 1 3 
Lower Ormeau 
Concerned 
Community 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Short Strand  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 0.67 0 0 0.33 0.33 1.33 
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Table.6.5 Interactive features available on Republican Residents’ Group Websites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Email  
Newsletter 
Bulletin  
Board 
Postal  
Address 
Telephone 
/Fax 
Number  
Email 
Webmaster 
Email  
Individual 
Members 
Resource 
Solicitation 
Score 
Garvaghy 
Road 
Residents 
Coalition 
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 4 
Lower 
Ormeau 
Concerned 
Community 
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 4 
Short Strand  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Mean 0 0 0.67 0.67 1 0 0.67 3 
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Table.6.6 Interactive features available on Loyalist Residents’ Group Websites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Email  
Newsletter 
Bulletin  
Board 
Postal  
Address 
Telephone 
/Fax 
Number  
Email 
Webmaster 
Email  
Individual 
Members 
Resource 
Solicitation 
Score 
Cluan 
Place 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Greater 
Glenbryn 
Community 
Initiative 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
White City 
Under 
Attack 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Mean 0 0.33 0 0 1 0 0 1.33 
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Table.6.7 Online recruitment resources of Loyalist Residents’ Group Websites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Members 
Only 
Section 
Full 
Membership 
Advertised 
Full Membership 
Available via 
Online Application 
Downloadable 
Public Relations 
Material 
Score 
Cluan Place 0 0 0 1 1 
Greater 
Glenbryn 
Community 
Initiative 
0 0 0 0 0 
White City 
Under Attack 
0 0 0 1 1 
Mean 0 0 0 0.67 0.67 
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Table. 6.8   Online recruitment resources of Republican Residents’ Group Websites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Members 
Only 
Section 
Full 
Membership 
Advertised 
Full Membership 
Available via 
Online Application 
Downloadable 
Public Relations 
Material 
Score 
Garvaghy Road 
Residents 
Coalition 
0 0 0 1 1 
Lower Ormeau 
Concerned 
Community 
0 0 0 0 0 
Short Strand  0 0 0 1 1 
Mean 0 0 0 0.67 0.67 
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Table.6.9 Presentation and delivery of Loyalist Residents’ Group Websites 
Website Graphics Frames Sound Video 
Streaming 
Pages in 
alternative 
format e.g. 
PDF 
Score 
Cluan Place 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Greater Glenbryn 
Community Initiative 
1 1 1 1 0 4 
White City Under 
Attack 
1 0 1 1 0 3 
Mean 1 0.33 0.67 0.67 0 2.67 
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Table 6.10 Presentation and delivery of Republican Residents’ Group Websites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website Graphics Frames Sound Video 
Streaming 
Pages 
Available in 
format e.g. 
PDF 
Score 
Garvaghy Road Residents 
Coalition 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Lower Ormeau Concerned 
Community 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Short Strand  1 0 0 0 0 1 
Mean 1 0 0 0 0 1 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
This study suggests that both civil and uncivil actors in Northern Ireland are yet to realise 
the potential of the Internet as a tool for political communication. Many of these groups 
appear to use the Internet to supplement their existing relationships with the mass media, 
rather than to adopt innovative forms of political activism like social netwar. Pro-
Agreement groups use their websites to demonstrate their support for the peace process. 
Meanwhile, the Internet may provide a channel of communication for dissidents that is 
not available to them in the conventional mass media. Yet, this research suggests that the 
Internet may not provide a critical mutiplier effect for these marginal groups in terms of 
political mobilisation. These groups need to attract a large audience to their websites if 
their online framing is to influence public opinion at an aggregate level. The key findings 
of this thesis are discussed in sections below.  
 
All Northern Irish political fronts use the Web to establish their credentials as cultural 
democrats 
 
The study suggested that all Northern Irish political parties use their websites to verify 
their democratic credentials. There was little to differentiate between the websites of 
terrorist-linked groups, such as Sinn Fein, and the websites of constitutional parties, such 
as the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Terrorist political fronts posted 
material online that was compliant with the regime created by anti-terrorist legislation, 
such as the UK Terrorism Act (2000). As such, groups such as Sinn Fein and the 
Progressive Unionist Party did not justify contemporary political violence on their 
websites, nor raise funds on behalf of their respective terrorist organisations. Irrespective 
of their continued support for armed struggle, all political parties in the region used their 
websites to suggest they were cultural democrats, committed to democracy “come what 
may” (Richards, 2001: 83). The study suggested that the frames adopted by terrorist-
linked groups were indistinguishable from those used by constitutional political parties. 
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Themes such as equality and shared responsiblity permeated all of the party websites 
analysed in this thesis. For example, Sinn Fein used its website to further the equality 
agenda that was traditionally associated with the moderate nationalist party in the region, 
the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP).  
 
The Internet provides a space for supporters and opponents of the peace process 
 
The online framing of political parties reflected their position vis-a-vis the Good Friday 
Agreement. Pro-Agreement parties used their official web presence to offer support for 
the power-sharing institutions. In this respect, the online framing of these groups had an 
antecedent in the peace frame projected by the mass media in the mid-nineties. However, 
a clear majority of actors under analysis used their websites to criticise the Belfast 
Agreement and its supporters. Anti-Agreement unionists such as the Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP) criticised the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) for sharing power with Sinn Fein. 
In the opinion of these groups, Sinn Fein had yet to demonstrate that it was committed to 
the use of exclusively democratic means to achieve its objectives. Dissident Republicans 
were also critical of the peace process, albeit for a different reason. Groups such as the 32 
County Sovereignty Movement believed that Sinn Fein had abandoned core Republican 
principles, leaving the Catholic community at greater risk of attack from Loyalist 
paramilitaries. In addition, these groups still believed that terrorism was the only way to 
remove the British presence from Ireland. Anti-Agreement sentiments were also evident 
on the websites of Loyalist and Republican supporters. In contrast to dissident political 
fronts, these actors did not have to demonstrate their civil society credentials to the 
Northern Irish electorate. Therefore, many solidarity actors used paramilitary insignias 
and pictures of hooded gunmen on their websites to illustrate their support for armed 
struggle.  
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Loyalist and Republican websites will attract a limited audience 
 
The online audience for Loyalist and Republican websites is likely to be limited to 
Internet users who use the Web for political research, and supporters of Northern Irish 
terrorist groups. In addition, the analysis of Internet usage patterns suggests that these 
Internet users are likely to be male, middle class, well educated and situated in Europe or 
North America. People with no prior knowledge of Northern Irish terrorism may turn to 
Internet search engines to locate information on these organisations online. These search 
engines faciltiate a form of mediated interaction between webmasters and Internet users. 
They will direct Internet users towards ‘more of the same’ organisational websites, rather 
than the websites of Loyalist and Republican political fronts. The sale of priority retrieval 
and the rule of Googlearchy are just two reasons why terrorists may not be visible on 
search engine directories. However, low visibility on search engines may be to the 
advantage of terrorist organisations who remain engaged in armed struggle. These groups 
may not wish to attract a large online audience for fear of compromising future military 
operations.  
 
The threat of amateur terrorism online may be illusory 
 
As Loyalist and Republican amateurs did not have to convince the electorate of their 
democratic credentials, they highlighted the links between political fronts and terrorist 
groups. In a similar vein to political parties such as Republican Sinn Fein, Republicans 
claimed that political violence was necessary because the Provisional IRA ceasefire had 
left the Catholic community at greater risk of attack from Loyalist paramilitaries. 
Loyalists criticsed the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) for allowing ‘unreconstructed’ 
terrorists, in the form of Sinn Fein, to participate in the Stormont Assembly. Support for 
political violence was expressed through the use of militaristic language and paramilitary 
emblems on solidarity websites. Yet, there was limited evidence to suggest that Loyalist 
and Republican solidarity actors themselves were engaged in acts of terrorism. Despite 
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many of these actors purporting to be members of terrorist organisations, many 
webmasters issued legal disclaimers stating they had no links to the paramilitaries. 
Furthermore, none of these webmasters risked potential legal sanctions by inciting others 
to perpetrate political violence, or soliciting resources on behalf of a proscribed terrorist 
organisation. The study suggested that ‘unofficial’ Loyalist and Republican websites did 
not constitute a new dimension of terrorist threat in Northern Ireland.  
 
Loyalist and Republicans use the Web to further their competition of victimhood 
 
Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups upload their grievances into cyberspace. 
Loyalists use their websites to highlight the social depravation that blights their areas, 
while Republicans focus on the disruption caused to their areas by Orange Order 
demonstrations. Residents’ groups on both sides of the sectarian divide claim that inter-
communal violence is solely the responsibility of the ‘other ‘ community. As a result, the 
term ‘ethnic cleansing’ featured on all of the websites maintained by interface 
communities. In addition, residents’ groups used their websites to publish pictures of 
local residents who had allegedly been ‘brutalised’ by either the ‘other’ community or the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). Overall, these websites represent the 
competition of victimhoods between Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups that 
exists in the offline world. As such, these websites are more likely to generate bonding 
social capital, as opposed to creating bridging social capital between communities 
divided by so-called ‘peacelines.’ These websites are a manifestation of the ‘benign 
apartheid’ that has emerged in Northern Ireland since the Belfast Agreement.  
 
SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Do existing patterns of  Internet governance allow terrorists to act with impunity online? 
 
Critics assert that the Internet is ‘pretty much a free for all’ for terrorists due to the failure 
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of nation-states to agree uniform rules regarding ‘harmful’ website content (Penfold, 
2004: 285). As discussed in this thesis, the failure to achieve an international consensus 
on terrorist proscription creates spaces in which terrorists can operate online. For 
example, a ‘pro-terrorist’ webmaster may register their website in a nation-state that does 
not define its subject as a terrorist actor. There is already some evidence to suggest that 
terrorist groups, such as Hamas, move the registration of their website from one nation-
state to another in order to remain online. Moreover, the principles behind the Global 
Internet stipulate that its enabling power should be available to both ‘good and bad 
information and communications behaviour.’264 This can be illustrated by the culture of 
anonymity that has developed around the domain registration system. There is no legal 
requirement for webmasters to provide accurate personal information to companies such 
as Nominet (www.nominet.co.uk) who administer the domain name system. A 
webmaster may request that organisations such as Nominet refrain from publishing their 
personal details on their website. Alternatively, a webmaster may choose to register their 
website via a third party, such as an Internet Host. Conceivably, this may make it more 
difficult for nation-states to identify - and prosecute - webmasters who justify terrorism 
on their websites. 
 
While terrorists may be able to manipulate the patchwork nature of Internet governance 
to their advantage, one cannot assume that they will always do so. The evidence 
presented in this thesis suggests that contextual factors determine the content of ‘pro-
terrorist’ websites. Contrary to our initial hypothesis, dissidents did not register their 
websites outside the United Kingdom in order to post material that would contravene UK 
anti-terrorist legislation. Although some websites were registered in the United States and 
Germany, all of the webmasters under analysis conformed to the norms of acceptable 
behaviour online. As such, none of the webmasters used their websites to justify 
contemporary acts of terrorism, nor solicit resources on behalf of proscribed groups. 
However, this research provided insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
Internet is a form of panopticon, in which webmasters voluntarily adhere to the norms of 
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acceptable behaviour due to the perceived threat of legal sanctions. While some 
webmasters may have removed references to contemporary terrorism for this purpose, the 
majority did so in order to frame themselves as civil society actors. Political fronts used 
their websites to differentiate themselves from the violent activities of Northern Ireland’s 
paramilitaries. For solidarity actors, the Internet provided a space in which they could 
commemorate fallen comrades and provide their own history of the Northern Irish 
conflict. Therefore, the messages posted by these webmasters online did not contravene 
anti-terrorist legislation. However, it is conceivable that these actors are using less public 
forms of computer-mediated communication, such as email, to plan and perpetrate 
atrocities. Overall, the thesis suggests that contextual factors determine the framing and 
function of ‘pro-terrorist’ websites, as opposed to the anti-terrorist regime in Europe and 
North America.  
 
Terrorists, ICTs and soft power: is there a cyber-optimist solution for terrorism? 
 
Crelinsten (2002) characterises terrorism as a form of ‘coercive communication,’ used by 
sub-state actors who ordinarily receive minimal coverage in the mass media (p.83). 
Cyberoptimists believe that the bridging of the ‘digital divide,’ the gap between those 
who are able to benefit from information technology and those who are not, is a 
precondition for resolving terrorism.265 The cyberoptimist model implies that terrorists 
may be able to use their websites to generate soft power, to persuade “others to want the 
same outcomes” (Nye, 2004: 5). As Weinmann (2004) suggests, terrorists might use the 
Web to counter their violent image, to claim they seek a “diplomatic settlement rather 
than the slaughter of innocent civilians” (p.6). This would presumably reduce the need 
for terrorists to perpetrate atrocities in order to generate publicity for their cause. In 
effect, these actors may cease to be terrorists, particularly if their military campaigns 
were designed to gain publicity. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that 
Loyalist and Republican terror groups use their websites to establish their political fronts 
as the driving force of their organisation. For example, pro-Agreement political fronts use 
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their websites to suggest they are ‘cultural’ democrats, committed to using exclusively 
democratic means to achieve their objectives. Hence, themes such as ‘shared 
responsibility’ and ‘equality’ permeate the websites of parties such as Sinn Fein, while 
there are no references to their respective terrorist organisations.  
 
Nye (2004) asserts that soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of 
“willing entrepreneurs and receivers” (p: 16). The cyberoptimist model works on the 
assumption that terrorists will be able to attract an audience to their websites, thus 
reducing their need to perpetrate political violence in order to secure publicity. The 
diversity of the online audience available to terrorists reflects their ability to generate soft 
power. This was illustrated by the analysis of Loyalist and Republican political fronts in 
this study. Due to its central role in the peace process, Sinn Fein has increased its ability 
to attract support from audiences at both home and abroad (see chapter 3). Soft power has 
become integral to the current strategy of the Republican movement, as the Provisional 
IRA ceasefire has remained intact during this period. A transfer of power within the 
Republican movement has accompanied this process, with leadership transferring from 
the IRA Army Council to Sinn Fein in 2001. Due to its unprecedented electoral success 
in recent years, the Sinn Fein website is likely to attract a large, diverse audience online, 
which is familiar with the Republican movement in the offline world. While this could be 
interpreted as evidence of Sinn Fein’s transition from political front to constitutional 
political party, this does not necessarily mean that the Provisional IRA have become 
irrelevant to the Republican campaign for a 32 county Irish Republic. Indeed, one 
interpretation of the Republican movement’s reluctance to announce a permanent 
cessation to hostilities during the late nineties might be that they were keeping their 
options open as to how they would pursue a united Ireland. Nevertheless, Sinn Fein 
appears to have gained soft power because of the Provisional IRA ceasefire.  
 
In contrast, dissident Republican parties have little or no political representation in local 
bodies, and limited appeal to international audiences due to their support for armed 
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struggle. As discussed in chapter 4, the online audience for these groups is likely to 
consist of Internet users who use the Web for political research and their supporters in the 
offline world. Therefore, these groups are likely to view political violence as the only 
effective vehicle for their propaganda. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that 
Northern Irish terrorists may have to abandon political violence in order to gain soft 
power beyond their own narrow constituencies. This may apply to all ethno-nationalist 
terrorist organisations that operate in a democratic political system, in which they possess 
the right to express their political opinions.   
 
Yet, terrorists are differentiated from members of civil society by their use of ‘non-
permissible’ violence, or the threat of such violence. Terrorists perpetrate violence to 
subject a target audience to their ideologies, rather than to gain their approval. This 
violence may be inspired by grievances that lack popular support outside the terrorist’s 
own constituency, as was the case with the Unabomber campaign in the United States 
(see chapter 5). Alternatively, the terrorist may not wish to gain publicity in order to 
influence the opinion of audiences. As discussed in chapter 2, not all terrorists perpetrate 
violence to generate the ‘oxygen’ of publicity. Publicity is less important to state 
sponsors, as they use ‘hired guns’ to covertly bring pressure to bear upon their enemies. 
These actors will continue to perpetrate atrocities, irrespective of whether they receive 
coverage in the mass media. Soft power is probably of little use to these terrorist actors, 
as their violence is not intended to attract new converts to their cause. Therefore, the 
availability of information and communication technologies (ICTs) will not lead to a 
change in strategy for some terrorist actors.   
 
The analysis presented in this thesis suggests that websites present the ‘public face’ of a 
terrorist organisation. Terrorists choose their own frames on their websites, often 
depicting themselves as ‘freedom fighters’ and their opponents as ‘the real terrorists’ 
(Weinmann, 2004: 6). In post-conflict Northern Ireland, Loyalists and Republicans only 
maintain websites under the guise of their political fronts. The online framing of these 
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groups suggests they have no links to Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries, despite 
compelling evidence to the contrary in the mass media. While these political fronts frame 
themselves as legitimate political parties on their websites, their respective terrorist 
groups remain involved in low-level paramilitarism. This form of political violence is 
directed primarily against their own communities, in the form of so-called ‘punishment 
beatings.’ For example, between 1 March 2003 and 31 August 2005, there were 17 
murders committed by paramilitary organisations within Northern Ireland.266 It is perhaps 
no surprise that political fronts omit references to this form of paramilitarism from their 
websites. Revelations about ongoing terrorist activity might further damage relations 
between dissident Republicans and Irish-American diasporas, many of whom remain 
staunch supporters of the peace process. In addition, it is inconceivable that a political 
front would reveal its support for terrorism online, for fear of compromising the security 
of its members. Thus, all Northern Irish terrorists appear to use their websites as a soft 
power resource, while continuing to use traditional forms of hard power, albeit that this 
violence is not directed towards the ‘other’ community. ICTs are an additional mode of 
communication, to be added to traditional forms of terrorist manipulation of the 
conventional mass media. In any particular situation, terrorist organisations may choose 
their strategies from this range of options according to the expected utility of each in that 
context. Terrorists will only abandon their military campaigns if they perceive can 
achieve their political objectives through the political process, as demonstrated by Sinn 
Fein’s integration into the political establishment in Northern Ireland.  
 
The Internet and Ethnic communities: narrowcasting? 
 
Cyberoptimists suggest the Internet will allow sub-state groups to broadcast their 
ideologies to a potential global audience. However, the evidence presented in thesis 
suggests that the Internet is more likely to facilitate the “targeting of specific niche 
audiences,” otherwise known as narrowcasting (Smith-Shomade, 2004: 70). This was 
particular evident in the analysis of Northern Irish residents’ groups online. The Internet 
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appears to further the competition of victimhoods between Loyalist and Republican 
interface communities. Loyalist and Republican residents’ groups use their websites to 
highlight the social and economic depravation that blights their communities, invariably 
suggesting that the community situated at the other side of the ‘peaceline’ is trying to 
ethnically cleanse their areas. As such, the audience for these websites is likely to consist 
of people who have similar experiences of living in interface communities, or those who 
are sympathetic to their plight. These groups use their websites to generate bonding social 
capital amongst their membership, as opposed to bridging social capital between ethnic 
communities situated at sectarian interfaces.  
 
The narrowcasting model can be applied to all sub-state political actors who maintain a 
website. Previous studies of the Internet, such as the Gibson and Ward (2003) analysis of 
Australian political parties, suggest that sub-state groups use their websites for intra-
group communication, as opposed to reaching out to other societal groups online. 
Moreover, the analysis of online audiences presented in this thesis suggests that both civil 
and ‘uncivil’ actors cannot assume that their websites will find an audience beyond their 
own constituencies. In this respect, the new world information order appears strikingly 
similar to the old one (p.79). Yet, if residents’ groups only use their websites to 
communicate with sympathisers, it is perhaps no surprise that these websites have a 
limited capacity to generate dialogue across sectarian interfaces. Ethnic conflict 
regulation necessitates the creation of an independent arena, in which rival communities 
can discuss contentious issues. The Northern Ireland Civic Forum, established under the 
terms of the Good Friday Agreement (1998), constituted an arena in which ‘positive’ 
communication could be encouraged between interface communities. However, it 
struggled with its remit as a ‘consultative’ body alongside the newly constituted Stormont 
executive. In 2002, the Civic Forum was suspended after the collapse of the power-
sharing institutions, and at the time of writing, there are no plans for it to reform in the 
near future (Bell, 2004: 566). The prospects for dialogic democracy in Northern Ireland 
appear slim given the lack of dialogue between communities situated across sectarian 
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interfaces. The websites of residents’ groups are a manifestation of the ‘benign apartheid’ 
that has developed in the province since the mid-nineties. 
 
Electronic bulletin boards might provide a more viable alternative to the Civic Forum, 
enabling Northern Ireland’s two communities to discuss political issues in a neutral 
arena. The BBC Radio Ulster Talkback programme, hosted by David Dunseith, has 
arguably enabled this stream of positive communication in the Province over the past 
decade. This radio show provides a space in which Loyalist and Republican interface 
communities can frame stories from their own perspectives, while the Talkback website 
provides a bulletin board in which listeners can post comments on a wide variety of 
issues.267 For example, people freely exchanged views on these bulletin boards about the 
Drumcree crisis during the mid-nineties.268 Yet, this dialogue is facilitated at the 
discretion of the Talkback production team, who are responsible for moderating these 
bulletin boards. Less public forms of computer-mediated communication may have a 
greater impact in moderating tensions between rival ethnic communities. As discussed in 
this thesis, mobile telephone networks have proved particularly successful in helping 
rival ethnic communities reduce tensions at sectarian interfaces. This communication 
channel could be extended through the exchange of emails between representatives of 
interface communities. Future research into ethnic conflict should consider to what extent 
ICTs construct social capital in other political contexts, whether it be bonding or bridging 
social capital. An analysis of how Israeli and Palestinian groups use the Web would 
provide further evidence as to whether new media technologies can facilitate ethnic 
conflict regulation in divided societies. This research would also determine whether 
contextual factors are critical to the efficacy of the dialogic democracy model proposed 
by Giddens. As Wright (2006) suggests, institutional design may be one of many factors 
that determine “whether people will participate and the form in which they choose to do 
so” (p.94). 
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Do the Cyber paradigms have limitations as analytical tools? 
 
In a recent article in the Sunday Times, Brian Appleyard argued that information 
technology should not be seen as autonomous as it is “utterly background dependent.”269 
This resonates with the analysis of Northern Irish political actors presented in this thesis. 
This research highlights the need for the continuous development of theoretical and 
analytical tools for researching the Internet usage of sub-state groups, which will have the 
capacity to evolve in parallel with technological and contextual developments. For 
example, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that social netwar is merely a 
description of the extraordinary political mobilisation in favour of the EZLN insurgents 
in Chiapas, as opposed to a durable conceptual tool for characterising online political 
activism. Furthermore, the cyber paradigms appear too static to provide a theoretical tool 
for the analysis of web activism without significant modification. The evidence presented 
in this thesis suggests that contextual factors, rather than the traditional focus upon the 
‘digital divide,’ determine how ICTs impact upon the reality of “politics as usual” 
(Norris, 2001:13). The digital divide itself describes the differential between those who 
can benefit from ICTs and those are unable to do so, as opposed to who has access to the 
Internet. Therefore, analytical tools need to incorporate factors that may explain why 
ICTs generate different outcomes for similar actors.  
 
There are three components that need to be added to the cyber paradigms, namely the 
purpose of the web activity, the media environment and the online audience. Firstly, 
researchers should consider what the actor hopes to achieve through their utility of ICTs. 
If the webmaster lacks influence in the ‘offline’ world, or wishes to remain anonymous 
online to avoid detection, their website is likely to make little or no immediate impact on 
‘politics as usual.’ Thus, individual and group objectives are critical to understanding 
how new media technologies influence power relations within nation-states. The Internet 
is used by some political actors as a means of generating soft power, enabling them to 
attract support from a potential global audience. These actors will use the Web to publish 
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their ideologies free from the ideological refraction of the conventional mass media. 
However, the three cyber paradigms presuppose that all political actors will use new 
media technologies for the same purpose, namely to gain political influence. Conversely, 
not all political actors will use information technology to alter power relations within 
their respective polities. For example, the Tullycarnet Ulster Political Research Group 
does not refer to its political objectives on its website, focusing instead upon community 
events such as a children’s disco.270 Residents’ groups may also use their websites to 
strengthen relationships within their own communities, as opposed to influence 
government policy. In a similar vein to residents’ groups, political parties use their 
websites primarily for intra-group communication. Only a few political parties are likely 
to be in a position to influence decision-making within nation-states. The cyber 
paradigms must consider the objectives of sub-state actors if they are to capture how 
politics has evolved in the digital age.  
 
The media environment is also critical to understanding how ICTs affects politics within 
nation-states. Political parallelism, or the extent to which media systems reflect political 
context, is also relevant to Internet usage within nation-states. As discussed by Hallin and 
Mancini (2004), the media should be relatively unrestricted in the United States due to 
the freedom of expression enshrined in the US First Amendment. These rights can also be 
applied to computer-mediated communcation in the same polities. Webmasters and 
Internet Hosting companies often cite ‘First Amendment Rights’ when justifying the 
continued presence of websites that project controversial views, such as ‘pro-terrorist’ 
websites. In contrast, semi-authoritarian nation-states, such as China, will attempt to limit 
dissent, whether it be transmitted via traditional media forms or on the Internet. This 
suggests that the potential of the Internet as a mobilising agent and means of generating 
soft power may be dependent upon the limits placed on the use of these technologies by 
nation-states. As discussed in this thesis, political fronts such as Sinn Fein have received 
routine media coverage courtesy of their electoral success post 1998, in sharp contrast to 
the censorship they faced in the wake of the UK Broadcasting Ban in 1988. Sinn Fein 
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uses its website to provide further evidence of its democratic credentials, to reflect the 
normalisation of its relations with both the conventional mass media and civil society 
itself. Evidently, Sinn Fein would be unable to project this ‘peace frame’ if the nation-
state in which the website was registered defined it as an ‘uncivil’ organisation. Yet, 
nation-states may be unable to limit the soft power of sub-state groups online through 
restrictions on their ability to use the Internet. Diasporas may generate soft power on 
behalf of a sub-state actor that has restricted access to their local mass media, as 
demonstrated by the Zapatista social netwar. Future research should consider the extent 
to which media environment – both domestic and international – determines where a 
webmaster registers his or her website.  
 
The online audience should also be added as a component to the cyber paradigms. After 
all, ICTs will only influence power relations within nation-states if sub-state groups find 
an audience for their websites that is unavailable to them in the conventional mass media. 
The evidence presented in this thesis suggests the online audience is highly fragmented, 
as people use the Internet as a private viewing box. As people use the Internet to pursue 
private interests, only the politically engaged will use the Web for political research. Yet, 
this illustrates another limitation of research into how sub-state actors use the Internet. It 
is virtually impossible to estimate the size and composition of an online audience for a 
particular website. While tools such as Google Zeitgeist provide data about the search 
queries that are “gaining the most growth,” they do not list the most popular queries. In 
addition, these tools tend to be heavily filtered to remove harmful content.271 In addition, 
there is no publicly available information about the number of unique visitors to a 
particular website. An online survey was rejected in this thesis, as the representative 
sampling of the audience was impossible to achieve for similar reasons. Nevertheless, 
this thesis demonstrates that the potential audience for a website may be modelled using 
data already in the public domain, such as Internet surveys conducted by the Oxford 
Internet Institute. This model will enable researchers to assess whether sub-state groups 
are likely to reach a large audience online using their websites.  
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A Thematic approach to content analysis? 
 
The analysis of website function only tells us part of the story when it comes to the Web 
strategy of political actors. In particular, this research illustrates how the coding scheme 
developed by Gibson and Ward (2000, 2004) has limited utility in the analysis of online 
frames. It suggests that a thematic approach towards content analysis is more flexible in 
terms of the requirement to adapt to change. For example, analysis of website function 
may tell us very little about Web 2.0, the section of the Internet that provides a platform 
for user-generated content.272 Research conducted using qualitative frames is able to chart 
how online discourse evolves in line with political developments in the ‘offline’ world. 
For example, this thesis provides a snapshot of Loyalist and Republican online discourse 
during a period of conflict transformation, as terrorist-linked groups move into 
mainstream politics and the number of violent terrorist incidents decrease. This was 
reflected in the themes of equality and shared responsibility that permeated the websites 
of Loyalist and Republican parties. The ‘benign apartheid’ that has developed across the 
province was also highlighted by the thematic approach used in this thesis. The Gibson 
and Ward coding scheme, in its current formulation, was also unable to capture the 
‘competition of victimhoods’ that was evident on the websites of rival residents’ groups. 
Overall, the research design provides a model for future research into how the online 
framing of terrorist-linked groups evolves during a period of conflict transformation. 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Further analysis of Loyalist and Republican web activism 
 
This thesis could provide the foundations for a number of strands of future research. The 
study could to be extended over a longer period, to chart how the media strategies of 
terrorist groups evolve alongside the normalisation of relations between political fronts 
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and the conventional mass media. In addition, the scope of the research could be 
extended to enable a comparison between the material posted on websites and the content 
of terrorist publications such as An Phoblacht/Republican News. Web blogs could be 
incorporated into this study to determine whether user generated content differs from that 
produced by amateur terrorists and terrorist-linked parties. The proposed study would 
provide evidence as to whether political fronts use local newspapers to issue threats to 
their own communities, while simultaneously using their websites to portray themselves 
as mainstream political parties to international audiences.  
 
This research also raises questions as to the expectancy value model behind each ‘pro-
terrorist’ website. This sociological theory, devised by Fishbein in the 1970s, provides an 
insight into what motivates webmasters to post material on the Internet. The model works 
on the assumption that people will choose behaviours that have the “largest combination 
of expected success and value.”273 It depicts people as goal-oriented beings, who will 
weigh up the positive and negative consequences of each action before choosing their 
behaviour. While there are clearly social and psychological factors that influence all 
forms of decision-making, this model could be used as the basis for a series of interviews 
with the webmasters responsible for Loyalist and Republican websites. In order to 
determine what the expected value of a website was to an actor, each webmaster could be 
asked to provide the same information, such as the cost of maintaining the website, and 
any feedback they had received from Internet users. Although this evidence might be 
largely anecdotal, it would help identify the webmaster’s target audience. This would 
provide further evidence as to whether the Internet facilitates a form of narrowcasting for 
sub-state groups, as opposed to the cyberoptimist theory that it will enable these groups 
to broadcast to a potential global audience.   
 
The Internet as a tool for active terrorists in a different political context 
 
Future research should consider how terrorist actors use the Internet in a different 
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political context. With the historic agreement between the Democratic Unionist Party and 
Sinn Fein leading to the restoration of devolution in May 2007, it is reasonable to 
speculate that a new era of cross-community relations may be evolving in Northern 
Ireland. While the ‘benign apartheid’ critique may detract from claims that the conflict is 
over, there has been a notable reduction in the level of paramilitary violence in the 
region. The most recent report from the Independent Monitoring Commission, published 
in April 2007, stated that the number of paramilitary-style assaults in the Province had 
fallen by 32 percent, when compared with statistics taken during the same period the year 
before.274 As Northern Ireland enters a post-conflict era, the web activism of terrorist-
linked parties has become virtually indistinguishable from that of constitutional political 
parties (see chapter 3).  
 
Therefore, one of the recommendations for future research would be a comparative study 
looking at the web activism of terrorist organisations in the Middle East. After its victory 
in the Palestinian Assembly elections of January 2006, Hamas may be developing a 
modus operandi that is congruent with the dual strategy employed by Sinn Fein 
throughout the 1980s, commonly referred to as ‘the ballot box and the armalite.’275 A 
preliminary empirical analysis of the Hamas web presence suggests that their online 
framing may be evolving in a similar fashion to Republican discourse. Conway and 
Reilly (2006) assert that the English-language version of official Hamas website is 
devoted to constitutional political issues, framing the organisation as a moderate force 
within the region (p.10). However, in contrast to the Republican movement, Hamas 
continues to maintain a website under the guise of its military wing, the Qassam 
Brigades. This website focuses upon the movement’s military activities, and can be 
characterised as a ‘virtual monument’ for the dead shudhada [martyrs] (Weinmann, 2006: 
83). Future research into the web activism of Hamas should employ analytical tools 
similar to those employed in this thesis, perhaps over a longer period. A longitudinal 
study would chart how the online frames adopted by Hamas evolve in response to 
political events, such as a terrorist atrocity or another election victory. It would also 
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determine whether the Sinn Fein model, whereby the political front evolves into a 
constitutional political party, is replicable in vastly different political contexts, and what 
role ICTs play in this process.  
 
The Internet as a tool for radicalisation in the United Kingdom 
 
In the United Kingdom, there have been a series of terrorist attacks perpetrated by 
Islamic fundamentalists, including the London bombings in July 2007 and the foiled 
attack on Glasgow Airport in July 2007. Future research should examine whether the 
Web is a prime venue for the radicalisation of Muslims, as was suggested by FBI director 
Donald van Duyn in September 2006.276 In particular, this research should consider the 
role that the Internet plays in the radicalization of protest from discourse to violence. 
Although the scale of radicalisation online is hard to estimate, there is already some 
evidence that Islamic fundamentalists are using the Internet as part of their overall 
strategy to indoctrinate young British Muslims. For example, three men were sentenced 
to ten years in prison in July 2007 for running a network of extremist websites in the 
United Kingdom. Evidence from the trial showed that these men had uploaded guides for 
making suicide vests, along with videos of the murders of Nick Berg and Daniel Pearl on 
to the Internet. In addition, one of the men arranged travel to Iraq for would-be suicide 
bombers. 277 Analysis of other ‘pro-Al Qaeda’ websites would provide further evidence 
as to how the Web is used to radicalise young Muslims.  
 
This research would also provide evidence of how the UK Terrorism Act (2006) has 
changed the media environment in the United Kingdom. As discussed in this thesis, the 
anti-terrorist regime governing Web behaviour allowed Loyalist and Republican 
webmasters to proclaim their support for paramilitary organisations, provided they did 
not incite terrorism nor justify contemporary terrorist atrocities. Under the new UK anti-
terror legislation, webmasters that express support for Islamic fundamentalists on their 
websites may face greater restrictions than Loyalist and Republican webmasters. A new 
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offence, the encouragement of terrorism, has been introduced to enable the prosecution of 
webmasters who use their websites to radicalise young Muslims. This bans webmasters 
from making statements that ‘glorify the commission or preparation of terrorist offences, 
whether in the past, future or generally.’278 The proposed research would examine 
whether, in light of this new legislation, self-regulation is common amongst ‘pro-
terrorist’ webmasters who reside in the United Kingdom. As was the case with Loyalist 
and Republicans, many of these webmasters might use legal disclaimers to avoid 
prosecution and the potential closure of their websites. Alternatively, ‘pro-terrorist’ 
webmasters may choose to register their websites in a sympathetic country, safe in the 
knowledge that they will not face prosecution for using the web as a tool for 
radicalisation.  
 
SUMMARY 
 
This thesis illustrates how Loyalist and Republican discourse has evolved since the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998. Terrorist-linked parties, such as the 
Progressive Unionist Party, use their websites to suggest they are cultural democrats, 
committed to using exclusively democratic means to achieve their objectives. In order to 
verify their democratic credentials, political fronts have adopted frames that are virtually 
indistinguishable from those used by constitutional political parties in the region. Thus, 
themes such as equality and shared responsibility permeate the websites of terrorist-
linked parties, such as Sinn Fein. These websites also make little or no reference to the 
links between political fronts and their respective terrorist organisations. In contrast, 
Loyalist and Republican amateurs often use paramilitary insignias on their websites to 
demonstrate their opposition to the peace process. For these actors, the peace process has 
left them at greater risk of attack from paramilitaries in the ‘other’ community.  However, 
the study found that these websites did not constitute a new dimension of terrorist threat 
to the peace process. Many of the webmasters who purported to be terrorists on their 
websites issued legal disclaimers on their websites to deny terrorist linkages. In addition, 
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these websites were compliant with the norms of acceptable behaviour, as they did not 
solicit funds on behalf of banned terrorist groups, nor incite others to perpetrate political 
violence.  
 
Elsewhere, the thesis suggests that the Web has reinforced the ‘benign apartheid’ that has 
developed in Northern Ireland since the Belfast Agreement. Analysis of residents’ group 
websites suggests that they further the competition of victimhoods between Loyalist and 
Republican interface communities. Both sides use their web presence to claim that they 
were constantly under threat of attack from the community situated at the other side of 
the ‘peaceline.’ As a result, these websites appear incapable of fostering bridging social 
capital between interface communities. Moreover, the thesis suggests that there will be a 
limited online audience for both civil and uncivil actors in Northern Ireland. The online 
audience for these actors is likely to consist of Internet users who use the Web for 
political research and Loyalist and Republican supporters in the offline world. Thus, ICTs 
will continue to have a limited impact upon ‘politics as usual’ within Northern Ireland. 
 
This research highlights the need for the continuous development of theoretical and 
analytical tools for researching the Internet usage of sub-state groups which will have the 
capacity to evolve in parallel with technological and contextual developments. In their 
current formulation, the three cyber paradigms are unable to provide a theoretical tool for 
the analysis of web activism, particularly with the advent of Web 2.0. The dissertation 
proposes a thematic approach towards content analysis that is more flexible in terms of 
the requirement to adapt to change. In particular, this thesis identifies three components 
that might explain why ICTs generate different outcomes for similar actors, namely the 
media environment, the available audience, and purpose of the web activism. It also 
suggests that the online audience for a particular actor can be modelled using data already 
in the public domain, from sources such as the Oxford Internet Institute. Modelling the 
audience allow researchers to assess whether an actor is likely to generate soft power 
using their website. The thesis provides a model for future research into how the online 
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framing of terrorist-linked groups evolves during a period of conflict transformation. 
Future research should consider whether the Sinn Fein model, whereby the political front 
evolves into a constitutional political party, is replicable in vastly different political 
contexts, and what role ICTs play in this process.  
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Appendix 1: Email sent to webmasters responsible for websites used in thesis. 
 
Dear Webmaster, 
 
 
I am a PhD candidate based at the University of Glasgow. My research focuses upon the 
use of the Internet by Northern Irish political actors. I would like to reference your site in 
my dissertation. My supervisor, Dr Sarah Oates is available for consultation if required. 
A summary of the research findings will be sent to you upon completion of the project.  
 
 
In anticipation of your cooperation 
 
 
 
Paul Reilly  
 
University of Glasgow 
Adam Smith Building 
40 Bute Gardens 
Glasgow 
G12 8RT 
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APPENDIX 2: SCREENSHOTS OF WEBSITES USED IN THESIS. 
 
 
NORTHERN IRISH POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL FRONTS 
 
 
1.Republican Sinn Fein 
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2.Tullycarnet UPRG 
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3.Democratic Unionist Party 
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4.Social Democratic and Labour Party 
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LOYALIST SOLIDARITY WEBSITES 
 
1. Ulster Protestant Movement for Justice 
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2.Scottish Loyalists 
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3. Birches Guerrilla Movement 
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4.The Loyalist 
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REPUBLICAN SOLIDARITY WEBSITES 
 
 
1.Hardline IRA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 299 
   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
2.Irish American Unity Conference 
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3.Irelands Own 
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4.New Republican Forum 
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APPENDIX 3: IMAGES OF SECTARIAN INTERFACES IN BELFAST (JUNE 2005). 
 
Picture of Short Strand/Cluan Place interface, taken from Short Strand perspective.  
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Picture of Cluan Place/Short Strand interface take from Cluan Place perspective. 
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Image of Lanark Way security gates, dividing Springfield Road and Shankill Road. 
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Image of peaceline taken at Cupar Way, West Belfast. 
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Image of peaceline in Glenbryn district, North Belfast. 
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Image of Holy Cross school, North Belfast. 
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Anti-Orange Order mural, Lower Ormeau Road. 
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Image of New Barnsley PSNI station, Highfield estate, West Belfast. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
